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ABSTRACT
One of the preventive measures to situations akin to world financial crises increasingly
forwarded is effective internal audit function (IAF) (e.g., Imhoff, 2003; Mohamad &
Muhamad Sori, 2011). Internal audit, a component of corporate governance, continues
to evolve due to changes in business strategies and requirements placed on it by
legislators. The roles of internal auditors and audit committees (ACs), the key personnel
in IAFs, are changing to a more value-added approach as business strategies move
towards corporate sustainability and organisational excellence. Suggestions forwarded
to improve the performance or determining the quality of IAF include effective
involvement of ACs in internal audit activities, the employment of competent internal
auditors and determining the impact of internal audit on corporate governance (e.g.,
Mohamad & Muhamad Sori, 2011, Sarens, 2009, Turley & Zaman, 2007). Research on
the quality of internal audit has focussed mainly on the relationships of internal audit
with internal control and ACs (e.g., Fadzil, Haron, & Jantan, 2005; Mat Zain &
Subramaniam, 2007; Turley & Zaman, 2007). However, none has linked the impact of
internal audit performance to corporate governance.

This study provides an agency of value view, explaining the effectiveness of IAF and its
impact on corporate governance. Using a convergent mixed methods approach, the main
findings from survey data collected from corporate members of the Institute of Internal
Auditors Malaysia are compared and integrated with perspectives from chief audit
executives of selected public listed companies interviewed. The factors investigated are
the structure of the IAF, activities of best practices in internal auditing, ACs’
involvement as stated by the Malaysian public listing guidelines (Bursa Malaysia, 2000,
2009b) and the World Bank’s corporate governance framework (World Bank, 1991).
An exploration on the extent of collaborations and combined assurances in internal audit
is also carried out.

The primary analysis on the probability of an effective IAF and profiling of the internal
audit activities, level of AC involvement and areas of corporate governance is made
using the Rasch model. Non-parametric tests are also used to determine the statistical
significance of the relationships of the components investigated. In-depth interview data
are analysed using template analysis.

ii

The findings support the establishment of an in-house IAF with a definitive team size
and professional expertise for an effective IAF. Other IAF components are member
experience, combined audit activities and collaborations of audit activities. Although
these other components are not significantly related to the effectiveness of IAF, the indepth interviews provided more explanations on their importance in internal audit. An
important structure of the IAF is the AC’s oversight role. The findings also indicate that
the level of ACs’ involvement in the reviews of each stage of the internal audit process
contributes to the overall effectiveness of IAF. Due to issues in staffing and the
changing business environment, collaborations particularly in risk management,
information technology audits and quality audits, are increasingly being used as a
strategy in internal audit to provide value add services. Further, as suggested by Sarens
(2009), the level of internal audit performance could now be identified to its impact on
corporate governance, for example such as in areas of expenditure management,
revenue management, analysis of data and conflict resolution.

The results have implications on the policy regarding internal control for public listed
companies, favouring an in-house internal audit function as opposed to outsourcing the
function, to address the recommendations on the effectiveness of ACs and its
relationship with IAFs. The practice of internal audit in future should be more
collaborative to harness the expertise and experience of other departmental personnel in
producing effective internal audit, ultimately creating a greater impact on corporate
governance.

Keywords: Internal audit, audit committee, corporate governance, performance,
collaborations, combined assurance, Rasch model
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Redefining Internal Audit Performance: Impact on Governance

1.1. Introduction
This thesis examines the effectiveness of the internal audit function (IAF), the
involvement of audit committee (AC) with the internal audit activities and the impact of
internal audit on corporate governance in the Malaysian context. This chapter presents
the background to the research, followed by the significance of the study, research
questions and objectives and the research methods. The chapter concludes with the
structure of the thesis and the chapter summary.

1.2. Background to the Study
The role of an internal auditor varies from providing independent assurance to acting as
management advisor (Deloitte, 2010). In the early 1980s in the Asia Pacific, internal
auditors were perceived to be doing traditional financial auditing work (Cooper, Leung,
& Wong, 2006). By the 1990s, more than 50% of chief executive officers in Malaysia
and Hong Kong perceived that the role of internal auditors was to provide independent
evaluation on the effectiveness of management (Cooper, Leung, & Mathews, 1996).
From 2000 onwards, the role is focused more towards monitoring compliance, internal
controls and the performance of management programs (Zakaria, Selvaraj, & Zakaria,
2006). Another area gaining importance in the business community is the support given
by internal auditors to ACs in the assessment of risk management and risk processes
(Soh & Martinov-Bennie, 2011). Elsewhere, such as in the US, the evaluation has
extended to environmental management systems (Tucker & Kasper, 1998). Based on
the roles outlined above, internal auditing has had some impact on good governance,
which is the particular interest of this study.

When Adam Smith (1776) raised the issue of conflicting interests of agents such as
managers and general workers in managing firms, he was elucidating on the owners’
motivation to realise the greatest possible value on capital employed. As a counter
measure, and to instil confidence in agents, Jensen and Meckling (1976) reasoned that
self-monitoring – internal audit – is undertaken. It is assumed that in self-monitoring,

1
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the purposeful placement of internal audit in the corporate structure, which is mandatory
for Malaysian public listed companies, contributes to the quality of good governance.

In the global economy of the twenty-first century, good governance has become a
central issue. One of the most important events of the 1980s was the emergence of
corporate failures, which later escalated to global financial crisis. The consequences of
corporate failure were demonstrated in Australia by the collapse of the National Safety
Council of Australia in the 1980s and the Pyramid Building Society in Victoria in 1990
(Somerville, 2006). These were followed by the fall of the HIH group, with a deficiency
of AUD5.3 billion, in 2001 (George & Malane, 2003). In America, Enron Corporation
filed for bankruptcy in 2001 after incurring losses of US$62 billion through
manipulation of financial statements by the company executives, including the
undertaking of risky business activities. Then in 2002, telecommunications company
WorldCom collapsed, with losses of approximately US$11 billion (Somerville, 2006).

Malaysia is not an exception to corporate failures. The first highly publicised corporate
scandal began with the Bumiputera Malaysia Finance case in Hong Kong, called the
BMF scandal, in the 1980s. The irregular loans of almost RM2.5 billion to the Carrian
Group were irrecoverable (Mohamad & Muhamad Sori, 2011; The Malaysian Bar,
2008). Later, several corporate turmoils, starting from 2004, dubbed as mini-Enrons,
involving Media Holdings Bhd, Southern Bank Bhd. and Transmile Group Bhd.
(Associated Press, 2007; T. H. Lee, Ali, & Kandasamy, 2008; Shah, 2007) were
exposed. Prior to the shake-ups in Malaysia, the Asian financial crisis in 1997/98 started
with the devaluation of the Thai currency immediately after the fall of Finance One, the
biggest finance company in Thailand (Garay, 2003). These financial debacles created
the impetus for better governance in Malaysia and the South East Asian region; this
impetus continues to be a lively topic (Liew, 2007; Mohamad Ariff, Othman, &
Ibrahim, 2007).

In the context of preventing corporate failure, questions have been raised about the
performance of internal audit and other forms of auditing (Imhoff, 2003; Mohamad &
Muhamad Sori, 2011). It is worldwide practice for the internal auditors to report to the
AC, not to management (except for administrative interface), in order to maintain their
independence (The Institute of Internal Auditors [IIA], 2012b; Verschoor, Barrier, &
Rittenberg, 2002). The effective relationship between internal auditors and the AC is
2
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crucial in ensuring good governance (MIA Professional Standards & Practices [MIA],
2012). There is, therefore, potential for better functioning of business in Malaysia to
optimise the internal audit function and audit committee interaction. Presumably, an
effective internal audit would depend on the understanding of the internal audit process
and, importantly, of the impact of internal audit on corporate governance.

The complexities in internal audit relate to the objective and scope of the audit. There
are various internal audits such as management audit, operational audit, systems audit,
compliance audit, computer audit, probity audit, value-for-money audit, and quality
audit (Pickett, 2003; Whittington & Pany, 2004). These various types of audits create
pressure for management and employees, giving them the perception that they are
constantly being audited. This poses the question of effectiveness of the audits and how
such audits would aid the organisation in its corporate governance and risk assessment
framework. Questions surrounding the effectiveness of internal audits need to be
addressed in the light of reliance placed on the IAF as one of the mechanisms of
corporate governance.

1.3.

Rationale and Significance of this Study

1.3.1. Rationale
This study on internal audit is motivated by the increasing focus by the Malaysian
government on the capital market initiatives, specifically on corporate governance, of
public listed companies. One of the measures implemented was the revision of the
listing requirements, making it mandatory for the companies to have an AC as an
oversight function. Generally, the AC and the IAF assist the board of directors, among
others, in ensuring the adequacy of internal controls, risk management and compliance
to the relevant rules and regulations. The insight on the effectiveness of both AC and
IAF within the corporate governance framework is expected to provide the basis for
identifying other measures needed to support the capital market initiatives and the
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance.

1.3.2. Contribution to theory
The emphasis on good corporate governance in the prevention of corporate failures has
highlighted the role of internal audit. The role of auditors has always been referred to as
an independent agent. However, given the wide variety of internal audit activities
undertaken, the effectiveness or quality of internal auditing is an empirical question that
3
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is yet to receive sufficient research attention (Sarens, 2009). This study uses other
theories such as institutional, organisational identity and identification theories besides
agency theory to explain internal audit performance.
1.3.3. Contribution to researchers
In this study, first, the researcher extends the evaluation of internal audit practices by
quantifying the level of involvement of audit committees in the internal audit activities
and the level of indirect outcomes of internal audit in corporate governance of
Malaysian public listed companies. Instead of the OECD principles of corporate
governance (2004) which have been used in most corporate governance studies, the
framework on governance by The World Bank (1991) instead is used, as the dimensions
are more appropriate in assessing the decision-making and business process of an
organisation.

Furthermore, recent advances have been made in the measurement of internal audit
performance by evaluating the internal audit activities and the intended outcomes
(Dittenhofer, 2001a; Fadzil, Haron, & Jantan, 2005). As concluded by Dittenhofer
(2001a), internal audit is a complicated process ending with reports on audit findings
and recommendations. Audit findings and recommendations for improvements may
affect corporate governance. Second, this study provides new evidence on the areas of
improvements made in organisations and the relationship with internal audit
performance.

All the studies reviewed so far, have centred on various aspects of audit committees’
and internal auditors’ roles, internal controls and judgement of auditors (R. H. Ashton,
1974; Brown, 1983; Fadzil et al., 2005; Haron, Chambers, Ramsi, & Ismail, 2004; B.
Lee, Naiker, & Sharma, 2009; O’Leary, Iselin, & Sharma, 2006; O’Leary & Stewart,
2007; Zakaria et al., 2006). However, combined assurance or collaboration, and how
this activity will affect internal audit performance, have not been discussed or
investigated. Third, the level of combined assurance and/or collaboration (quantitative
analysis) and the perception by chief audit executives (CAEs) on these activities are
now examined in the survey and in-depth interviews (qualitative analysis) in the present
study.
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Additionally, the study on internal audit performance has mostly been done
quantitatively. There is a need to explain such results in more detail, especially in terms
of the participants’ perspectives because little is known about the collaborative
mechanisms in internal audit activities and how internal audit impacts overall corporate
governance of an organisation. Fourth, the mixed methods used, both qualitative and
quantitative inquiries, provide greater insight on the internal audit function.

Fifth, the present study uses Rasch model to measure the effectiveness of the internal
audit function. Rasch model measures the latent trait of generic skills and has been used
to assess the quality and construct of measuring instruments such as tests and
questionnaires (Baghaei, 2008; Sick, 2008a; Uekawa, 2007). The Rasch model has been
used extensively in the field of education (e.g., Green, Bock, Humphreys, Linn, &
Reckase, 1984; Griffin, 2007; Lindsay, Clogg, & Grego, 1991; Waugh & Chapman,
2005), health sciences and psychology (e.g., J. F. Pallant & Tennant, 2007; Steinmeyer
& Möller, 1992; Tennant, McKenna, & Hagell, 2004). In finance, the Rasch model has
been used to measure the financial capability of mutual fund investors (Pellinen,
Törmäkangas, Uusitalo, & Raijas, 2011) and, the severity of gambling problems
through the measurement of gambling symptoms (Strong & Kahler, 2007) whilst in
management, it has been used to evaluate the types and involvement of employee
participation in workplace decision-making (Drehmer, Belohlav, & Coye, 2000). An
initial evaluation on internal audit performance using the Rasch model had found that
the internal audit activities used in the questionnaire issued to internal auditors were
appropriate for the creation of a performance index (Abdullah, A Rashid, & Masodi,
2008). This study now extends the measurement method to internal audit performance
in evaluating the effectiveness of internal audit function by incorporating the
involvement of audit committees and the dimensions of corporate governance.

1.3.4. Contribution to policy makers
Although internal audit findings are not publicised, Malaysian public listed companies
report on their business strategies and corporate governance activities, which include
risk management and audit committee. However, these annual reports are usually
prepared to conform to the stock exchange requirements (Haron, Ibrahim, Jeyaraman, &
Chye, 2010; Johl, Johl, Subramaniam, & Cooper, 2013; Mat Zain & Subramaniam,
2007) and do not allow the quality of corporate governance to be easily assessed. The
recommendations of internal auditors usually indicate the implications the internal audit
5
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findings would have on the internal control environment and other governance areas if
corrective actions and improvements were not taken. The literature is silent on the areas
of governance that have been impacted by internal audit. As transparency and
accountability are usually the focus for the disclosure of information about an
organisation, the additional disclosure on the areas of governance is relevant.
Therefore, the findings from the exploration into this impact could be gleaned from the
areas where audit findings have been made and the identification of weaknesses in the
interactions of ACs and the IAF.

1.3.5. Contribution to practitioners
First, at the professional level, this study provides insights into the level of involvement
of audit committees in internal audit activities and how this will affect internal audit
performance. The information will facilitate the areas of interaction with Acs to enable
better performance, such as, accessibility during internal audit to information and
personnel.

Second, since the survey is made on all corporate members of the Institute of Internal
Auditors Malaysia in charge of internal audits in public listed companies in Malaysia,
this study has the potential to serve as a benchmark study of current practices. The
practices would cover, among others, the structure of the IAF, type of IAF and the level
of collaborations with other experts.

Generally, business strategies and corporate structure change in order to create
sustainable competitive advantage. For example, international certifications for products
and services necessitate that organisations establish a quality assurance department
(Skrabec, 1999) alongside the ‘traditional’ internal audit department for self-reviews
and continuous improvement. The complexities of business activities and evolving
internal auditors’ roles to meet the demands of organisations may lead to higher
collaborative audits or using external experts. Last, this study provides further
information on the types of collaborative activities conducted and perhaps give an
indication on the areas of training for the CAEs to pursue.

1.4.

Objectives and Research Questions

This thesis sets out to explore the ways IAF in Malaysian public listed companies is
practised together with the level of collaborations and/or combined assurances ̶ in an
6
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environment where organisational excellence is ostensibly espoused, as indicated in the
annual reports ̶ and to evaluate its quality or effectiveness. More specifically, the study
addresses the following questions:
1. What are the factors determining internal audit performance?
2. How does the AC affect the performance of the IAF?
3. How has internal audit enhanced corporate governance?

The premise for this thesis is that internal audit is more than an agency relationship; its
performance is affected by the motivation for organisational excellence. The proposition
is that value-add internal audit function is likely to occur where organisational identity
and institutional theories are predominant within the agency relationship. Additionally,
the varied conduct of activities by the IAF – internal audit structure including combined
assurance or collaboration and AC – are vital in internal audit performance. In this
thesis, the researcher aims to demonstrate that the questions and answers on internal
audit performance will lead to identifying specific impacts on corporate governance.

In addressing the questions, this study examines factors such as:
•

internal audit structure, which include team size; composition, in terms of
experience and expertise; and whether combined assurances or collaborations are
conducted;

•

involvement of AC in the IAF activities; in the reviews of audit planning, audit
execution, and actions on recommendations of internal audit; and

•

internal audit performance impacts on corporate governance in four key dimensions;
legal framework/corporate policies, management improvements, accountability, and
information and transparency.

The end result of an internal audit is the audit recommendations. The recommendations
that are acted upon by management may help to further strengthen the various
dimensions of corporate governance. Management decisions to act on these
recommendations may provide an indication of the effectiveness of internal audit. The
above factors are used as a framework to model an effective IAF by using Rasch
measurement, as a proxy, of the state of corporate governance where internal audit
operates.
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1.5.

Research Method

This mixed methods study to investigate the effectiveness of the IAF and its link with
corporate governance has two strands;
1. Quantitative strand involves mailed survey to the corporate members of the
Institute of Internal Auditors Malaysia (IIAM) on the perceptions of internal
audit performance, the level of involvement of AC in internal audit, evidence of
collaborations and combined assurances, and the nature of audit findings relating
to the components of corporate governance, and
2. For the qualitative strand, in-depth interviews were conducted with the CAEs
nominated by the Securities Commission Malaysia. They were questioned about
their individual organisation’s IAFs, involvement of ACs, type of audit activities
and the perception of how internal audit performance affects corporate
governance.

The quantitative data from the survey and the qualitative data from the in-depth
interviews were analysed separately. The main findings were compared and integrated
to provide evidence on the quality of the IAFs and the relevant theories. The results
point to internal audit as being more than an agent and its performance is affected by the
motivation for organisational excellence.

1.6.

Thesis Structure

This thesis is subsequently organised as follows: Chapter 2 positions the IAF in
corporate governance, related theories and the measures in evaluating internal audit
performance. Chapter 3 presents the conceptual framework and the hypotheses
development. Chapter 4 discusses the research design incorporating a formal survey and
in-depth interviews. The measurement method using Rasch measurement analysis and
the ordering of items based on item difficulty are explained. Chapter 5 elaborates and
discusses the results of the quantitative strand. The elaboration covers the ability to
perform effective internal audit, the association of IAF and the perception on AC’s
involvement, and the level of impact of the IAF’s performance on corporate
governance. Chapter 6 describes various IAFs through interviews with CAEs and links
the outcomes with results of the quantitative strand. The motivations in conducting
internal audit are discussed in relation to the agency theory and others; legitimacy,
institutional and organisational identity. The final chapter, Chapter 7, presents the
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summary of main findings, implications, limitations of the study and avenues for future
research.

1.7.

Summary

This chapter gives an introduction of the agency role of internal audit in providing
support in the corporate governance structure of any organisation and the measurement
of the IAF as examined in this thesis. Agency theory is further explained in the next
chapter. Additionally, this chapter states the rationale and significance of the present
study, the key areas of focus and the overview of the research methods. Chapter 2
provides the background on the IAF, Malaysian listing requirements on governance, the
theoretical perspectives and the relationship of internal audit with corporate governance.
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Research into Internal Audit Function, Theoretical Perspectives and Corporate
Governance
2.1.

Introduction

The following review defines IAF, its structure, IAF’s relationship with AC, presents a
collective explanation of the different theories associated with internal audit and how
these theories shape the IAF. A description of the dimensions of corporate governance
that relates to internal audit is also given. Further, as this research examines internal
audit of listed companies, an in depth explanation is made of the listing requirements
pertaining to corporate governance in Malaysia. Finally, an overview is given on
methods in measuring internal audit performance.

2.2.

Internal Audit Function

2.2.1. Definition of internal audit
Internal audit is defined as an objective assurance with the aim ‘to evaluate and improve
the effectiveness of risk management, control and governance processes’ (IIA, 2010b).
‘Assurance’ is also used by the international accounting body in tandem with auditing
standards (IFAC, 2010). Although auditing standards are applicable for audits of
financial information, the assurance standards are for other engagements. Internal audit
has also been described as an independent appraisal of the effectiveness of internal
control within an entity of its management process in achieving set objectives and goals
(Gill & Cosserat, 1993; Haron et al., 2010).

Fadzil et al. (2005) looked at the internal auditing practices and its effect on the quality
of internal control. They summarised the services performed by the IAF to cover four
areas:
1. Review of adequacy and effectiveness of the control systems (accounting,
financial, operational);
2. Ascertain the compliance to policies, rules and regulations which could impact
significantly on the business operations;
3. Review the means of safeguarding the company’s assets including efficiency
and economy of resources employed; and
10

CHAPTER 2: REVIEW OF LITERATURE AND THEORY

4. Review operations or programs to determine that the results are as established by
management.

Upon the conclusion of an audit, the report presented should give a ‘reasonable
assurance’ on the state of matter that was investigated. ‘Reasonable assurance’ is
clarified as the degree of confidence the user of the audit report has that due
professional care has been exercised in the audit (A. Chambers, 2006; ICAEW, 2011).
Although the concept of reasonable assurance is linked to external audits, the basis for
the opinions made on the outcomes of internal audits, should be traceable to the
supporting documents or analyses made during the audits. Confirmation of factual
content with the auditee is essential (Dittenhofer, 1997). The reliance on the reports or
other opinions of internal auditors is very important as these reports will be referred to
by management when they undertake continuous improvements. The work of internal
auditors will also be assessed by external auditors who would determine whether
reliance will be placed on such work in the conduct of financial audits or other
engagements (e.g. AUASB, 2010). Upon the agreement of the process owners to take
corrective actions or improvements, customarily the follow-up audit made by the
internal auditors will also assess the effectiveness of such corrective actions in ensuring
the root causes for the weaknesses have been addressed. The report on the initial audit
findings and the results of the corrective actions would be indicative of the effectiveness
of the internal audit.

2.2.2. IAF structure
IAF has been referred to as the department that performs internal audit (Johl et al.,
2013; Mat Zain & Subramaniam, 2007; IIAM, 2009). Even though, the Malaysian
listing requirements specify the presence of the IAF in the corporate governance
structure, the IAF could be outsourced (Ahmad & Taylor, 2009; Haron et al., 2004; Johl
et al., 2013). As such, in this study, IAF refers to the internal audit process and its
reporting structure, notwithstanding whether the IAF is in-house or outsourced.

Dittenhofer (1997) stated that internal auditors evaluate the activities of management
and people in their organisations. The internal audit process can be divided into four
dimensions (see Figure 2-1): planning, execution or fieldwork, reporting, monitoring
11
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and follow-up on findings (Beckmerhagen, Berg, Karapetrovic, & Willborn, 2004;
Dittenhofer, 2001a, 2001b; Fadzil et al., 2005; Moeller, 2009; Thompson, 1996). In
planning the audit, major items to be considered are: scope and objective of audit, rules
and regulations, potential risks, independence and competencies of internal auditors,
and audit programs. While executing the audit, internal auditors obtain reliable
information including process performance data as audit evidence. They also ensure
good documentation and easy retrieval of audit findings.

Internal audit process
Key dimensions

reporting

execution

monitoring

Attributes
audit plan

independence

competencies

audit techniques

report adequacy

management of
audit department

data gathering

audit evaluation

audit review

scope &
objective
potential risks

work papers

audit findings

follow-up audit

rules & regulations

audit programs

Figure 2-1. Key dimensions and attributes of internal audit process illustrating the
relationships between attributes derived from literature review
Reporting of audit findings to the relevant management level is done for appropriate
corrective actions to be taken by the auditee to eliminate root causes of weaknesses
found. Monitoring of internal audit process through self-assessments and peer reviews
of audit teams should be conducted for performance improvement, for example, to
identify training needs for internal auditors in areas such as information technology or
risk management. Following-up on audit findings is crucial to ensure that corrective
actions by management are effective and changes to organisational processes are
aligned to targeted improvements.
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Internal auditors have taken specific strategies, including combined audits and
collaborations, to perform their monitoring role for management. An initial step towards
a combination of internal audit activities is a comprehensive audit. In a comprehensive
audit, the activities encompass attesting financial statements, checking legal and
administrative compliance, ensuring probity of decisions by management and
conducting a performance audit (Gill & Cosserat, 1993). Another suggestion made to
auditors performing value-for-money and comprehensive audits is to include the
evaluation of the quality of strategic planning and how the services were provided
(Khemakhe, 2001). Khemakhe called this type of audit integral auditing. The risk or
impact assessments made are also important in ensuring accountability of policy or
program undertaken by an organisation. By performing an integral audit, Khemakhe
claims that auditors have gone beyond the role of controller to that of facilitator, thereby
providing a better performance assessment on corporate governance.

Moreover, the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA), the professional body for internal
auditors based in USA, prescribes that internal audit be consultative in nature to add
value and improve an organisation's operations (2010b). The call for integral audit by
Khemakhe is in line with the IIA’s prescription. The IIA has also identified combined
assurance as a new area to be studied, but the institute has not yet defined combined
assurance. However, the term combined audits has been used when two or more
different management systems are audited simultaneously (International Register of
Certificated Auditors, 2011). The adoption of the ISO standard for risk management by
the IIA (2010a) suggests that combined assurance, such as incorporating audit criteria
for quality audits into process audits, is the new direction for internal audit.

Specific references to combined audit activities for better performance have been made
in quality system audits and audits of various work processes (Hala, 2008; Pun, Hui, &
Lee, 2001). For example, the assurance activities in a corporation, Rio Tinto, are not
limited to financial systems but encompass managing people by identifying key risks
and business processes (Hala, 2008). The combined assurance framework focuses on
internal audit, risk, Sarbanes-Oxley, legal, external audit, health and safety, compliance,
treasury, communities and external commitments, human resources and sustainable
development. Collaboration between audit and assurance teams in Rio Tinto is used to
13
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identify audit overlaps and gaps in ensuring a higher assurance in key risk management
and control systems of business processes. Collaborative work has also been found to be
necessary when performing work that requires certain expertise (Akers & Klos, 1995;
Pendlebury & Shriem, 1991; Tucker & Kasper, 1998).

Any strategy taken in performing internal audit requires adequate resources. To
strengthen the IAF, the Malaysian Securities Commission and IIAM had issued
guidelines on IAF’s establishment (Bursa Malaysia, 2000). Further, the Malaysian Code
of Corporate Governance also specifies disclosures about matters relating to the internal
audit. Among the disclosures are the mandate on the internal audit activities, whether
the function is performed in-house or outsourced, identity of the CAE and the AC
members, and the duties of AC (Bursa Malaysia, 2000; Johl et al., 2013; Mat Zain &
Subramaniam, 2007).

Previous studies had concluded that the outcome of an IAF depended on the type of
IAF. For example, an outsourced function is to fill a skill gap or to serve a core purpose
(K. Van Peursem & Jiang, 2008) and later, found to have less ability to monitor
financial activities (Johl et al., 2013). In contrast, even though the in-house IAF is
perceived to be less independent, it is more relied upon by external auditors due to the
competency of worked performed such as follow-ups on deficiencies reported in prior
audits (Haron et al., 2004). It is said that an in-house IAF is also more effective because
of its intimate business knowledge (Coram, Ferguson, & Moroney, 2008; Soh &
Martinov-Bennie, 2011). There has been an increase in the size of in-house IAF in
recent years, from 2006 to 2008, in Malaysia (IIAM, 2009). However, the extent of the
value added services of the IAF and the impact on corporate governance is still unclear.

The quality of work performed is dependent also on the audit team composition: size,
expertise and experience. The decision to collaborate or outsourced certain audit
activities will depend on the range of skills and experience of the CAE and the team
members. The CAE should determine the requirements in terms of size and the
capability of the team, depending on the type of business and the complexity of business
operations (Powell, 1993). Hence, the question that needs to be asked is whether team
structure affects the performance of an audit task.
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Audit teams are reconfigured for each audit and audit size has not been considered
central when teams could rely on their supervisors (Dirsmith, Fogarty, & Gupta, 2000).
Dirsmith et al. found that audit size is related positively to the variability and difficulty
of task complexity. The decision making in teams allowed for the pooling of
information (Casey, Gettys, Pliske, & Mehle, 1984). Complex tasks involve search of
alternatives and the provision of ingrained information from more than one person
(Bamber & Bylinski, 1982). Earlier research noted by Shaw (1976) and Casey et al.
(1984), had shown that group or team performance derived benefits such as generating
new or improved ideas from the combination and sharing of knowledge, abilities and
viewpoints.

A team exists when it is comprised of more than one person. Team size would not
impact audit coverage if certain audit strategies are taken such as using audit surveys
(Benson, 1995). Benson added that the survey comprises questionnaires and audit
programs based on previous audit findings highlighting issues in controls and
management that affect performance and accountability. In line with comprehensive
audits, as mentioned by Khemakhe (2001), the streamlining of audit procedures to
include the checklists related to other types of audits for example financial, compliance
and operational audits, would create greater efficiency. However, Benson stressed the
need to have follow-up audits to ensure the audits are effective.

Even though diversity is needed, the optimum team size is not mentioned in the internal
auditing literature. Larger audit teams, for example team with seven members, do not
operate well and the job satisfaction declines (Firth-Cozens, 1992). In the area of
information security, a team of around three persons is suggested to avoid delays in the
decision making process (SANS Institute, 2007). The majority of IAF in Malaysia
(57.6%) have up to 5 employees (Fadzil et al., 2005), and as such, in most probability,
the audits are conducted by small teams.

Powell (1993, p. 52) recommended that an internal auditor “has to be commercially
aware, professionally qualified and a good communicator with all levels of staff and
management”. Since the scope of internal auditing encompasses the review and
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assessment of the business operations, being professionally qualified would also mean
that internal auditors need to have a level of expertise in specific areas. Expertise in
auditing requires extensive experience where the auditor had years of intensive practice
and repetition in specific areas, spanning from three to five years (A. H. Ashton, 1991).
Ashton’s study on audit expertise used error frequency knowledge across industries. It
was found that the level of experience is irrelevant in determining the accuracy of the
relative frequency of financial errors due to the limited experience with actual errors.
However, the auditors tend to know the financial areas affected by errors based on the
type of industry. Ashton noted that expert auditors could not be identified easily as they
perform both judgemental and non-judgemental tasks. An effective team welcomes
diversity of skills and knowledge as the members recognise that the audit is exploring
unchartered areas which require various new skills (Firth-Cozens, 1992).

Expertise is closely related to experience. Experience builds the auditor’s error
knowledge and is likely to be influenced by specific audit experiences, team
discussions, the level of supervision, including the following of audit plans and audit
guides or programs (Choo & Trotman, 1991; Tubbs, 1992). Choo & Trotman (1991)
found that inferences by experienced auditors were significantly linked to their
predictive judgments and the clustering of recalled atypical items on the going-concern
problems of a company. Additionally, Tubbs (1992) stated that the recognition of
atypical errors and the ability to detect causal explanation of internal control violations
increase with experience.

A previous study by Libby & Frederick (1990) suggested that a more experienced
auditor would generate greater number of errors found during the audit to explain the
audit findings. They found experienced auditors’ error frequency perceptions to be more
accurate. Additionally, the way the auditors had responded to the error prompts implied
that the auditors organise their knowledge based on the transaction cycle of the business
process. With that knowledge, the conclusion for an audit objective may differ since
“the knowledge of the cycle organisation may allow whole classes of explanations to be
rejected based on the same additional data” (Libby & Frederick, 1990, p. 363). More
experienced auditors had anticipated the acceptance of a more ethical stance in certain
situations such as reporting on a material revenue recognition issue although being
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pressured otherwise by the financial controller (O’Leary & Stewart, 2007). However,
the same internal auditors in the study were unsure that their peers would behave
ethically and report on the audit findings. So far, the team structure, particularly team
size, expertise and experience has not been investigated in the Malaysian context to
determine how this would affect the conduct of the internal audit activities.

The second part of the IAF investigated in this study is the reporting structure. A dual
reporting relationship for IAF is recommended by IIA to prevent conflicts of interests
and collusion (IIA, 2012a). The CAE usually reports to the chief executive officer for
direction and areas of audit interest, including administrative support. Another line of
reporting is to the most senior oversight group — normally the AC, a sub-committee of
the board of directors — for reviews of internal audit activities and reinforcement on
risk, business processes and control issues (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2004;
DeZoort, Hermanson, Archambeault, & Reed, 2002; Haron, Jantan, & Pheng, 2005;
Mat Zain & Subramaniam, 2007; Vanasco, 1994). Presumably, this reporting structure
would create an effective audit function especially where the internal auditors need to
maintain their independence with the required level of trust within the organisation.
Trustworthiness is very subjective, more so, when internal auditors are included as
agents in management’s monitoring mechanism. Further links of the IAF to AC are
detailed in the next section.

2.2.3. IAF relationship with AC
AC is responsible for the oversight of the IAF and as such, AC is IAF’s primary
customer (Haron et al., 2010). Interactions among AC, internal auditors, the board of
directors and the management apart from the external auditors are essential to effective
governance (Cohen et al., 2004). IAF is the most appropriate vehicle to report on the
effectiveness of internal control (Powell, 1993). Without this oversight, a good IAF will
have minimal effect on internal control as the internal auditors could be isolated and
have difficulties to gain access and cooperation from the auditees (Haron et al., 2010;
Soh & Martinov-Bennie, 2011). An effective AC should have complied completely with
the regulations set by the listing authority (Haron et al., 2005). However, an effective
AC together with high management integrity does not assist the internal auditors to act
ethically when in a dilemma (O’Leary & Stewart, 2007). As such, an effective IAF will
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enable the CAEs to report and interact with the ACs at regular intervals and facilitate
the internal audit process.

Among the requirements on the composition of the AC are that there should be at least
three members with the majority being independent directors and one of them
financially literate (Bursa Malaysia, 2009b; Haron et al., 2005; Liew, 2007). Mohd.
Nazim & Kalaithasan (cited in Haron et al., 2005, p. 190) claim that the disclosures in
the annual report about AC and AC’s activities are easily made and as such, should be
authenticated. Haron et al. (2005) found that the disclosures in the AC reports of
Malaysian listed companies were quite uniform and gave the impression that the
disclosures were a formality and not informing the actual practices. As such, the
reviews by AC on the IAF as reported in the annual report could also be in question.

The specific AC’s reviews relating to the IAF in the legislations (Bursa Malaysia, 2000,
2009a, 2009b) included:
1. IAF reports directly to the AC;
2. Adequacy of the scope, functions, competency and resources of IAF, and
authority to conduct the audit work;
3. Internal audit program, processes, the results of audits or investigations
conducted, and the status of audit recommendations;
4. Appointment or termination of senior staff members of the IAF; and
5. Reports by CAE on effectiveness of risk management, internal control, and
governance processes.

Due to the concerns regarding the effectiveness in the interactions of AC and IAF, this
study examines the reviews made by the AC on the IAF outlined above, as part of the
evaluation on the effective performance of IAF.
2.3.

Theoretical Perspectives

The principal theory relating to auditing is still agency theory (Deegan, 2009). Other
theories such as, legitimacy theory, institutional theory and, organisational identity and
identification theory are also relevant to the changing roles of internal auditors. Rather
than serving as mere watchdogs, internal auditors now expect to provide value added
services, especially regarding assurances of business processes and risk. While other
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researchers have used each of the theories named above in measuring internal audit
performance, none have used them collectively to explain the performance of internal
audit function and its impact on corporate governance. This study breaks new grounds
by using a collection of theories to assess the internal audit function and its impact on
corporate governance.
2.3.1. Agency theory
An agency relationship exists when managers and those employed perform a service on
behalf of owners or shareholders with the delegation of some decision-making authority
(ICAEW, 2005; Subramaniam, 2006). ‘The qualitative state of excellence in decisionmaking’ is good governance (Bridgman, 2007). However, the momentum of companies
being publicly listed made the separation of owners from actively managing their
companies more prominent, casting doubts on sound managerial capacities of directors
and senior management. Conflicting self-interest of owners and agents, first highlighted
by Adam Smith in 1776, in The Wealth of Nations and reiterated by Jensen and
Meckling (1976), together with information asymmetries, caused agency problems

(ICAEW, 2005; Subramaniam, 2006). In the case of listed companies, the distance
between the owners and the agents – the management team – is great; owners who are
shareholders are not involved in the management of their organisations. Jensen and
Meckling (1976) argued that agents are inclined not to maximize the wealth of the
owners and in mitigation, monitoring activities such as external audits, are imposed by
the owners.

In Malaysia, three recently reported cases dealt with managerial problems. First, in
Southern Bank Bhd., revenue and profits were falsified and creatively accounted for
with overstatement of net assets by RM160 million in 2005 (Shah, 2007). Secondly, the
revenues of Transmile Group Bhd. from years 2004 to 2006 were overstated by RM622
million (Associated Press, 2007). Finally, Megan Media Holdings Bhd. suffered losses
of RM1.14 billion in 2007 due to accounting fraud at its subsidiary (T. H. Lee et al.,
2008). These cases highlight the incongruence in expectations of good governance and,
due professional care and diligence, of directors, managers, as well as auditors.

Jensen and Meckling (1976) specified two agency costs in the management of
companies: monitoring costs and bonding costs. According to Godfrey, Hodgson, &
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Holmes (2003) monitoring costs include costs of auditing, management compensation
plans, budgets and operating rules. Fees to external auditors are considered as
monitoring costs (Godfrey et al., 2003). Notwithstanding the weaknesses in the
monitoring activities as indicated in the corporate scandals above, reliance by external
auditors on the internal audit function generates cost savings in audit fees to the
organisation (Brown, 1983; Haron et al., 2004). Internal audit has been identified as a
bonding cost because the agents undertake to guarantee against any malfeasance by
conducting the checks on their operational activities by appointing specified persons in
their companies (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Within the organisational structure,
internal audit is charged with the oversight of good governance. Internal auditors look at
the future by reviewing controls and processes in contrast with external auditors who
attest on representations made by management on historical events namely, financial
statements for statutory purposes (similarly Dittenhofer, 1997). By evaluating and
relying on competent internal audit, the extent of work by external auditors is expected
to be reduced.

The simplistic view in agency theory of untrustworthiness of agents negates inherent
human nature and motivation. Central to human psychology are the self-actualization
needs, first coined by Kurt Goldstein and later used by Maslow: the tendency to achieve
one’s potential and having the sense of truthfulness (Maslow, 1943). Dittenhofer (1997)
clarified that “the need to be accepted and recognized” and the “desire to be a part of the
organisation” changed the ways internal auditors operate. The view of internal auditors
as watchdogs only, is changing. Audit, as it is currently practised, goes beyond the
requirement under existing legislations. It also may provide answers to questions on
bias in decision making, particularly in owner controlled companies (ICAEW, 2005). In
stating their opinions on the financial statements of a company, the external auditors
also form an opinion on the trustworthiness of the internal auditors’ work and the
system of internal control; reducing external audit work.

The requirement to give value added service to the organisation when performing
internal audit acknowledges the role of internal auditors working in consultation with
management (Bou-Raad, 2000; IIA, 2010b). Instead of auditing, ‘assurance services’
has been used for reviews made by internal auditors and to provide advice or
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recommendations to management to assist in business strategies. Through their
professional background and competency, internal auditors are involved in the
development of internal control structures or management control processes and risk
management. The involvement of internal auditors beyond the role of controllers or
monitoring agents contributes to better internal control structure and quality of
information for decision-making. Bou-Raad (2000) concluded that internal auditors are
able to determine their independence and would not undermine their competency and
integrity, and that organisations recognise internal auditors’ services in business
practices. The emerging recognition of the expanded role of internal auditors and the
benefits of internal auditors’ services in aiding organisations to meet their business
objectives require more than agency theory can explain. The following sections discuss
alternative theories.

2.3.2. Legitimacy theory
Besides agency theory, legitimacy theory is also related to monitoring activities in
organisations. Under legitimacy theory, organisations constantly attempt to portray their
activities as legitimate relative to ever changing societal norms (Deegan, 2009). The
vital point in legitimacy is what society perceives about the organisation’s actions. It is
assumed that society will allow the organisation to operate as long as it complies with
the social contract, taking into consideration the rights of investors and the general
public. Public expectations are not just about quality goods and services and profit
maximisation, but include concerns about environmental and safety issues with
emphasis on better corporate governance. Failure to accede to social contract may incur
societal sanctions, for example, consumer boycotts and legal restrictions on an
organisation’s business activities. Studies incorporating legitimacy theory, as noted by
Deegan (2009), concentrate on social and environmental disclosures in annual reports.

Each organisation will perceive differently what society expects from it when they
conduct their business activities. To ensure legitimacy, business strategies may include
education of, and disclosure to, the public about the changes in the organisation’s
performance and activities (Taylor, Sulaiman, & Sheahan, 2001). For example, an
organisation would undertake ISO14001 certification as a strategy with the intent to
improve environmental performance or merely as environmental credentialism arising
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from issues directed towards environmentally sensitive industries. The organisation
would conduct environmental audits through the internal auditors to satisfy the
certification requirements. Taylor, Sulaiman and Sheahan (2001) found that the
credential of certification was the key to satisfy stakeholders on how the implicit social
contract of managing the environmental effects of the organisations’ activities was met.
They also noted that the legitimization process of the environmental performance made
the organisations adopt strategies that would change public perceptions without
changing their organisations’ environmental behaviour.

Both agency theory and legitimacy theory may explain why organisations perform
internal audits for various reasons, including compliance with public listing rules and
obtaining certifications as part of their business strategies. To remain competitive and
be seen as a leader within an industry sector, organisations also adopt structures that are
deemed the norm. These structures are now elaborated in the next section.

2.3.3. Institutional theory
Institutional theory explains why organisational structures are similar. DiMaggio and
Powell (1983, pp. 148-149) state that various societal forces cause this similarity due to
the presence of an organisational field from the activities of diverse organisations. The
organisational field encompasses key suppliers, competitors, resource and product
consumers, and regulatory agencies. Organisations adopt structures and business
processes to achieve compatibility and homogeneity because decision-makers acquire
appropriate responses to distract from criticism. This homogenisation process is called
isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).

Voluntary corporate reporting or disclosure is considered an institutional practice. The
processes which are adapted and continually changed to suit pressures exerted on the
organisation by other organisations that they are dependent upon, and by society, are
isomorphic

processes.

Organisational

change

includes

changes

in

structure,

organisational culture, and goals or objectives. The organisation would adapt its
reporting practices by ensuring the internal audit function, the roles of internal auditors
and the audit committees are in line with the expectations and demands of its
stakeholders or regulatory authorities, which are considered the norm. The similarities
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in reporting of internal control and corporate governance in relation to internal audit
function can be gleaned from the annual reports of the Malaysian public listed
companies (Haron et al., 2010). The evidence showed that 97% of the companies
complied with the listing requirements with 70% having in-house internal audit
function.

Another aspect of institutional theory is that of decoupling (Deegan, 2009). Decoupling
means that even though managers might perceive a requirement to adopt certain
institutional practices that are publicly sanctioned and implement the relevant formal
processes, the actual organisational practices may differ. This differentiation is related
to legitimisation of business strategies, for example, the pursuit of profitability and
shareholder value by managers instead of the apparent image created by corporate
disclosure on social and environmental reporting. Decoupling may also be present in the
way internal audit is conducted in-house or outsourced and in the way various types of
internal audits are combined to serve business needs. Institutional theory complements
the legitimacy theory and organisational culture and identity theory, in explaining the
motivations of organisation managers, and the involvement of audit committees and
internal auditors in responding to social and institutional expectations of having good
corporate governance.

2.3.4. Organisational identity and identification theory
‘Organisational culture and identity’ are vital in organisational identification (M. R.
Mills & Bettis, 2006). Work is an essential human activity; psychologically, socially,
physically, and economically (Vredenburgh & Shea-VanFossen, 2009). Organisational
structure specifies the existence of various departments, job functions and, to a certain
extent, the hierarchical status of a person by virtue of their position. Due to the
differentiation in job functions and educational backgrounds, people define themselves,
for example, through the place of employment or professional affiliations. By
identifying with the organisation, people in the organisation achieve their psychological
needs such as self-actualization and affiliation; on the other hand, the organisation gets
motivated members to produce results as strategized by management (M. R. Mills &
Bettis, 2006). One of the strategies in remaining competitive is seeking international
recognition through certification and accreditation. ISO certifications and other quality
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assurance certifications promote organisational excellence through performance
measurement and customer satisfaction (A Rashid, Abdullah, Ghulman, & Masodi,
2008).

Many organisations are seeking public recognition worldwide through certification and
accreditation to ensure their economic sustainability and competitiveness. The common
ISO certifications sought are ISO 9001 quality management system, ISO 14001
environmental management system, ISO 22000 food safety management system, ISO
27001 information security management system and ISO 17025 competence of testing
and calibration laboratories (ISO, 2004, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d, 2011f; The ISO 27000
Directory, 2009). In the education sector, accreditation is sought from accreditation
agencies such as Australian Universities Quality Agency (2011), Malaysian
Qualifications Agency (2010) and Accreditation Board for Engineering and Technology
(ABET, 2010). Certification and accreditation are aimed at giving assurance that the
services and products meet quality standards through continuous improvements.

The focus on corporate governance and organisational excellence by the public sector as
well is demonstrated, among others, by the Malaysian government’s introduction of the
Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance and the formation of the Minority
Shareholders Watchdog Group (Liew, 2007); the requirement for companies to be ISO
certified for licensing purposes (Construction Industry Development Board Malaysia,
2009); and the issuance of a government circular on ISO certification of public services
(Malaysian Government, 1996). Within this framework, the self-review on quality made
through internal audits is crucial. With the increase in firm competitiveness in pursuing
customer satisfaction and good corporate governance, effectiveness in internal audit is
crucial.

For organisational excellence to happen, high-performing human systems or teams are
needed (Vaill, 1982). The teams should perform excellently against certain external
standards; their potential performance level; their acknowledged starting point; and their
required use of significantly fewer resources. Teams are focused on their broad purpose
and are task oriented. Their discovery of systems operations that require integrated
actions can be seen in their behaviours and attitudes. The pervasive sense of purpose is
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affected at least by organisational members’ needs, expectations, values and capabilities
together with incidence of reorganisation. Deming (1986) used continuous quality
improvement in his approach to quality and excellence. He defined quality as meeting
or exceeding customer satisfaction with the product or service. This definition is used
by ISO in all certifications when organisations deal with customers; external, internal,
process, and stakeholders (ISO, 2011e). Internal audit performance is crucial in the
monitoring and continuous improvement process where quality management is
practised with the aim of inculcating a quality (ISO, 2004; 2011a). As such, internal
auditors must have a clear focus on what they are doing and how they benefit the
organisation, namely stakeholders and customers.

Many organisations in Malaysia have two distinct internal audit departments or units;
Quality Internal Audit Unit in the Quality Assurance Department and Internal Audit
Department in the administrative or corporate division (similarly Skrabec, 1999).
Usually, internal audit reports from the Quality Assurance Departments are tabled at
management meetings or at Board of Directors meetings whilst the reports from the
Internal Audit Departments are tabled to the Audit Committee. These differing
organisational and reporting structures may have the potential to create barriers to
organisational excellence and impede the effectiveness of corporate governance. One
such barrier has been identified as dysfunctional organisational politics, which have
evolved from self-interest and a focus, among others, on rewards and influence, and
need attention for its dissolution (Vredenburgh & Shea-VanFossen, 2009). Self-interest
and focus of the two separate audit teams should be resolved by management and the
Board of Directors if the organisation is committed to pursue customer satisfaction and
good corporate governance. Combined assurance in internal audit activities may also act
to reduce the barriers towards good corporate governance. Even if, combined assurance
and collaborations are not widely practiced, a certain degree of reliance by the Internal
Audit Department on the review reports by departments such as the Quality Assurance
Department would have been made.

Of particular interest in this study is how the interactions between the two internal audit
departments may serve to define the degree of homogeneity in the teams such as equal
status and intergroup cooperation. In strategic performance measurement, organisational
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culture is important (Franco & Bourne, 2003). Accountability for the performance
measures falls on the managers, who ‘will furnish accurate and relevant information
about the performance and stewardship’ (Al Athmay, 2008). Most corporations use
balanced scorecard (Kaplan & Norton, 1996; Niven, 2008), key performance indicators
(Waal, 2007), and customer satisfaction (E. U. Bond, III & Fink, 2001; Feciková, 2004;
Knouse, Carson, Carson, & Heady, 2009), apart from financial performance, as
measures. In practice, these measures and the related processes that yield these
measures are usually reviewed by the internal auditors as part of performance audit (Al
Athmay, 2008; A. Chambers, 2006; Raaum & Morgan, 2001). Since overall
organisational performance is said to rely on the sense of belonging to the organisation,
the perception that internal auditors have given value add services would be perceived
through the acceptance of other departments, as process owners, of their audit activities.

When conducting an internal audit, certain studies have evidenced that cooperation and
teamwork are necessary: Pendlebury and Shriem (1991) found that managers felt that
accounting-qualified internal auditors should be supported with personnel from other
disciplines or service experts in doing performance audits; Akers and Klos (1995) in
their study of environmental audits, however, found that 79% of organisations surveyed
engaged only organisational staff outside of the internal audit department in
environmental audits, whereas 4% indicated that they used a combination of internal
audit staff and other staff members. Tucker and Kasper (1998) concluded that internal
audits under ISO 14000 led to systems audits, as opposed to technical regulatory
compliance, with collaborations of various experts, trained in risk management, quality
management and internal controls. The various audit described above indicated that
internal auditors need to have diversity in team members and skills to enable them to
perform their roles in various capacity. This study investigates internal audit team size
composition, in terms of experience and expertise. The collaborative approach as
described by Tucker and Kasper corroborates the use of teams for organisational
excellence and good corporate governance.

Due to the pressure for better corporate management practices and market
competitiveness, business strategies are more focused on building trust on the quality of
goods and services. Disclosures on organisational performance apart from financial
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indicators, corporate governance and the credentials obtained including international
certifications are now the norm. With such disclosure, self-assessments through internal
audits will be conducted, taking into account how the organisations plan to combine the
various assurance reviews and subsequently, execute the reviews. In this regard, the role
of internal auditors providing services of value to their organisations and promoting
good governance would be better explained through the agency theory, institutional
theory and organisational culture and identity theory.

2.4.

Corporate Governance and Auditing

The World Bank has defined governance as ‘the manner in which power is exercised in
the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development’ (1991,
p. 1). At the micro level, corporate governance relates to how well an organisation is
managed to ensure its sustainability as a going concern. Going concern is aptly captured
by IIA’s view of governance:
Governance is the system by which organizations are directed and controlled. It includes
the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs to ensure success while
maintaining the right balance with the stakeholders’ interest (IIA, n.d.).

Evidence for poor governance includes failure to establish a legal framework, a
tendency for pursuing private gains and non-transparent decision-making (World Bank,
1991, pp. 5-6). The key dimensions in corporate governance identified by the World
Bank are: legal framework; improvements in management; accountability; and,
information and transparency (Figure 2-2).
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Corporate governance
Key dimensions

legal framework /
corporate policies

management
improvements

accountability

revenue
management

Attributes

policies &
change
procedure

expenditure
management

financial
performance

economic
performance

conflict
resolution
enforcement

complaints
procedure

personnel
management

information &
transparency

corruption
prevention

information
transparency

information
dissemination

data analysis

policies
application
direct link
indirect link

Figure 2-2. Key dimensions and attributes of corporate governance framework (adapted
from World Bank, 1991)
Under the first dimension — legal framework or corporate policies — the World Bank
states that there should be known rules or policies and the related change procedure, for
rules application and enforcement, as well as conflict resolution. In applying this
requirement to an organisation, these rules or policies may relate to the company
policies on various business processes including human resource management, which
could be evidenced through standard operating procedures. Further, to avoid abuse of
rules and policies, review systems or monitoring mechanism are required. Where
conflicts arise on enforceable agreements, the resolution must be binding and made by
independent parties. By inference, the monitoring mechanism singled out in the legal
framework is the internal audit function which is legally required for public listed
companies in Malaysia. This position is crucial and needs to be understood within the
organisational structure as there will be occasions where internal auditors are asked to
perform certain task that may undermine the independent status of internal auditors. The
reporting requirements for the internal audit function and the specific reference to the
audit committee in certain legislation, specifically, the listing rules, emphasise the
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important roles of internal auditors and audit committee members in the corporate
governance framework. One of the areas that is to be reviewed by the internal audit
function is risk management (Bursa Malaysia, 2009b). A brief account on the risk
management policies is readily available in the annual reports of Malaysian public listed
companies.

Next, improvement in management is viewed from the perspectives of management of
revenue, expenditure and personnel. Revenue needs to be even, expenditure controlled
and the placement of staff based on competencies and appropriate compensations. The
World Bank’s emphasis here is on capacity and efficiency.

The third dimension, accountability means holding a person responsible for his/her
actions and is gauged from financial and economic performances, and voice
mechanism. Financial accountability involves the use of accounting and auditing
covenants. External audits act to reinforce expenditure control and assist in fraud
prevention. Internally, the organisations would enforce the monitoring mechanism for
all processes by internal audits in the legal framework. In economic performance,
value-for-money reviews are made on expenditures. Voice mechanisms relate to
disseminating information on services, getting feedback and dealing with complaints.
For effective accountability assessments, the World Bank advocates focusing on the
reviews of audit reports and the action taken to contend with identified corruption and
waste (World Bank, 1991, p. 9).

The final dimension in the World Bank framework on corporate governance is
information and transparency. Availability and access to adequate information together
with transparency of decision-making, are critical to accountability and the legal
framework. Transparent decision-making safeguards against corruption, wastage and
abuse of authority. Corruption prevention through transparent expenditure management
apart from reporting and monitoring systems should be in place. The organisation
should analyse its data and its information system in the evaluation of its capabilities to
disseminate information.
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All the dimensions in the World Bank’s governance framework could be linked to the
sub-elements of internal control. Internal control is the management’s control
mechanism to achieve an organisation’s operating objectives and to meet reporting
obligations (Gill & Cosserat, 1993). There are three elements in internal control,
namely, control environment, information system and control procedures (O’Leary et
al., 2006). The control environment encompasses management’s philosophy and
operating style, organisational structure, human resource and levels of authority,
internal audit, audit committee and the use of information technology. For control
procedures, there should be segregation of duties, authorization procedure, safeguards
for assets and documentation.

An alternative to the World Bank’s framework is that proposed by the Organisation of
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The key principles of corporate
governance by the OECD (2004) relates to mechanisms in ensuring the basis for an
effective corporate governance framework; rights of shareholders and key ownership
functions; equitable treatment of shareholders; stakeholders role in corporate
governance; disclosure and transparency, and responsibilities of the board of directors.
These principles can be grouped into four main areas: mechanism of business ethics,
mechanism of decision-making, adequate disclosure and transparency, and lastly,
mechanism of book keeping and final accounts (Abu-Tapanjeh, 2008).

The World Bank and OECD do not work independently. Both parties have collaborated
in establishing the regional Corporate Governance Roundtables to identify areas of
reform in corporate governance (Jesover & Kirkpatrick, 2005). Although there are four
main areas that can be used to evaluate an organisation’s corporate governance, the
OECD principles are more focused on rights and duties of shareholders and board of
directors. Further, the disclosure and transparency requirement is directed towards
financial performance, composition of ownership and governance. The OECD corporate
governance principles are used as part of the listing requirements by Bursa Malaysia
(Bursa Malaysia, 2009b). The Malaysian listing requirements are discussed further in
the next section. As internal audit deals with the processes in their organisation and the
way these processes are managed such as compliance to procedures and good business
practice; operational practices for economy, efficiency and effectiveness (Dittenhofer,
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1997; Moeller, 2009; Ziegenfuss, 2000); a framework that looks at these activities is
needed to gauge the performance of internal audit. As such, using the World Bank’s
framework would facilitate the investigation into areas of improvements on the business
processes arising from internal audit recommendations.

Arguden (2010) argued that corporate governance is not just compliance and the
purpose of measuring it, is for improvements. The notion on improvements augurs well
with the second dimension in the World Bank’s framework of management
improvements in business processes. An ideal measure for corporate governance,
however, is difficult to achieve. This situation is fairly recognised when discussing
measures of corporate governance (Romano, Bhagat, & Bolton, 2008; Wan, 2010).
There seems to be a consensus that measurement of corporate governance needs to
correlate with performance, the premise for formulating governance scores or indices. A
number of proxies have been used in the creation of indices. For example, the
Governance Index used the strength of shareholder rights in the provisions for takeovers
to measure the impact of governance on firm performance (Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick,
2003). The measures used are mainly on anti-takeover provisions and would not be
appropriate for measuring on-going governance, which is of multi dimensions.

Another study to measure accountability in corporate governance was done using data
envelopment analysis or DEA (Feroz, Goel, & Raab, 2008). The researchers argued that
the board of directors in discharging their monitoring role, use market based measures
such as return on equity (ROE) in business performance analysis, as an approach to
review the quality of decision-making relative to their competitors. DEA decomposes
ROE into measures of profitability, asset utilization and equity multiplier so that
responsibility can be assigned to the relevant business unit. They argued that an income
efficient organisation produces maximum total revenue while using the minimum of
resources. A survey on corporate governance in Japan also uses ROE and return on
assets (ROA) as part of corporate governance index, a measurement from the
shareholders’ perspective (JCGR, 2006). In Malaysia, the governance index for public
listed companies also uses ROE in addition to the Malaysian Code of Corporate
Governance, Malaysian listing requirements and disclosures in annual reports (MSWG,
2011; Mohamad Ariff et al., 2007).
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Yet, another proxy is used to measure overall firm level or internal governance by
referring to relationship of governance mechanism – board of directors – with
information risk (Strydom, Navissi, Skully, & Veeraraghavan, 2009). The rationale
given was that good internal governance is present when monitoring, disclosure and
control mechanism as prescribed by best practices, are implemented. The proxy for
information risk used is the quality of working capital accruals and cash flows from
operations of US listed companies.

The use of indices provides one summary number of multiple dimensionality (Romano
et al., 2008). Romano, et al. insisted that corporate performance could not be
consistently related to the governance index and such indices should not be the main
criteria for stock investments. The above indices are very much linked to reported
financial performance. The quality of information for market purposes, including
computation of ROE and ROA, is dependent on the disclosure of financial information
via the audited accounts and annual reports. Availability of information and
transparency could reduce uncertainty and transaction costs, which together with
mechanisms to analyse and disseminate information, lead to better accountability
(World Bank, 1991). The work of internal auditors in reviewing and ensuring reduced
transaction errors and efficiency in business processes ultimately leads to improvements
or better firm performance. Administrative controls need to minimise the opportunities
for corruption, for example through transparent budgets and procurement procedures as
well as performing environmental assessments (World Bank, 1991). Although the
World Bank did not mention risk, this recommendation on administrative controls is in
line with the steps in risk management – another review area of internal auditing.

In this study, rather than using the index as a measure of corporate governance as
mentioned by Gompers, et al. (2003) or the Malaysian governance index, the impact on
corporate governance of internal audit performance will be assessed by the
recommendations made by internal audit on the dimensions in the World Bank’s
corporate governance framework. This measure is in agreement with the suggestion by
the World Bank in using the reviews of audit reports as effective accountability
assessments. Further, this measure also followed one of the measures of IAF’s
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effectiveness by using the acceptance and adoption of IAF recommendations (Soh &
Martinov-Bennie, 2011; Ziegenfuss, 2000).

2.5.

Malaysian Listing Requirements on Governance

The Malaysian law in relation to corporate governance is comparable to the
recommendations by OECD in the areas of shareholder and creditor rights and their
protection (Liew, 2007). The corporate governance principles are being used as listing
requirements by Bursa Malaysia with specifications on directors, audit committee,
auditors, corporate governance disclosure, and internal audit (Bursa Malaysia, 2009b).
Specifications on directors, audit committee and internal audit are all related to the legal
framework or corporate policies of the World Bank’s corporate governance framework
as shown in Figure 2-2 in section 2.4. The Bursa’s specification on external auditors
and corporate governance disclosure in financial statements is related to the
accountability dimension. The World Bank framework on corporate governance (World
Bank, 1991) is more comprehensive for self-evaluation, for example, by internal
auditors, as it covers management and monitoring mechanism for managing an
organisation which aligns with organisational excellence, including using data for
evaluation and capacity building.

The listing requirements in Malaysia also charge the audit committee with reviewing
and reporting on the internal audit activities apart from reviewing the report of the
external auditors on their assessment of the system of internal controls. Specifically, the
board of directors is required, as part of corporate governance practice, to implement
risk management and review the integrity of the management information systems
including compliance with rules and regulations. The review by audit committees on
internal audit need assessments to be made on the adequacy of the scope and functions
of audit, competency and resources, audit programs, audit reports including actions
taken by management as recommended by internal audit (Bursa Malaysia, 2009b).
Audit committees can influence the quality of corporate governance by their
assessments and reviews on various aspects of audit processes, risk and control
environment as well as financial reporting (Yusoff, 2011). The perception about the
quality of the internal audit process is as significant as the reality. Reliance on internal
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audit reports will occur if the process can be trusted, hence, the question on internal
audit performance.

2.6.

Performance of Internal Auditors

With the introduction of performance indicators, IAF has pursued the use of common
indicators, for example, percentage of planned audits completed, number of audits
completed on time, auditee satisfaction survey, and number of recommendations
implemented (Austin Chapter Research Committee, 2009; Gramling & Hermanson,
2009; Rickard, 1993; IIAM, 2009; Tilley, 1999; Ziegenfuss, 2000). Although these
indicators may indicate a measure of the quality of internal audit activities, there are
also concerns that reliance on these indicators may lead to negative behaviours like
inflation of the number of audit findings with immaterial items or focusing on areas that
add less value in the improvements of operations (Gramling & Hermanson, 2009). The
indicators show the administrative activities performed but do not depict whether IAF
has contributed value to the organisation (Rickard, 1993). Further measures of
performance are needed to address the notion of internal audit as an agent of change and
provide value added services.

Pertinent to quality assurance and improvement processes of internal auditing is the
monitoring of the performance of the internal audit activity under IIA Standard 1311
(Audit Executive Center, 2010). The common method of measurement is using the
provisions in the Standards for Professional Practice of Internal Auditors (SPPIA)
(Dittenhofer, 2001a). Fadzil, et al. (2005) surveyed public listed companies in Malaysia
on the internal auditing practices and its effect on internal control using five
components of the SPPIA, namely, independence and objectivity; professional
proficiency; scope of work; performance of audit work; and management of the internal
audit department. They concluded that for the measure of internal audit activities, three
more components need to be added to SPPIA namely, a) audit reviews, b) audit
programs and c) audit reporting. All the components identified by Fadzil, et al. could be
identified to the attributes in Figure 2-1 in section 2.2.2. The attribute professional
proficiency by SPPIA represents a trait resulting from education, training, experience
and competency. As such, in this study, professional proficiency is included under
competency of the plan dimension.
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Another study using the internal auditing practices similar to the components used by
Fadzil, et al. (2005) reported that the internal audit performance was relatively effective
(Abdullah et al., 2008). The internal auditors perceived certain activities in various
internal audit activities were difficult to achieve, which may affect the internal audit
quality. For example, confirmation of information of internal processes and retrieval of
information were among the difficult tasks (Abdullah et al., 2008). However, an insight
on the outcome of the internal audit is necessary to provide an indication on the overall
quality of IAF.

Dittenhofer (2001a) and Gramling and Hermanson (2009) pointed out that effectiveness
or performance of internal auditing should be measured against the achievement of the
audit objectives together with the reliability and usefulness of the reports. This approach
would actually be ascertaining the types of audit findings as a result of the examination
by internal auditors. Concurrently, this method also supports the suggestion by World
Bank (1991) for the review of audit findings as an assessment method. Further, Sarens
(2009) had commented that effective IAF should impact positively on the quality of
corporate governance. Before any internal audit activities take place, the scope of the
audit would influence the audit techniques and any collaboration or use of experts in the
audit implementation. Hence, it is appropriate to measure governance in relation to
internal audit by reviewing the findings made on the dimensions of corporate
governance.

A part of the internal audit function is its reporting structure or the oversight role by AC
on internal audit; dictated also by the CG regulations in Malaysia. Turley and Zaman
(2007) contends that how AC operates is important in viewing the impact of AC on CG.
Informal interactions significantly affect AC effectiveness (Turley & Zaman, 2007;
Zaman & Sarens, 2013). However, the studies found that certain interactions such as
questioning internal audit findings, review of audit agenda and work plan or audit
program are limited.

A study on the audit committee compliance level with the Malaysian listing
requirements was done by examining 2002 annual reports of 120 public listed
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companies (Haron et al., 2005). Grid analysis was used to measure the extent of
coverage of activities undertaken by audit committee and internal audit whilst the
composition of audit committee, its terms of reference and the frequency of meetings
were measured by the number of occurrence. The results indicated that the overall
compliance level was 92%, and 87% of the companies that have a majority of
independent directors on the audit committee. However, 58% of respondents complied
with the meeting attendance requirements for independent directors. Eighty seven per
cent of the companies also have reported on the internal audit activities. It was found
that the disclosures of the activities were uniform and suggested that the action maybe
for mere compliance. As such, the disclosures could not provide informative
representation of the actual situation in the companies and the state of internal audit.
Little is known on the factors that rank highly in the involvement of AC on the internal
audit function.

Another study examined the interactions of audit committee and the internal audit
function (IAF) through interviews with heads of internal audit function of 11 Malaysian
public listed companies (Mat Zain & Subramaniam, 2007). The perceptions of the
internal auditors were sought on the effects of the audit committee on the authority and
influence of internal audit specifically the line of reporting and independence of
auditors, the nature of audit processes and the quality of communication, and the
characteristics of the audit committee that could improve the relationship between the
two parties. The findings indicated that there were infrequent and limited
communications between them and that clear reporting lines are needed. The consensus
was that audit committees are highly regarded and essential in supporting the IAFs but
the IAFs need to be well resourced for the audit committees to be effective. The study
by Zain and Subramaniam (2007) and others (Stewart & Subramaniam, 2010; Zaman &
Sarens, 2013) suggest that the relationship between audit committees and internal
auditors needs exploration to improve the internal audit practice and better governance.

Generally, business strategies and corporate structure change in order to create
sustainable competitive advantage. It is now widely recognised that one such business
strategy for organisational excellence is to obtain international certifications for
products and services. This move necessitates that organisations establish a quality
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assurance department (Skrabec, 1999) alongside the ‘traditional’ internal audit
department to undertake self-reviews as part of the monitoring and continuous
improvement process. The complexities of business activities and evolving roles of
internal audit to meet the demands of organisations may lead to undertaking
collaborative audits and/or relying on having work performed by others in the
organisation or using external experts.

Another audit strategy is to perform a combined audit, where more than one type of
internal audit activities are conducted at the same time, for example, risk assessment
with legal compliance. A combined internal audit was implemented for ISO 9001 and
EMS 14001 to decrease overlapping assessment of processes and increase the efficiency
of the internal audit process (Pun et al., 2001). With the added pressure for companies to
address environmental issues, internal auditors are also expected to evaluate quality and
environmental management systems. The potential exists for internal auditors to
develop joint audits to permit sharing of views and knowledge even though they may
lack technical expertise to perform environmental audits since internal auditors
emphasis is on internal control (Tucker & Kasper, 1998).

In this study, an investigation will be made on whether the types of assurance activities
described by Rio Tinto as combined audits (Hala, 2008) or as a mixture of systems audit
(Pun et al., 2001) are being conducted in conjunction with internal audit in Malaysia.
The level of combined assurance by the internal auditors could affect the internal audit
performance and may lead to integration of all audit and risk assessment activities into a
single audit program. This will probably ensure a more effective and efficient internal
audit by gathering data across all business processes and reduce duplication in internal
audit activities.

Other than combined assurance, in order to match the fit of internal auditors’ experience
with the activities they conduct; out-sourcing or co-sourcing were done. The main
reasons have been due to the lack of knowledge and technical expertise of the in-house
internal auditors (Barac & Motubatse, 2009; Selim & Yannakas, 2000; K. Van Peursem
& Jiang, 2008). Even though 30% of the internal audit function in Malaysia were outsourced (Haron et al., 2010) and there is evidence that the quality of IAF affects
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financial reporting (Johl et al., 2013), little is known about whether this affects the
performance of internal audit. Views from the CAEs or person’s in-charge of the
internal audit function about in-house and out-source internal audit is critical in
evaluating internal audit performance. Since internal audit function is a major control
environment for corporate governance, the quality of internal audit would impact an
organisation’s corporate governance.

2.7.

Summary

The literature on internal audit, theories associated with internal audit, components in
corporate governance and measures on internal audit is covered in this chapter. These
will be the basis for the research framework and hypotheses development in the
following chapter.
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CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND DEVELOPMENT OF
HYPOTHESES
Propositions about Internal Audit Function and Corporate Governance

3.1.

Introduction

The chapter presents the conceptual framework for the IAF, and explains why the
involvement of an AC and the structure of the IAF are expected to affect performance
and hence ultimately affect corporate governance. The dependent variables investigated
are internal audit performance and corporate governance.

3.2.

Conceptual Framework of Internal Audit Function

In practice, the board of directors is a vital structure in corporate governance where the
implementation of the strategy and direction of an organisation for its on-going success
is delegated to the management. The establishment of the AC at the board of directors’
level, a legal requirement by the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange, creates the linkage
between the IAF to the board of directors under the legal framework where companies
are required to have an IAF (see Figure 3-1).

Corporate
Governance

legal framework

Internal Audit
performance
Audit Committee
Internal Audit function

accountability
planning
information &
transparency

monitoring

management
improvements

execution
reporting

Figure 3-1. Relationship between corporate governance, audit committee and internal
audit
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The IAF reviews all business and decision-making processes and makes the necessary
recommendations to management for improvements. A robust IAF is beneficial as it
acts as an independent advisor for the Board of Directors and senior management
including strengthening corporate performance (Swanson, 2010). It is reasonable to
expect that corporate governance would be affected if recommendations by internal
auditors, which are sanctioned by the AC through the line of reporting for internal audit
activities, are not implemented by management. Due to the nature of their work, internal
auditors’ recommendations usually are for improvements in internal controls and risk
assessment, thereby encompassing resources needed and used by the organisation,
establishment and compliance of rules and policies, and disclosures made on financial
and non-financial matters (see Figure 2-2 on dimensions and attributes of corporate
governance in Chapter 2 section 2.4).

IAFs in Malaysian listed companies share similar characteristics: internal audit process,
internal audit structure, and the role of AC. The internal audit process (see Figure 2-1
in Chapter 2 section 2.2.2) starts from the planning of the audit, audit execution,
reporting of audit findings to monitoring of audit activities (Abdullah, Halim, Zaharim,
A Rashid, & Masodi, 2007; Beckmerhagen et al., 2004; Dittenhofer, 2001a; Fadzil et
al., 2005; Moeller, 2009). The role of ACs in the reporting structure (DeZoort et al.,
2002; Mat Zain & Subramaniam, 2007) has been identified to strengthen internal audit
performance. The AC involvement at various degrees that were highlighted include
ensuring internal audit recommendations being acted upon on a timely basis,
determination of the CAE position, and the scope of the audits relating to risk
management. To make a difference towards corporate governance, it is reasonable to
assume that the internal audit function needs to be effective and be seen as of value to
the organisation.

3.3.

Development of Hypotheses

As a member of the organisation, internal auditors hold a unique agency role. This role
is clearly expected where there is an in-house internal audit function. They are required
to provide independent reviews of the business processes and also must not be seen to
be actively involved in the management of the organisation. The relationships between
the internal auditors and the auditees may be of mutual assistance that could give rise to
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a successful internal audit (Dittenhofer, 1997). Although on the administrative level,
the internal auditors are accountable to the chief executive officer, the reports for all
work done are directed to the AC (Swanson, 2010; IIA, 2012a; n.d.).

To understand how internal audit is perceived and its impact on corporate governance,
in relation to the research questions in Chapter 1 section 1.4, it is proposed that a valueadd internal audit function is likely to occur where organisational and institutional
theories are predominant within the agency relationship where internal audit operates.
The research hypotheses examine the internal audit structure and the involvement of
ACs on internal audit practices on the internal audit performance and the impact of
results of internal audit on corporate governance.

3.3.1 Internal audit structure
3.3.1.1. Internal audit team size
The IIA recommends that the skill composition and size of audit team be dictated by the
services expected by the AC and management (IIA, 2012c). In assembling the team,
The IIA advocates that the following be considered: risks assessment, critical systems
and business processes, business objectives and growth strategies.

In general, audit assignments are carried out in teams. The teams are expected to do
certain audit coverage whether the activities involve, for example, compliance to
policies and regulations; efficiency in performance; or risk management. There is no
specific requirement on the size of the audit department. Recent statistics on audit
budget as a portion of revenue varies greatly depending on industry and annual revenue,
showing 0.16% to 0.38% in banks; 0.04% to 0.09% in biotech/chemical; and 0.03% to
0.08% in companies with revenue up to $19.9b (Beale, 2012). Benson (1995) argued
that team size has no impact on audit coverage. Furthermore, the value of audit could be
maximised by applying specific audit strategies such as, use of audit survey,
streamlining audit procedures; participating in system reviews and conducting followup audits. In the area of information security, an optimum team size of around three
persons is suggested for reviewing policies to avoid delays in the decision making
process (SANS Institute, 2007). Larger audit teams such as seven members do not work
well compared to smaller teams but diversity is also needed (Firth-Cozens, 1992).
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Therefore, it is expected that the size of internal audit teams are quite standardized to
two to three persons with a limit to seven persons, and has no impact on internal audit
performance; hypothesised as the follows:

H1.

Number of audit team members will not be associated with overall
internal audit performance.

The sub-hypotheses relating to the stages in internal audit are as follows:
H1a.

Number of audit team members will not be associated with internal audit
planning.

H1b.

Number of audit team members will not be associated with internal audit
execution.

H1c.

Number of audit team members will not be associated with internal audit
reporting.

H1d.

Number of audit team members will not be associated with internal audit
monitoring.

Teamwork is likely to facilitate collective task achievement and improve performance
(Rousseau, Aubé, & Savoie, 2006). However, the team members should possess diverse
backgrounds, experience and skills suited to the business’s needs to adequately conduct
the internal audit activities (Firth-Cozens, 1992; Powell, 1993). If such experience and
skills are insufficient, a particular audit scope will not be undertaken. For example,
internal auditors provide only limited assistance in environmental audits such as audit
planning and reporting because of the technical orientation (Akers & Klos, 1995). The
responsibility to ensure a competent team is present falls on the CAE at the planning
stage.

The association between team roles and team performance is relevant to internal audit
as internal auditors work in teams on any assignments. The role entrusted to the internal
audit team as an assessor of the effectiveness of internal control would affect the status
of corporate governance. Blenkinsop & Maddison (2007) found the tendency towards
elective homogeneity of teams ̶ with similar traits or backgrounds ̶ in the effort to
ensure improved performance. This situation shed further insights on earlier findings
that showed qualifications of internal auditors were not used as a measure of
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professional commitment towards job performance (Larkin & Schweikart, 1992).
However, certain traits such as increased responsibility and opportunities to develop
skills and abilities were associated highly with success in internal audits. These traits
could be aligned with team dynamics such as team support (e.g., Firth-Cozens, 1992).
Griffith (1999) suggested that to be of significance, the internal auditors need to be
more business and operationally oriented so as to support management’s requirements
and responsibilities. If internal auditors are expected to provide value added services,
these traits or backgrounds would also be identified by the CAEs as being important in
team composition.

3.3.1.2. Internal audit member expertise
Expertise is expected from employees from diverse backgrounds to be applied for
example, in evaluating new technologies, in detecting fraud and assessing policies’
effectiveness (IIA, 2012b). Expertise is also crucial in intuitive decision-making (Salas,
Rosen, & DiazGranados, 2010), as is required in the work of internal auditors that deals
with diverse business activities and governance issues. For instance, expert performance
is affected through intuition on specific areas developed through practice, specialised
skills and experience (Chase & Simon, 1973; Salas et al., 2010). The internal auditors
need to make value judgments based on their expertise on areas for improvements,
reflected through the internal audit findings. The greater the expertise, the more likely
internal audit is effective. As such, the following hypotheses are proposed:

H2

High levels of professional expertise of audit team members will be
associated with high overall internal audit performance.

The sub-hypotheses relating to the stages in internal audit are as follows:
H2a.

High levels of professional expertise of audit team members will be
associated with high internal audit planning.

H2b.

High levels of professional expertise of audit team members will be
associated with high internal audit execution.

H2c.

High levels of professional expertise of audit team members will be
associated with high internal audit reporting.

H2d.

High levels of professional expertise of audit team members will be
associated with high internal audit monitoring.
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3.3.1.3. Internal audit member experience
Other than expertise, skills and knowledge of team members are necessary (IIA, 2013;
Firth-Cozens, 1992). Skills and knowledge are built through the years, creating
experience. Higher experience team members have better developed teamwork
knowledge and are more effective in their teamwork (Rentsch, Heffner, & Duffy, 1994).
Additionally, Dyer (cited in Rentsch et al., 1994, p. 454) states that high-experienced
teams performed better than less-experienced teams. Rentsch et al. (1994) assert that
members in low experience teams are inflexible in the use of their knowledge. The more
the experience, the greater the auditors’ error knowledge and the related control
objectives being violated, and the greater the ethical stance (O’Leary & Stewart, 2007;
Tubbs, 1992). Experienced auditors provide a more complete picture on the
explanations for the occurrence of audit findings (Libby & Frederick, 1990), resulting in
a higher performance in auditing. The following hypothesis predicts similar results:

H3

High levels of experience of audit professionals will be associated with
overall high internal audit performance.

The sub-hypotheses relating to the stages in internal audit are as follows:
H3a.

High levels of experience of audit professionals will be associated with
high internal audit planning.

H3b.

High levels of experience of audit professionals will be associated with
high internal audit execution.

H3c.

High levels of experience of audit professionals will be associated with
high internal audit reporting.

H3d.

High levels of experience of audit professionals will be associated with
high internal audit monitoring.

3.3.1.4. Combined audit activities
The assessment on the effectiveness of business processes by internal auditors will
require them to gather information across departments in the organisation. Team
members engaged in various activities may exchange appropriate information, known as
boundary spanning, as part of their decision making process. Rudolph and Welker
(1998) found that boundary spanning occurred with the aim to obtaining information as
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well as to reduce uncertainties in audits, subsequently, improving auditors’ judgment.
Pendlebury and Shriem (1991) placed emphasis on the need for internal auditors to be
supported with personnel from other disciplines or service experts, which was
evidenced later by Akers and Klos (1995), albeit, by a small occurrence of 4% of the top
100 of the Fortune 500 Industrial Companies. Instances of combined audit activities
giving rise to more effective internal audits were indicated in ISO internal audits (Pun et
al., 2001) and the different internal audit activities by Rio Tinto (Hala, 2008). Similar to
the audits mentioned by Gill & Cosserat (1993), Benson (1995) and Khemakhe (2001)
recommended the use of combined audits of financial, operational, risk assessments and
compliance audits in a comprehensive audit approach to streamline audit procedures.
As such, it is suggested that by having combined audits, there will be greater efficiency
in internal audits, as indicated by the following propositions:

H4

A combination of audit activities will be associated with overall high
internal audit performance.

The sub-hypotheses relating to the stages in internal audit are as follows:
H4a.

A combination of audit activities will be associated with high internal
audit planning.

H4b. A combination of audit activities will be associated with high internal
audit execution.
H4c.

A combination of audit activities will be associated with high internal
audit reporting.

H4d. A combination of audit activities will be associated with high internal
audit monitoring.

3.3.1.5. Collaboration of audit activities
Ensuing from combined audits, collaborations with other departments or other experts
would also enhanced performance as not every member in the audit team will have the
necessary technical experience or expertise to audit all audit areas. Powell (1993) stated
that it is usual to include specialists such as in IT, production and engineering, who are
suited to the business needs. Collaboration, a form or alliance formation and partnering,
is a key response to situations like cost pressures and illustrates the point in ‘two heads
are better than one’ (Chua, 2011). Another similar strategy is joint audits, where two
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firms simultaneously perform an audit and issue a common audit report. Joint audits
have been found to affect positively the audit quality of audit firms (Deng, Lu, Simunic,
& Ye, 2012; Zerni, Haapamäki, Järvinen, & Niemi, 2012). However, active
collaboration is still a challenge (Chua, 2011).

Since most companies adopt

certification as part of their strategies in organisational excellence and having internal
audits as a vital monitoring activity, overall organisational teamwork should make for
better performance. Accordingly, the level of collaboration in internal audit activities
with other departments would impact positively on internal audit performance. The
following hypothesis is proposed:

H5

Number of collaborations of audit activities will be associated with high
overall internal audit performance.

The sub-hypotheses relating to the stages in internal audit are as follows:
H5a.

Number of collaborations of audit activities will be associated with high
internal audit planning.

H5b.

Number of collaborations of audit activities will be associated with high
internal audit execution.

H5c.

Number of collaborations of audit activities will be associated with high
internal audit reporting.

H5d.

Number of collaborations of audit activities will be associated with high
internal audit monitoring.

3.3.2. Audit committee involvement
3.3.2.1. Audit committee composition
A major role for the AC is oversight of corporate governance (Verschoor et al., 2002).
The formal channel of communication used by the internal auditors in general, is
through the AC, a sub-committee of the Board of Directors. This organisation structure
aids the independence of the internal auditors as a majority of the audit committee
members are independent (Mat Zain & Subramaniam, 2007). ACs ought to be
independent and be knowledgeable in financial matters (Verschoor et al., 2002). The
corporate governance guidelines by the Securities Commission in Malaysia have
specified the compliance requirements for the composition of the AC members that at
least one of them should have financial professional qualification (Bursa Malaysia,
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2009b; Haron et al., 2005). Organisations with strong corporate governance are likely to
appoint an accounting financial expert on the AC (Krishnan & Lee, 2009). Cohen et al.
(2004) suggested that a more knowledgeable AC has greater cooperation with the
auditors. It is expected that the required minimum level of professional competency of
AC members will be followed as this competency aids in the performance review of the
IAF. However, expertise in more oversight areas such as auditing and law are preferable
(DeZoort, 1997), for which AC reviews done would subsequently lead to a higher
internal audit performance. Accordingly, the hypotheses below are proposed:

H6

High levels of professional competency of audit committee members will
be associated with high overall internal audit performance.

The sub-hypotheses relating to the stages in internal audit are as follows:
H6b.

High levels of professional competency of audit committee members will
be associated with high internal audit planning.

H6c.

High levels of professional competency of audit committee members will
be associated with high internal audit execution.

H6d.

High levels of professional competency of audit committee members will
be associated with high internal audit reporting.

H6e.

High levels of professional competency of audit committee members will
be associated with high internal audit monitoring.

3.3.2.2. Review of internal audit activities
The Securities Commission in Malaysia also outlines the duties of ACs with regards to
the internal audit function (Bursa Malaysia, 2009b). The reviews that are entrusted to
the AC relates to various internal audit stages. An effective relationship between
internal auditors and the AC is critical to the internal audit performance (Deloitte, 2012;
MIA, 2012). Various review questions needed to be considered, for example, whether
audit plans are aligned to key business risks, whether peer review or self-assessments on
internal audit performance are conducted, is there appropriate staffing and mix of
professionals, and whether there is tracking of management actions on audit findings
(Bailey, 2007; Deloitte, 2012; DeZoort, 1997). Although annual or periodical
assessments on IAF by the AC should be carried out, a comprehensive review covering
the stages in the internal audit activities was not duly done (Bailey, 2007; Deloitte,
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2012; DeZoort, 1997; Schneider, 2010). It is expected that frequent interaction of the
AC with the IAF will create an effective relationship through the reviews done on the
different stages of internal audit practices. Thus, the following hypotheses are proposed:

H7

High levels of review of the internal audit plan by audit committee
members will be associated with high overall internal audit performance.

H7a.

High levels of review of internal audit plan by audit committee members
will be associated with high internal audit planning.

H8.

High levels of review of the conduct of internal audit by audit committee
members will be associated with high overall internal audit activities.

H8a.

High levels of review of the conduct of internal audit by audit committee
members will be associated with high internal audit execution.

H9.

High levels of review by the audit committee members of actions taken
on internal audit recommendations will be associated with high overall
internal audit activities.

H9a.

High levels of review by the audit committee members of actions taken
on internal audit recommendations will be associated with high internal
audit reporting and monitoring.

3.3.3. Internal audit performance
Since internal audit is a review of the business processes, the impact of internal audit on
corporate governance could be gauged by identifying whether internal audits have made
any recommendations on the dimensions of the corporate governance framework.
Arguden (2010) maintained that the objective of corporate governance measurement is
for compliance and improvements. Similarly, Benson (1995) argued that the assessment
made by auditors in follow-up audits will determine whether there are improvements in
performance and accountability, including the responsiveness of management towards
audit

recommendations.

Additionally,

follow-up

audits

could

determine the

effectiveness of audits in introducing needed improvements in organisations.

48

CHAPTER 3: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND DEVELOPMENT OF
HYPOTHESES

It is expected that the CAE would be able to identify where benefits have accrued to the
organisation as a result of the internal audit activities. About fifty one percent of internal
auditors surveyed in 2006 have used audit findings and recommendations as a measure
of the value-add services of internal auditors (Burnaby & Haas, 2009). It is assumed
that the more areas in corporate governance identified where audit findings are raised
(refer to the four dimensions of corporate governance in Figure 3-1 in section 3.2) ̶
either positive or negative findings ̶ the greater the impact on corporate governance.
Accordingly, the following is proposed:

H10.

High levels of internal audit performance will be associated with a
greater number of recommendations for improvements of elements in the
corporate governance framework.

In summary, the examination of internal audit and its impact on corporate governance is
depicted in the conceptual framework in Figure 3-2.
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Figure 3-2: Conceptual framework for testing hypotheses

3.4.

Summary

This chapter sets out the conceptual framework of internal audit and how it functions in
the corporate governance structure of organisations that led to the development of the
hypotheses.

The next chapter discusses the methodology of this study.
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CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY
Researching Internal Audit Function Using Mixed Methods

4.1.

Introduction

The conduct of a study varies with the viewpoint or general perspective of an inquiry.
As such, certain beliefs or assumptions referred to as a paradigm, dictate the
researcher’s actions (Guba & Lincoln, 2005). This study’s objective is to uncover the
effectiveness of the IAF of Malaysian public listed companies and its impact on
corporate governance. To give an understanding of the motivation for choosing the
particular research method, first, the research paradigm is discussed.

Secondly, this chapter describes the research design and methodology used. In
explaining the various research activities, the data collection and analysis are discussed
in the various phases as shown in Figure 4-1 in section 4.3. Thirdly, in conjunction with
the modeling of the IAF, the theoretical construct and design of the survey instrument
are described in detail. These are followed by an explanation as to why the Rasch
measurement is used in addition to the true score measurement theory for examining the
data.

4.2.

Paradigm

A paradigm is a philosophy deeply entrenched in one’s personal experiences, culture
and history (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011, pp. 21-23). It comprises a certain set of
assumptions about reality (ontology) that is translated into hypotheses, knowledge about
that reality (epistemology) and the specific way of knowing about that reality
(methodology) (Guba, 1990).

Both ontology and epistemology affect the choice of research methods (Bisman, 2010;
Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011). Two polar paradigms often cited are interpretive and
positivist. An interpretive or idealistic stance is characterized by an exploratory study
with the purpose of interviewing stakeholders in understanding the truths or realities of
the researched subject (Burrell & Morgan, 1979), for example, investigating the
informal processes of ACs (Turley & Zaman, 2007). As the research method is
qualitative, data gathered are descriptive and explanatory with context given to words
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used in the interview data. Whereas in a positivist stance, the researcher will predict and
explain the changes observed, for example, determining whether compliance to internal
auditing practices affects the internal control system of a company (Fadzil et al., 2005).
The research method then, is quantitative and measurable from questionnaire data.

This study takes a functionalist and interpretive approach (Dunn, 2010; Modell, 2009;
Schultz & Hatch, 1996). The functionalist paradigm focuses on providing rational
explanations of social affairs in a pragmatic way, approaching positivism (Burrell &
Morgan, 1979; Dunn, 2010). Based on the functionalist approach, the organisational
structure of the IAF and the processes in the internal audit activities are those that are
acceptable to the norms of the society, comprising the business community, the
accounting and auditing profession and the legislators in commerce. However, a pure
functionalist approach could not explain situations outside the norms (Dunn, 2010). As
such, the interpretive approach is also used. The research done is to identify and verify
essential generative mechanisms and structures that produce actions and events
pertaining to effective internal audit and its impact on corporate governance, wherein
both quantitative and qualitative methodologies are used (Bisman, 2010; Carlsson,
2005). The suggestion by Sarens (2009) to investigate the impact of IAF quality on the
quality of corporate governance was followed, as discussed below.

As internal audit is part of the mechanism in the decision-making process within
corporate governance, the examination of the impact of internal audit on corporate
governance requires the understanding of the internal audit activities and the interaction
of internal auditors with ACs. This examination requires an interpretive approach, in
addition to the functionalist approach. Acquiring this knowledge involves the
consideration of how individuals namely, CAEs, perceive their present and future
realities, and how their relationships and the perception of their internal audit activities
impact the corporate governance of their organisations.

As detailed in Chapter 2 in the literature review of internal audit performance and the
regulatory framework in Malaysia, the research paradigm in this study is as follows:
1. IAF is assumed to be present in all public listed companies,
2. The relative impact of internal audit on corporate governance could be explored,
and
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3. The assertion of collaboration or combined assurance in internal audit activities
needs to be exposed.

The aims and research questions in this study together with the above paradigm called
for the use of a quantitative method to produce conclusions useful for shaping or
improving internal audit practices through the hypotheses and the design of the survey
instrument. Additionally, the unique manner that IAF operates in individual
organisations and the perceptions of the CAEs are explored qualitatively through indepth interviews.

4.3.

Research Process

This research explores how internal audits enhance corporate governance particularly,
the effects of internal audit performance on corporate governance and the level of
collaborations or combined assurances in internal audit of Malaysian listed companies.
Existing research on internal audits has offered little insight into the above. Neither
quantitative nor qualitative methods by themselves are sufficient to provide the answers
sought (Ivankova & Stick, 2007). Using both quantitative and qualitative methods or
mixed method research will provide a better understanding of the research questions and
give stronger inferences on the gathered data (Creswell, 2005; Creswell & Plano Clark,
2011; Molina-Azorin, 2012; Morgan, 1998). In addition, Bisman (2010) argued that
taking either an idealistic or interpretive stance that focuses on a particular context may
be incapable of supporting generalisations, which are needed in improving practice and
policy. For this reason, Bisman forwarded that an examination of human behaviours in
the accounting field by mixed research methods is beneficial.

Evidences of certain aspects of internal audit such as performance of internal audit
activities and ACs interactions have predominantly been done quantitatively through
questionnaires (Fadzil et al., 2005; Mat Zain & Subramaniam, 2007; Stewart &
Subramaniam, 2010). Case studies and qualitative method using interviews in internal
audit were conducted, for instance, to give in-depth understanding of the
communication process between internal auditors and ACs (Mat Zain & Subramaniam,
2007; Turley & Zaman, 2007) and adding richness in understanding the roles of internal
auditors (Eisenhardt, 1989; Nagy & Cenker, 2002; K. A. Van Peursem, 2005).
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A case study approach is identified as a research strategy and not a method (Hartley,
1994). In the initial stage of this research on the internal audit and its impact on
corporate governance, the research strategy was to do case studies to seek useful
information and explanations on the various processes relating to the interaction
between internal auditors and ACs. As pointed by Merriam (1998) and Hartley (1994) a
case study is an exploration or detailed investigation of a bounded system and valuable
if the research interest is about understanding the processes of events in relation to its
context. The bounded system could be as in this study, the present IAF of public listed
companies in Malaysia.

Case studies are useful in answering questions on how and why particular activities are
undertaken (Yin, 2009). The questions could be related to how an IAF is managed, how
collaborations and combined assurances are done, and why these activities are done in
achieving good corporate governance as perceived by the CAEs. A case study can be
single or multiple (Creswell, 1998, 2005; Yin, 2009). Multiple case studies are also
called a collective case study (Stake, 1995). Data are collected usually over a period of
time and may include in-depth interviews with a variety of people, questionnaires,
archives and observations. Due to the extensive data-gathering in the examination of
processes in great depth for case studies and both the functionalist and interpretive
approaches outlined earlier for this research on internal audit, a case study analysis was
not undertaken in favour of mixed methods.

The motivation for undertaking mixed method research in this study is also to
corroborate the results on the quantitative aspect of how internal audits enhance
corporate governance by using a qualitative method. With the conscious strategies
undertaken by management for organisational excellence, namely ISO certifications and
other accreditations, some companies have undertaken internal audit activities in
varying ways. These variances may point to evidence of collaborations in internal audits
with other parties outside the internal audit department. Consequently, there is a need to
explore these important issues to discover the internal auditors’ perspective on the
performance of the IAF.

The internal auditors’ or the CAEs’ perspective has also been reviewed in other studies
such as in the practices of decision-making and interaction mechanism in IAFs and the
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performance of internal audit (Abdullah et al., 2008; Fadzil et al., 2005; O’Leary &
Stewart, 2007; Turley & Zaman, 2007; Zaman & Sarens, 2013). This study is identified
as a convergent mixed methods design (Creswell, 2005, 2014; Creswell & Plano Clark,
2011; Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998) where quantitative and qualitative data are collected
in parallel. The responses are analysed separately and then merged as shown in Figure
4-1.

Figure 4-1. Research process map for the convergent mixed method design (adapted
from Creswell, 2014; Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011)
The first quantitative phase gives a general understanding of the research question and
tests of hypotheses by studying the effects of internal audit structures and the
involvement of ACs on IAF performance, and the subsequent impact on corporate
governance. A survey instrument is developed and the construct for the questionnaire
items are discussed in relation to the model of IAD (see section 4.4). A pilot test of the
survey instrument is done before the quantitative data are collected (see section 4.6 and
section 4.8.1 about reliability of the survey instrument). At the same time, in the
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qualitative phase, data are gathered from in-depth interviews and archived data and are
then analysed. The in-depth interviews explore practices of internal audit including
composition of the audit team, evidence of collaborations and combined assurance in
internal audits, and the level of involvement of ACs. The qualitative phase compares
and corroborates the results on the quantitative phase to give better insight into the
performance of the IAF and the agency theory than would be obtained through using
either method separately.

Before any data were collected for this study, ethical clearance was given by the Edith
Cowan University Human Research Ethics Committee. The ethical guidelines provide
for the protection of confidentiality and anonymity of research participants.

The

following paragraphs discuss the model and measurement of the IAF, followed by the
details on the survey and research interview.

4.4.

The Model of Internal Audit Function within Corporate Governance

In answering the question on how internal audit has enhanced corporate governance, a
workable model of the performance of IAF needs to be develop by considering the main
aspects of internal audits. Literature on practices of internal audits suggests two distinct
components (see Figure 3-1 in Chapter 3 section 3.2): internal audit process – planning,
execution, reporting, and monitoring – and, the reporting structure to the AC. The
attributes of an internal audit process are derived from the types of activities carried out
as good practice in each of the audit stages (Beckmerhagen et al., 2004; Buttery &
Simpson, 1989; Fadzil et al., 2005; ISO, 2008; ISO, 2011; Moeller, 2009; Swanson,
2010; Thompson, 1996), which are summarised below:

Audit planning
1. Internal audits should be planned incorporating the scope and objective of audit
work, relevant rules and regulations relating to the process or area to be audited,
and timing of the audit.
2. An audit plan should consider the status and importance of the process and areas
to be audited, potential risks, identified weaknesses and the results of previous
audits.
3. An annual audit plan is generally approved by the AC.
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4. Audit criteria, which include key controls and performance measures in the audit
programs or checklist, are used as references in implementing the audit.
5. Audit plans are also communicated to the auditee except for special or
investigative audits.
6. Internal audit assignments are carried out by audit teams. Audit team leaders are
appointed based on suitability (qualification and competence) for the assignment.

Audit execution
1.

The audit team members were chosen based on their qualification and
competencies to undertake the audit.

2. Informing the auditee of the objective and scope of the audit before
commencement.
3. Audit execution considers the process, the manner of implementation,
competencies of personnel operating in the audit area and the presence of
weaknesses.
4. Internal auditors are required to obtain reliable information as audit evidence
through various means, for e.g., use of statistical sampling if appropriate, checking
of systems, vouching to supporting documents, making observation and
performing analytical tests.
5. Reviews and adequate supervision are done on the audit progress. New team
members who may lack the appropriate experience are usually placed together
with those having more experience.
6. Audit criteria, audit tests, evidences and audit findings are usually documented for
easy retrievable. Audit documentation helps in the clarification of the judgments
made by internal auditors and in the follow-ups of audit findings.
7.

Audit findings are reported clearly and presented to management for them to take
appropriate corrective actions to eliminate the root causes of such weaknesses.

Audit reporting
1.

The results and outcomes of internal audits are evaluated against the audit
objective.

2.

The conclusions on the internal audits are usually reported to the audit committee
and are monitored.

57

CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

3. Audit reports will also show the status of previous audit findings through audit
follow-ups.
4. Other matters brought to the AC will also include any resource needs for the
internal audit department.

Audit monitoring
1. Where audit findings have been made and management has agreed to take
corrective actions, follow-ups are made by internal auditors to ensure the taken
by management are effective.
2. Where corrective actions are found to be ineffective, these will also be
communicated to the management and AC. Management is expected to initiate
other measures for improvements.
3. Once management and internal auditors are satisfied that the improvement is in
place, it is expected that efforts be made to standardize the improvement.
Usually the change in process will be noted by the internal auditors for changes
in audit procedures in the following audit.
4. As part of the prescribed practice by the profession, self-assessments and peer
reviews are usually done on the conduct of the internal audit for performance
improvement.

To determine the performance of internal audit, Dittenhofer (2001a) suggested that a
review is made on whether the tasks required to be performed were accomplished as
described by the audit objective. Also, an overall evaluation would need to consider the
internal audit system, collective auditing processes and the degree of achievement of the
audit objectives (Beckmerhagen et al., 2004; Dittenhofer, 2001a). The degree of
achievement would suggest that there are degrees of difficulties in performing specific
tasks.

A study using the concept of audit task complexity looked at task difficulties to judge
the extent to which audits were coordinated including through audit programs and
formal policies (Dirsmith et al., 2000). The auditors in that study were asked among
others, how often they encountered difficult problems, the time to complete audit tasks,
and how easily the assignments were completed.
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Another study on internal audit practices found that certain activities were difficult and
others were easy to undertake (Abdullah et al., 2008; Abdullah & Masodi, 2012). The
researchers used the Rasch model to measure task difficulties. Among the difficult items
are; assessment based on industry standards, retrieval of information, use of statistics in
audit procedures and ensuring observation of rules. Items that were found to be easy
include confidentiality of information, reporting on closures of audit findings and
assessing business processes. The above attributes in the internal audit process in each
of the audit stage were used as the basis of the conceptual model of this study, as
explained below.

An approach to constructing measures is to consider the presence of a single underlying
characteristic or unidimensionality in the instrument design (Wilson, 2013; Wright &
Stone, 1999). The exploration into determining the impact of an internal audit on
corporate governance is multidimensional. Wilson (2013) suggested that the approach
to measure multidimensionality is to consider each construct separately. A number of
items could be used to measure a construct in a reasonable way instead of relying only
on one true task or item. Andrich (1988, p. 14) stated that when an observation is made,
‘the actual properties are not observed – only the manifestations are observed. The
properties are abstractions based on the patterns of observations’.

This study assumes that the properties termed as constructs or latent variables of the
IAF being measured, incorporating the internal audit practices and the reporting
function, have a specific continuous form – from easy to difficult – to be accomplished.
All items for the IAF are assumed as a unidimensional latent variable to assess the
ability to perform an effective internal audit. Rasch measurement model is suited for all
ability or achievement evaluation, provided the items used are appropriate to the
research area (Pellinen et al., 2011). The structure or construct map of the types of
internal audit activities relating to Figure 3-1 in Chapter 3 section 3.2, for the
performance of an IAF in the internal audit survey (IAS), the complexity of the
activities and the Rasch measurement model is shown in Table 4-1. The Rasch
measurement model is able to distinguish the degree of difficulties of items based on a
person’s perception of the achievements or frequency of undertaking the specified tasks.
Further explanation on measurement and the choice of using the Rasch model is
provided in the next section in this chapter.
59

CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

Table 4-1
Proposed construct map for the ‘performance of internal audit function’ construct in
the ‘internal audit activities’ part of the IAS. Adapted from (Abdullah et al., 2008;
Abdullah & Masodi, 2012) and literature review.

Difficulty of
tasks

Activities in audit process
Audit planning
unrestricted access to information
set key performance metrics for audit assignments
confirm key control areas of business process
communicate audit plan to BOD and operations
evaluate policy implementation effectiveness
set performance objectives as reference in audit program
appoint auditors with necessary skills
verify communication of management policies
identify processes of concern to management
monitor auditors’ competency for training purposes
Audit execution
list audit findings based on significance and impact
determine information availability on consistency of transactions
inform management of follow-up audits
clarify root causes of audit findings
auditee available as scheduled
determine from auditee changes in processes or controls
verify understanding of use of information or transaction handled
determine overrides to processes or controls
check with auditee on how to detect errors
identify issues of potential waste in resources
use statistics to review systems performance
Audit reporting
report contains status of previous audit recommendations
reports accepted without further queries
reports specify clearly implications/potential of problems
discuss reasonableness of audit findings with management
corrective actions seen as an avenue for improvements
team leaders discuss issues with management on conduct of audit
report gives information on inefficiencies in resource management
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Difficulty of
tasks

Activities in audit process
Audit monitoring
review samples from recent records in follow-up audit
receive reviews outside of internal audit on checklists
review feedback on audit activities with management
management monitors improvement activities
statistical data analyses in promoting preventive measures
receive reviews on audit reports from reporting authority
continuous updates of audit procedures

easy

difficult

Another component to the IAF as mentioned earlier (see Figure 3-1 in Chapter 3 section
3.2) is the reporting structure to AC. Reporting flows mainly from three internal audit

activities:

planning,

reporting

and

monitoring.

Communication

of

audit

recommendations with stakeholders and an auditee was done without much difficulty
with ratings of 79.6 – 83.3% (Cooper et al., 1996). The role of receiving and responding
to audit reports are the most significant in most cases, deemed easily undertaken by AC
members (Mat Zain & Subramaniam, 2007; Turley & Zaman, 2007). Since the presence
of an AC is mandatory for corporate governance of listed companies in Malaysia, the
roles of the AC regarding oversight of internal audit are stated in the listing
requirements and disclosed in the annual reports (Haron et al., 2010).

In practice, ACs generally are not actively involved in reviewing audit programs and
internal audit processes. ACs involvement is concentrated on ensuring the audit plan is
met and there is easy acceptance of audit reports with limited review of audit work plan
or program and questioning the basis of audit findings (Turley & Zaman, 2007). CAEs
had argued that AC members needed aid to assess audit programs and are comfortable
enough to approve the programs as tabled (Mat Zain & Subramaniam, 2007). These two
activities, review of internal audit processes and programs, are expected to be viewed
comparatively as difficult to be achieved by the AC. For Malaysian listed companies,
the requirements for AC involvements in the activities of internal audit have been
specified but as yet not determined as to the level of achievement by ACs. Accordingly,
these requirements are used in the IAS (Bursa Malaysia, 2000; Securities Commission
Malaysia, 2007) and structured according to the level of difficulties as shown in Table
4-2.
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Table 4-2
Proposed construct map for the ‘involvement of audit committee’ construct in the
‘internal audit activities’ part of the IAS based on literature review.

AC involvement in reviews of
results of the internal audit
management actions on recommendation
scope of the internal audit activity
functions of the internal audit department
resources of the internal audit function
competency of the internal audit function
internal audit processes
internal audit program

Difficulty
of tasks
easy

difficult

Similarly, the items for determining the impact of internal audit on corporate
governance by reference to the areas of audit findings is considered another construct,
with items identified from easy to difficult. Instead of using the OECD principles of
corporate governance (2004) as a measure of corporate governance, a new measure
based on the components of corporate governance by the World Bank (1991), as shown
in Figure 2-2 in Chapter 2 section 2.4 and Figure 3-1 in Chapter 3 section 3.2, is used.
As mentioned in Chapter 2 section 2.4, these dimensions or components are better
suited in reviewing the impact of an internal audit on aspects of governance, which
focus more on the processes within an organisation instead of the aspects of
stakeholders’ interest.

Grambling and Hermanson (2009) identified that a determinant of the quality of internal
audit were the value of the audit reports and resulting implementations of audit
recommendations. Customarily, auditing focused on finance and compliance with
procedural rules specifically review of internal control; now, it has shifted towards
performance measurement or operational efficiency, and review of business activities
and potential risks (Al Athmay, 2008; Cooper et al., 1996).

The most frequent audit findings being reported are related to internal control,
compliance and risk assessment (Leung, Cooper, & Robertson, 2004). Frequently cited
areas in financial or earnings management are financial disclosures, asset valuation,
capital write-offs, confidentiality and conflicts of interest. Leung et al. also found that
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the AC is also more involved in disclosures in financial reporting and issues of
conflicts. Because 87% of the respondents reported regularly on internal control, it is
presumed that findings would relate to areas of compliance to rules and policies.
Further, the majority of internal audits have focused on operational areas (Cooper et al.,
1996). As such, it is deemed that revenue management and areas dealing with business
processes such as expenditure, finance, personnel and the related rules and policies,
would not pose a difficult task to the internal auditors.

With the broader role of internal audit in corporate governance, the internal auditors are
expected to go beyond the financial areas and be capable of giving assurances and
consultations on integrity of the information system, risk management and the
effectiveness of management (Cooper et al., 1996; Leung et al., 2004; Powell, 1993).
Two challenges where organisations have instituted a strategic performance system such
as a balance scorecard are making meaningful interpretations of performance data by
those with evaluation skills and ensuring the IT system is providing data that can be
used by the organisation in its business processes (Franco & Bourne, 2003). With the
expanded role, internal auditors are expected to have adequate skills to evaluate the
management information system. The abilities, which can be linked to the IT system,
and making meaningful interpretations include retrieving related data on productivity,
assessing the performance against industry standards and identifying wasteful activities
or inefficiencies (Abdullah et al., 2008).

Other studies have found that an audit on the information system is difficult due to a
lack of expertise and financial resources (Cooper, Leung, & Mathews, 1994; Cooper et
al., 1996). Chambers (2014) commented that IT auditing competency is an area not
seriously handled by CAEs. The CAES are said to take defensive stands such as
ignoring IT risks and outsourcing. As such, audit findings in areas related to the IT
system and the analysis of data are expected to be rarely reported and presumably
difficult to be achieved.

The construct map for the impact on corporate governance based on issues raised in
internal audit findings is shown in Table 4-3. The format of the item can be either a
fixed-response such as the Likert-style scale, for example, Strongly Disagree to
Strongly Agree, or an open-ended item (Wilson, 2013). The fixed-response format with
63

CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

an attitude scale of Never to Always is used for the internal audit activities (similar to
Abdullah et al., 2008) and audit committee involvement to gauge the perception of the
CAEs on the occurrence of such instances. For audit findings and collaborations or
combined assurance, an open-ended response format is used as these activities are being
explored for the first time in this area of research.
Table 4-3
Proposed construct map for the ‘areas in which issues or audit findings raised’ part of
the IAS based on literature review.

Internal audit findings in areas of
revenue management
expenditure management
financial performance
personnel management
compliance to rules
rules enforcement
rules and policies change procedure
economic performance
complaints procedure
conflict resolution
corruption prevention
information transparency
analysis of data
dissemination of information
4.5.

Difficulty
of tasks
easy

difficult

Measurement

Measurement is the assignment of numbers on a linear continuum to a particular
concept, showing its’ magnitudes from low to high or in a ‘more and less’ judgment
with equal distances between the numbers (Andrich, 1988; Thurstone, 1928; Wright &
Stone, 1999). Measures are based on discrete observations that are transformed using
mathematical models (Andrich, 1988). The purpose of measurement is stated clearly by
Wilson (2013, p. 4) as ‘to provide a reasonable and consistent way to summarize the
responses that people make to express their achievements, attitudes, or personal points
of view through instruments such as attitude scales, achievement tests, questionnaires,
surveys, and psychological scales’. Two main theories on measurement are considered
in researching internal audit function and its impact on corporate governance in
Malaysia: true score theory and latent trait theory.
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4.5.1. True score theory
The true score theory or classical test theory (CTT) is based on the assumption that the
total scores or raw scores of correctly answered items measures a person’s ability or
knowledge. All items contribute equally to the total score and that equal differences in
the scores demarcate equal ranges of ability (Sick, 2008a). The prime indicator of test
quality is reliability or Spearman correlation coefficient. In CTT, reliability is measured
by KR-20 index and Cronbach’s coefficient alpha computed from raw scores (Andrich,
1982; Christensen, Kreiner, & Mesbah, 2013; Sick, 2008a; Wright & Stone, 1999).

When ordinal scales are used, such as rating of items on a Likert scale, it is assumed
that each item contributes equally to the raw score, when in actuality the interval is
unknown (Merbitz, Morris, & Grip, 1989). This presumption may lead to misinference
because a useful measure needs to be linear; a value of 2 is twice as large as 1. Raw
score only describes the raw data and considered as ranking of items on an ordinal scale
(T. G. Bond & Fox, 2007, p. 2; Sick, 2008b; Wright & Stone, 1999, p. 31). The use of
raw score fractions or percentages has the tendency to clump responses around the
middle scores (T. G. Bond & Fox, 2007, p. 24). Further, the non-linearity bias of raw
scores becomes significant with extreme scores (Smith Jr., Wakely, De Kruif, & Swatz,
2003; Wright, 1999). Because the data originated from ordinal observations and being
non-linear,

raw

scores

also

lacks

other

characteristics

of

measurement:

unidimensionality; items not ordered to levels of difficulty; person and items measure
of differing scales; and measures of different test with the same topic cannot be validly
linked to a single scale (Reckase, Ackerman, & Carlson, 1988; Waugh & Chapman,
2005; Wright & Stone, 1999). An alternative to the true score theory is latent trait
theory.

4.5.2. Latent trait theory
Latent trait theory is also referred to as the item response theory or item characteristic
curve theory which is traceable to the work of Lawley and Lazarfield in 1943 and 1950,
respectively (cited in Hambleton, Swaminathan, Cook, Eignor, & Gifford, 1978). The
theory states that a person’s performance can be predicted through the scores obtained
on defined characteristics or traits that are used in a test instrument. Traits are not
directly measurable, thus, are referred to as latent traits or abilities. Latent trait theory
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stipulates that there is a relationship between observed test performance and
unobservable traits or abilities assumed in the test construct (Hambleton et al., 1978;
Wright & Stone, 1999). The limitations in CTT, as listed above, were addressed in
latent trait theory. The most applied probabilistic measurement model for latent trait
theory is the Rasch model (Andrich, 1988; T. G. Bond & Fox, 2007; Waugh &
Chapman, 2005; Wright & Mok, 2004).
4.5.3. Rasch model
The Rasch model is a mathematical model in the form of a simple logistic model (SLM)
to compare data. There are a few differences and similarities between the CTT and SLM
even though in general, the items used for testing are neither too easy or too difficult
(Andrich, 1988, pp. 83-85). First, the total unweighted score or raw score (the statistic)
characterizes the person in both SLM and CTT. However, in SLM, the statistic resulted
from a model specified at the item level. Second, the statistic estimates the person’s
unknown location parameter (termed as true score in CTT).

CTT assumed the linearity of raw score to the true score with a normally distributed
random error, but in SLM, this regression is nonlinear. Moreover, in SLM the scale
values of the items are defined relative to each item and independent of the person’s
locations distribution. This definition of scale values in SLM allows tests on person’s
locations and items difficulties; focusing on the person’s ability or probability of
success of 0.5 in answering or performing a task. Because of the differences outlined, it
is possible to model the latent traits in investigating the internal audit function through
transformation of the data collected from the survey using the Rasch model even if the
data are not normally distributed.

The greatest advantage of this model is the possibility of testing the fit of data to the
model, implying that correct measurement is accomplished for the constructed
instrument. In contrast with CTT which uses raw scores, reliability in Rasch which is
known as Separation Index, is computed from the estimated person measures (locations)
and their standard errors (Andrich, 1982, 1988; Wright & Stone, 1999). Separation
index overcomes the shortcomings in the characteristics of KR-20 and the generalized
Cronbach alpha for internal consistency which are as follows:
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1. Item response variance is based on the ‘average’ person sampled. If the
distribution is not normal, then the error variance of the ‘average’ person differs
from the average of an individual person’s error variances.
2. Since the variance of raw scores of sampled persons is greater than zero, KR-20
will always overestimate the score error variances of persons with extremely low
or high scores.
3. The anticipated reliability of a proposed application with a previously given KR20 is unlikely unless the proposed sample is known to have the same score
distribution.
4. The use of raw scores for calculating sample variance is misleading as raw
scores are not linear representations of a variable (Wright & Stone, 1999).

Bond and Fox stated,
The model is based on the idea that useful measurement involves examination of
only one human attribute at a time (unidimensionality) on a hierarchical “more
than/less than” line of inquiry. This line of inquiry is a theoretical idealization
against which we can compare patterns of responses that do not coincide with this
ideal (2007, p. 41).

Responses in a test instrument to measure ability, attitude or perception differ
depending on time and circumstances.

Wright and Mok (2004) suggested that

experience is continuous but at the moment or time we notice experience or make an
observation, it becomes discrete: counting begins and has a function of time, with the
intention of replication. There are situations where indications of more or less of a
dimension defining the experience can be introduced as categories within each
observation resulting in raw data such as:
Yes/No

for x = 0, 1

Never/Sometimes/Usually/Always

for x = 1, 2, 3, 4

The item raw score is used to estimate a person’s ability to perform the task or define
their experience and is the basis for estimating the level of difficulty (Sick, 2008c). The
transformation of an ordinal data to an interval scale of natural logarithm is achieved by
the Rasch model by converting the raw score percentages into success-to-failure ratios
or odds (Andrich, 1988; T. G. Bond & Fox, 2007, p. 24). The standard unit in Rasch is
called logit or log odds. The Rasch model is an applied item response model that is used
to model ordinal observed variables which are assumed to be unidimensional or
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reflecting a common latent variable and locally independent (Adams, Wu, & Wilson,
2012; Andrich, 1988; Sick, 2008d). Unidimensionality requires that ‘items in a test
measure the same composite of abilities, rather than only a single ability’ (Reckase et
al., 1988). As such, unidimensionality could be applied to a process or function such as
the internal audit function.

Wright (1977) stated that the Rasch model has the fewest ingredients in person
measurement, person ability β v and item difficulty δ

i.

in determining the probability

of a person succeeding on an item. The more the person’s ability exceeds the item
difficulty, the greater is the positive difference and the higher the probability of success.
The Rasch model in a dichotomous case is expressed as follows:
Pr (xi= 1) =

e βv −δi

(1)

1 + e βv-δi

where Pr (xi=0,1), is the probability of the turn of event upon interaction between the
relevant person and assessment item;
e = Euler’s number, 2.71828

β v = the ability of person v
δ i = the difficulty of assessment item i

simplified as:
Logit (P/1-P) = β v − δi

(2)

The simplest interpretation of the Rasch is that ‘the probability of a positive response
increases as the parameters increase towards infinity’ (Christensen et al., 2013, p. 6). In
measuring the internal audit function, the person parameter is represented by the level of
internal audit performance whereas the item parameter is represented by the experience
in the involvement of audit committee and internal audit activities. The measurement
model for internal audit function is based on the probability of a successful internal
audit using items in best practices and IIA standards (Abdullah et al., 2008) as follows:
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Figure 4-2. Internal audit success model using items on best practices in internal
auditing

In this study, the components for the internal audit function are expanded to include the
involvement of audit committee and the impact on corporate governance as shown in
Figure 4-3. The measurement instrument, IAS, is based on the domains or components
presented in Figure 3-1 in Chapter 3 section 3.2.

Figure 4-3. Model of successful internal audit function incorporating items of best
practices in internal auditing, involvement of AC on reviews of the internal audit
function and areas of audit findings in corporate governance

4.6.

Validity and Reliability

Validity is associated with ‘the meaning of inferences from test scores’ (Wright &
Stone, 1999, p. 167). Validity in a mixed method research refers to ‘the ability to draw
meaningful and accurate conclusions from all the data’ (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011,
p. 146).

The quantitative strand – the survey – involved constructing the questionnaire and
validating it for measuring the internal audit function and its impact on corporate
governance. The focus in this phase is the reliability of the survey instrument and the
rigour of the statistical analysis rather than validity. This focus is important as validity
presumes reliability; if the measure is not reliable, then the measure is not valid
(Bryman, 2012).

Before the survey questionnaire is pilot tested, two measures of validity are considered;
face validity and construct validity. Face or content validity is the extent the items in the
instrument represent all possible questions about the research or address the intended
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latent variable (Baghaei, 2008; Creswell, 2005). For content validity, four experts were
asked to judge whether the items used were suitable to represent the construct; whether
the items address the intended latent variable as to relevance, clarity and completeness.
The variables (as discussed earlier about the internal audit model) are based on
dimensions of internal audit process, incorporating the types of audit activities,
interactions of audit committees with internal audit, and the impact of internal audit on
corporate governance.

The other validity issue which is critical is construct validity and is assessed by
statistical and practical procedures (Baghaei, 2008; Creswell, 2005). For construct
validity, or assessing whether the scale or test measure what they are supposed to
measure, theoretically from a ‘less to more’ difficult items in the construct for internal
audit activities, AC involvement and areas of corporate governance, the survey data
need to fit the statistical model – the Rasch model. The construct validity ‘focuses on
the idea that the recorded performances are reflections of a single underlying construct:
the theoretical construct as made explicit by the investigator’s attempt to represent it in
items or observations, and by the human ability inferred to be responsible for those
performances’ (T. G. Bond & Fox, 2007, pp. 34-35).

The fit statistics is derived by analyzing the item calibrations and persons measures on
the variable map, also known as the person item map (Baghaei, 2008; T. G. Bond &
Fox, 2007), based on the relative locations in terms of logits. The acceptable value on a
standardized t scale is between -2.0 and +2.0 with sample sizes between 30 and 300 (T.
G. Bond & Fox, 2007, p. 43).

The other concern in measurement is reliability. Reliability in quantitative research
method refers to the consistency of a measure or the degree of test or measure scores
being error-free (Bryman, 2012; Neuman, 2006; Wright & Stone, 1999). The pilot test
for the questionnaire has helped to reduce the occurrence of unreliable data by ensuring
the questions are unambiguous and clear.

In this study, internal reliability is considered. Internal reliability is the consistent
determination of the indicators or scores used in the measure based upon a single test
conducted assumed to contain homogeneous items (Creswell, 2005; Wright & Stone,
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1999). The traditional primary reliability statistic is the Cronbach’s coefficient alpha or
Kuder-Richardson’s KR-20 with an acceptable reliability value of 0.70 (DeVellis, 2003;
Sick, 2008a).

In this study, the person and item measurement reliability in the Rasch measurement as
an alternative to Cronbach’s alpha is also used in the analysis. An instrument with good
reliability would show a person and item measurement reliability of at least 0.81 (see
Table 4-4). The initial construct for the internal audit activities portion of the internal
audit survey, adapted from a previous study on the probability of a successful internal
audit, has been confirmed by Rasch measurement, which showed item and person
reliability of 0.94 and 0.91 respectively (Abdullah & Masodi, 2012). With greater focus
by IAF on risk management (Audit Executive Center, 2010; Protoviti, n.d.; IIAM, 2009;
Thomson Reuters, 2012), the survey items are adapted by replacing very easy items
with items related to risk management.
Table 4-4
Rating scale instrument quality criteria for person and item to determine the reliability
index in Rasch measurement (Fisher, 2007)

Linacre (1994) identified that a sample size of 50 which are well-targeted on items
being measured is conservative in producing statistically stable estimates of 99%
confidence interval with item calibration within ±1 logit, the unit used in Rasch analysis
(see Table 4-5).
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The requirements are symmetric for the Rasch model so you need as many items for a
stable person measure as you need persons for a stable item measure. Consequently, 30
items administered to 30 persons (with reasonable targeting and fit) should produce
statistically stable measures (Linacre, 1994).

For a 95% confidence interval, the minimum reasonable sample size is 30 (Linacre,
1994, 2005). As the scales used are from 1 to 4, the samples are termed as polytomies.
There are 57 items in the survey questionnaire (as detailed in the next section); 35
internal audit activities items, 8 audit committee involvement items, 14 areas of
corporate governance items. With the response from 68 CAEs in the survey (see
Chapter 5 section 5.2), it is expected that the data will produce stable estimates.
Table 4-5
Crucial statistics for determining minimum sample size for targeting persons and items
(Linacre, 1994)

For the qualitative strand, the question on external validity or generalizability needed to
be addressed as in a case study (Bryman, 2012). The findings of an IAF in a particular
public-listed company could not be representative of all other IAFs of companies on the
Malaysian stock exchange. As pointed out by Yin (2009), the case study sites are not
chosen as representatives of certain criteria in a population since theoretical
generalisation is more important than statistical generalization. Similarly, the choice of
interviewees from various industries is not meant for statistical generalization. Other
than the interview, published data in the form of annual report are also collected to
corroborate the information given during the interview. It is assumed that the qualitative
analysis of the interviews will show the extent existing agency theory provides a good
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explanation of the current state of internal audit activities. As such, the exploration in
the ways IAF in Malaysian public listed is practised together with the level of
collaborations and the perception about IAF in giving value-add services are addressed.

4.7.

Normality of Data

In inferential statistics, the pre-requisite assumption is normality which can be explored
in various ways: graphically by histogram, boxplot, and statistically by KolgorovSmirnov and Shapiro-Wilk tests with Lilliefors significance level, and the Skewness
and Kurtosis (Allen & Bennett, 2010; Howell, 2013). Kolgorov-Smirnov is not
recommended because most small sample are non-normal and would pass the test and
for large sample, it will reject the normality hypothesis even if there were minor
deviations and would not affect further data analyses (Howell, 2013). Most data in
studies on IAFs across organisations are usually small sample (see Stewart &
Subramaniam, 2010).

Data screening for missing data is useful to ensure data have been entered correctly and
are normally distributed. If data deviates dramatically, the validity of the results may be
affected. Hence, transforming the data to satisfy the normality assumption is necessary
if the researcher uses parametric statistics (Field, 2009). However, other authors do not
recommend transforming the data as the transformed data are difficult to interpret and
suggest that non-parametric tests be carried out (Allen & Bennett, 2010; J. Pallant,
2010; Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Pallant (2010) concluded that non-parametric
techniques be used when the data is ordinal, very small sample and not normally
distributed. For the statistical analyses, the results should be within the limits (Allen &
Bennett, 2010; J. Pallant, 2010) as in Table 4-6.
Table 4-6
Crucial statistics for determining normality
Skewness & Kurtosis
- z scores
Shapiro-Wilk
Boxplot
-outliers
-extreme scores

Small sample
< ±1.96 for p=0.05
Sig. >0.05

Big sample
< ±2.58 for p=0.01
< ±3.29 for p=0.001
Sig. >0.05

Above/below 1.5 and 3 box lengths
>3 box lengths
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A post hoc test is used to make all pairwise comparisons where the hypothesis testing
using Kruskal-Wallis shows significant results. This is done to eliminate a Type 1 error
due to the unusual difference between the groups, such as the groupings for internal
audit team sizes and team expertise area (Howell, 2013).

4.8.

Data Collection

As mentioned earlier in the research process, this study involves two strands: a
quantitative strand using a survey questionnaire and a qualitative strand using research
interviews.

4.8.1. Survey
A survey serves to collect primary or secondary data from a sample with the purpose of
analysing them statistically before making generalisations (Collis & Hussey, 2009, p.
76). A written questionnaire is used to gather information on people’s characteristics,
opinions and behaviours (Neuman, 2006, p. 273). The population, from which the
sample is derived, is ‘a precisely defined body of people or objects under consideration
for statistical purposes’ (Collis & Hussey, 2009, p. 77). Instead of using all listed
companies on the KLSE as the population, as in a study on ACs where a review of the
annual reports were made (Haron et al., 2005), the population in this study is the
internal auditors in public listed companies in Malaysia who are corporate members of
the Institute of Internal Auditors Malaysia (IIAM). The internal auditors are chosen
because not all companies have an in-house IAF.

A good sampling frame, being a list of cases in a population that closely reflects
elements in the population, is crucial to avoid invalid sampling (Neuman, 2006, p. 225).
The types of IIAM memberships serve as the sampling frame in this study. As at 31
May 2011, as provided by IIAM, there are 2,344 individual members and 237 corporate
members. Professional members are those with at least 3 years professional experience
in internal auditing with tertiary education. An associate is one who is engaged in
internal auditing but does not qualify for professional membership. Corporate
membership is open to companies who nominate employees who are internal auditors as
their representative, including companies that hold themselves as a group.
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From the sampling frame above, the minimum sample size is then determined.
Generally, two methods are used: random sampling and rule of thumb (Neuman, 2006,
pp. 241-242). In random sampling, an acceptable confidence level and the degree of
variation in the population are assumed. In contrast, the rule of thumb approach leads
the researcher to use an acceptable sample size that is based on previous experience and
meets the requirements in statistical methods. Even in random sampling, the size tends
to be fixed at 278 for a population of 1,000 and around 380 cases for large populations
of 20,000 and above (Collis & Hussey, 2009, pp. 210-211). The sample size based on
the rule of thumb in a related study on ACs of public listed companies in Malaysia is
120 (Haron et al., 2005). As the study is targeting the CAEs of listed companies, all 237
IIAM corporate members are taken to be the most appropriate sample. Further, this
group of internal auditors is in charge of the internal audit activities of their companies
and have the necessary professional background to enable them to respond to the
questionnaire.

Good survey questions should be meaningful, and able to avoid confusion in
respondents whilst collecting data that would give valid and reliable measures
(Neuman, 2006). Further, the questions should also adequately capture all information
to answer the research questions. The research instrument is constructed after a
thorough review of the available literature, consultations with accounting and auditing
professionals including the researcher’s knowledge and professional experience.
Additionally, the questionnaire is also adapted and extended from an existing
instrument measuring the performance of internal audit activities in order to ensure the
reliability and validity of the measures or the questionnaire items which are related to
the different stages of internal audit (Abdullah et al., 2008).

The questionnaire is divided into six sections: individual characteristics, company
characteristics, collaborations and combined assurances, AC involvement, corporate
governance areas where findings were made, and internal audit practices. The
questionnaire based on dimensions of internal audit process, incorporating the types of
audit activities, interactions of ACs with internal audit, and the impact of internal audit
on corporate governance, is first reviewed by audit experts, comprising technical
advisors from IIAM and the Malaysian Institute of Accountants, to determine its
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relevance, clarity and completeness. Where internal audit is fully outsourced, it would
be reflected in the answer to the type of internal audit department.

In this study, the opinions of internal auditors, showing their attitude or perception, are
sought and use as the method of measurement on various tasks undertaken in internal
audit activities. Thurstone (1928) stated that attitudes can be measured. This was
confirmed by Gawronski (2007) when he reviewed various studies relating to attitudes
including implicit attitudes. Attitude data can be collected using Likert scales and a
statement of attitude (Linacre, 2001). Skills and know-how, for example, financial
management, are reflected in practices and daily habits or attitudes towards any
activities (Firth-Cozens, 1992).

A pilot study of the survey questionnaire is done with 11 CAEs selected from various
industry sectors on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange. Pilot studies have been
conducted for various reasons such as to determine the feasibility of a Responsive
Business Scorecard using two industry sectors (Woerd & Brink, 2004); the citation
behaviour of 19 faculty members from a university who had published periodical
articles (Prabha, 1983); and the service quality and staff training of five members in
two focus groups (Monk & Ryding, 2007).

A pilot study will allow for modification of the survey instrument arising from
unforeseen events, such as data collection methods (Baird, 2000; Lanphear, 2001).
Lanphear (2001) added that the pilot study will also allow validation of the statistical
approach and the questionnaires before full administration. However, no validation of
the statistical approach is made in this study as the instrument has been adapted from an
instrument used in determining the success of an internal audit measured using the
Rasch model (Abdullah et al., 2008). Additionally, in this study, a comparative analysis
of the results for the internal audit activities is made on the level of difficulties of the
items used. During the pilot study in the quantitative phase, the respondents found that
the items in the instrument are not ambiguous and need not be amended. This pilot
study has helped to ensure the quality of data collected by preventing the existence of
unclear and ambiguous questions.
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4.8.2. Survey data collection
The questionnaires are issued through cooperation with the IIAM membership division
to ensure a good response rate ̶ a pre-paid envelope is included with the questionnaire.
Cover letters accompanied the mailed questionnaire stating the purpose of the survey,
confidentiality of information gathered and seeking cooperation from the respondents
(see Appendices 1, 2 and 3).

An on-line survey of the instrument is also made available to facilitate data collection.
In addition to the mail out survey, two further calls for responses are made through the
on-line survey.

4.8.3. Research interview
A research interview is commonly used in qualitative method studies as it is very
flexible and ‘capable of generating data of great depth’ (King, 1994, p. 14). ‘A research
interview seeks through questioning to obtain knowledge of the subject’s world’ (Kvale,
1996, p. 21). The main objective in doing the research interview is to obtain the
interviewee’s perspective about the research topic through direct conversation and to
understand the motivations for specific actions undertaken by the interviewees (King,
1994; Schultze & Avital, 2011). The in-depth interview is also done to gather
information about the reality ̶ ‘concrete, specific desires and interests’ ̶ and to illustrate
the meanings in the quantitative study that are related to a particular context, in this
case, the IAF (King, 1994; J. Miller & Glassner, 1997, p. 103).

As at 31 December 2011, there are 822 companies listed on the main market and 119
companies on the Ace market (Bursa Malaysia, 2012). All listed companies are required
to have an IAF and an AC (Bursa Malaysia, 2009b). The IAF for these companies may
be conducted under a group function at the holding company level. The roles of internal
auditors and ACs at various stages of internal audit identified through the literature
review are used to develop the semi-structured interview questions. It is believed that a
mix of close-ended and open-ended questions is the most appropriate way to collect
data. In addition, open-ended responses allow for an exploration of reasons for closeended responses (Creswell, 2005).
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In the research interview, the identity of the interest group ̶ the researcher and the
interviewee ̶ is important to generate rich data when the interviewee imparts his or her
‘intimate knowledge’ of the subject matter (Charmaz, 2006; Schultze & Avital, 2011,
p. 3). Determining the intentions and the impact of any activities such as the internal
audit in an organisation may be difficult if the interest group is not identified and share
some commonality. How the researcher, as the interviewer, present herself could
influence the ability to solicit from interviewees a willingness to share their life stories
(Charmaz, 2006; King, 1994; J. Miller & Glassner, 1997). With the researcher’s
expertise in the area of internal audit and corporate governance, there would be rapport
and trust so that the interviewee’s reality could then be ‘interpreted and constructed’
(Schultze & Avital, 2011). To facilitate interpretive inquiry, the intensive or active
interviewing undertaken with the CAEs used semi-structured questions which allowed
the researcher to show the researcher’s interest and wanting to know more about the
IAF of their organisations (see Charmaz, 2006; Holstein & Gubrium, 1997). In this way,
the researcher is allowing the CAEs to be the experts of their own field since they are
professionals, to choose what and how to tell the actions taken and share their
significant experiences.

Based on the study design, purposive sampling is used. Purposive sampling is where the
respondent is intentionally selected in order to gain an understanding of the key
characteristics pertinent to the research question (Bryman, 2012; Creswell, 2005).
Further, Patton (2002, p. 230) emphasised that ‘the logic and power of purposeful
sampling lie in selecting information-rich cases for study in depth’.

Another sampling approach is systematic sampling. For example, in an explanatory
mixed method, the approach is to use the results of the quantitative statistical results to
direct the follow-up sampling for the interview. However, the identifying information
for this study, in complying with ethical requirements, cannot be collected and this
necessitates public-listed companies to volunteer their participation. Further, this
sampling method may lead to a weaker connection between the quantitative and
qualitative phases (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011).

Accordingly, the cases or the respondents purposefully chosen are those where the
internal audit issues could be examined extensively. Two criteria are established on an a
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priori basis. They needed to be a public-listed company in Malaysia and have an IAF.
Additionally, approval for the quantitative strand in this study ̶ survey ̶ required full
anonymity of the respondents and this places a constraint on following-up on specific
findings in the survey data, if an explanatory approach instead of a convergent mixed
method is used.

‘Qualitative inquiry typically focuses in depth on relatively small samples, even single
cases (N = 1), selected purposefully’ (Patton, 2002, p. 230). In determining the number
of participants for the interview, the selection method as in a case study research is used
as guidance. A single case study allows for understanding the reality and the dynamics
existing within a particular setting from within-case analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Eisenhardt (1989, p. 540) argues that within-case analysis allows for familiarity and the
emergence of unique patterns of a case. This analysis is said to promote the existence of
generalized patterns in multiple cases when selected categories or dimensions are found
to be similar. As such, this study adapted the multiple or collective case study approach
to exemplify certain characteristics in the IAF.

The suggestion by Eisenhardt (1989) in selecting cases by a particular field led to
selecting companies listed on the stock exchange in Malaysia, mainly due to the
mandatory requirement of an IAF. A multiple case study on internal audit has ranged
from five to eleven companies (Mat Zain & Subramaniam, 2007; Stewart &
Subramaniam, 2010). The studies referred to by some researchers have indicated that in
a multiple case study, a minimum of four cases is acceptable (Creswell, 2005;
Eisenhardt, 1989; Merriam, 1998). Consequently, the number of interviews was limited
to five companies and these interviews were made with CAEs. As in the case study by
Turley and Zaman (2007), the direct engagement with the CAEs could provide
complementary qualitative evidence on the interaction of the internal auditors with ACs
and the impact of the IAF on corporate governance. In this context, the in-depth
interviews sought to provide evidence on the manner internal audits are conducted,
specifically collaborations and combined assurances, and to extend the research on
internal audit performance.

Gaining access to and obtaining the cooperation of public-listed companies to consent
for interviews are difficult. The general view as pointed to by an officer in IIAM is that
79

CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

internal auditors view information about internal audit activities as confidential in
nature except those that are disclosed publicly such as in the annual reports. This view
on confidentiality resonates with the reason for non-response to the survey
questionnaire in the initial quantitative strand of this study. Other researchers have
indicated that some connection is required in enabling access to sensitive information as
is the case for internal audit activities (Bachkaniwala, Wright, & Ram, 2001). Due to
the perceived sensitivity of information, the Audit Oversight Board of the Malaysian
Securities Commission and the Malaysian Institute of Accountants are approached in
the identification of CAEs of public listed companies to be interviewed.

Contact with the listed companies is established through the Executive Chairman of the
Audit Oversight Board, Securities Commission Malaysia. An initial expression of
interest in studying the IAF of companies listed on Bursa Malaysia is made. This action
leads to introductions to the Chairman of Audit Committees and the CAEs of six listed
companies. Every interview is approached by a preliminary phone call about the context
and the purpose of the meeting. Prior to the in-depth interviews, research presentation
letters assuring them of confidentiality (King, 1994, p. 21) together with consent forms
as suggested by Smith (2011, p. 99) are sent to the CAE or head of internal audit of the
public listed companies informing them of the study. The letter informs them of the
motive of the study, gaining permission for participation, granting the right to withdraw
at any time including ensuring safe storage of research data (see Appendices 4 and 5).
On the appointed date, one of the companies declines the interview. Four of the five
interviews are tape-recorded. The recorded interview helps to reduce extensive notetaking and ‘interrupting the free flow of the conversation’ (Kvale, 2007, p. 94).

The semi-structured interviews with the CAE or a representative are conducted to
examine how the companies conduct their internal audit processes and why the various
assurance activities, for example risk management, environmental audit and quality
audit, are incorporated in the financial and performance audits. Questions also include
whether collaborations are present between accounting-qualified and non-accountingqualified internal auditors or other personnel, such as with those from other departments
in their organisations (see Appendix 6).
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An interview guide or interview protocol was used to provide clear steps for the
interviews (Creswell, 2005, pp. 221-222; King, 1994, p. 19; W. L. Miller & Crabtree,
1999b, p. 96). This guide helped in providing reliable and comparable qualitative data
and is less standardized compared with a structured interview. Concurring with King’s
(1994) and Jacob and Furgerson’s (2012) suggestions the topic in the interview guide
draws from the literature and my personal knowledge and experience in internal audit.
The topics were divided into three sections, covering the ‘internal audit structure’,
‘internal audit activities’ and ‘involvement of audit committee’. These topics capture in
essence the 20 questions that should be posed by the board of directors about internal
audit (Swanson, 2010, pp. 56-57). Topical trajectories in the conversation where
appropriate are allowed to ensure higher validity in the data and to gain rapport with the
interviewees.

In conjunction with the research questions and the survey questionnaire, queries were
made on the reporting structure for audit findings to determine the level of involvement
of ACs or other alternative committees in the performance of internal audit. Of interest,
questions include whether the presence of internal audit had any impact on the corporate
governance of the organisation and how this presence affects any of the corporate
governance dimensions by measuring the impact of internal audit recommendations
acted upon by management in incorporating changes in the organisation. As such, the
five interviews provided information on how an internal audit is judged to be effective
and the extent to which their recommendations are implemented.

Attention is given to indications that suggest combined assurance activities or
collaborations are conducted and why they are conducted, are recorded. Specific
questions are asked as to whether the auditors and the ACs perceive any benefits arising
from such events. As the annual reports of these companies are publicly available,
certain information regarding the internal audit activities and the type of audit report
given by the external auditors are also reviewed.

An extract of the questions in the first and second sections of the interview guide:
‘internal audit structure’ and ‘internal audit activities’ are shown below:
1.1.

Q

Has there been any instance where an internal audit is carried out with
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other departments or other departmental staff members?
Prompt – e.g. collaboration for IT audit, risk assessment, health and
safety
Probe - Describe the situation and why?
When was it done? Frequency, departments involved, types of
audits, etc.
Why was collaboration done?

2.1.

Q

Do you feel that internal audit has any impact in the corporate
governance of this company?
Probe – What are the situations that you feel that the company has
benefitted from internal audit?
Why do you think that the situation create an impact?
How do other department feel about or view your work?

The analysis of qualitative data is aimed at understanding or interpreting the
phenomenon by the meanings the people brought to the phenomenon (Denzin &
Lincoln, 2000). Additionally, the focus is ‘to show how what is being said relates to the
experiences’ (Holstein & Gubrium, 1997, p. 127) and in this study, on meanings
ascribed by internal auditors to the IAF. Invariably, themes or codes are used. Coding is
a way to classify data and to tag the text to the codes for easy retrieval (Miles &
Huberman, 1994). The codes can be derived from the data and from prior theoretical
understanding of the researched subject (Ryan & Bernard, 2003).

Three methods of analyses are considered: content analysis, template and editing
(Charmaz, 2006; Crabtree & Miller, 1999; King, 1994, 2004b; Krippendorff, 2004).
Content analysis is an approach that seeks ‘to quantify content in terms of
predetermined categories and in a systematic and replicable manner’ (Bryman, 2012, p.
290). Content analysis is usually used to examine textual data and documents (Bryman,
2012; Silverman, 2011). Although in the interviews, annual reports of the companies are
reviewed in relation to the internal audit function, the quantification of specific words
that are categorized as the codes in the analysis is not sufficient to provide a meaningful
interpretation of actions clarified by the CAEs. Bryman (2012) suggests that ‘when the
process of coding is thematic, a more interpretative approach needs to be taken’.

The next alternative, template analysis, makes use of an initial predetermined themes or
codes but with two added features: the codes are revised through the themes being
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exposed by the data, and, interpretation is done qualitatively on the resultant pattern of
themes (Crabtree & Miller, 1999; King, 1994, 2004a, 2004b; King & Ross, 2004). As
Crabtree and Miller (1999) observe, the use of a template is time efficient as it is more
focused on certain aspects of the text, and connects related pieces of text earlier in the
analysis.

The final method of analysis using coding is editing. Miller and Crabtree (1999a, p. 21
& 23) described it as the action where ‘the interpreter enters the text much like an editor
searching for meaningful segments, cutting, pasting and rearranging until the reduced
summary reveals a helpful interpretation’. Usually, this is use in grounded theory with
the method advocated by Glaser and Strauss of constant comparison (Bryman, 2012;
Charmaz, 2006). The process begins by directly looking at the text, making
observations on the text, organizing the text as a category or code, and finally re-reading
to make an interpretation based on the patterns of the codes. Among the criticisms to
this approach highlighted by Bryman (2012, pp. 574-575) is the extensive time to
constantly interplay data collection and conceptualization. Further, the code given to the
fragmented data creates a sense of loss to the context and flow of the interview data.

As this qualitative phase is to gain further explanations that could not be obtained in the
quantitative phase, a template analysis is used. This allowed for cross analysis of
interviews where interpretation could be made on the CAEs motivations in relation to
their IAF. However, extensive investigation of themes such as the editing analysis in
grounded theory which is usually done if the study is solely done qualitatively, is not
made.

First, the recordings of interviews are transcribed to allow for a more thorough
examination of what the interviewees said. Transcribing the oral data is the initial data
analysis. Further, the transcripts also help to identify the values of the interviewees. The
transcripts are given a brief reading to gain an overall view of the interviewees’
responses. Next, the paragraphs are attached to labels to reflect the codes as in the
initial coding template.

The initial coding template is constructed a priori with three high level themes from
specific theories such as agency and institutional theory, and practical issues of research
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regarding IAF. As a guide, the questions raised by Liamputtong (2004) and Charmaz
(2007) for coding are also used, which include type of actions, intentions and
accomplishments relating to the conceptual framework in Chapter 3 section 3.2. The
initial codes in Table 4-7 have themes that are related hierarchically ̶ with the top level
codes as broad themes, and the lower levels as more specific focused themes (Ferguson
& Heidemann, 2009; King, 2004b; King & Ross, 2004).

Table 4-7
Initial coding template for analysing interviews on internal audit function and its
impact on corporate governance

1. Establishment
1.1. In-house
1.1a Academic background
1.1b Years of experience
1.1c Reporting function
1.1d Critical audit activities
1.1e Value adding services
1.2.
Out-sourcing
1.2a Liaisons
1.2b Consultant
1.2c Audit areas
1.2d Impact on financial audit
1.3.
Collaborations
1.3a Collaborative activities
1.3b Limitations due to work load
1.4.
Combined assurance
1.4a Mix of combination
1.4b Motivations
2. Audit Committee
2.1
Composition
2.2
Experience and background
2.3
Review of internal audit activities
2.3a Audit planning
2.3b Audit execution
2.3c Audit reporting and monitoring
3. Corporate governance
3.1
Business operations
3.2
Risk management
3.3
Human resource management
3.4
Fraud and conflict
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The labelled paragraphs are then sorted into themes based on similarities of responses
towards particular activities or functions undertaken in the internal audit and frequency
of responses. This initial template is then modified in response to detailed readings of
the transcripts and text of the annual reports until a final template is developed. Finally,
these coded texts are reviewed to determine the fit to institutional, and organisational
identity and identification theories; particularly on the value add service of internal
audit, the collaboration or combined assurance process in internal audit, and the impact
of IAF on corporate governance.

Two criteria are used (Patton, 1980): 1. Do the responses given confirm the theories?
and 2. Are there any new insights into and interpretations of collaboration or combined
assurances?

The questions on why the collaboration or combined assurances are

undertaken are examined and how these activities would fulfil the organisations’
objective towards organisational excellence and improved corporate governance. The
interviews are taken as exemplars of the IAF in public-listed companies, providing an
appropriate context for answering the research question and allowing for the
examination of key areas in the internal audit.

4.8.4. Statistics and software
Quantative data
Rasch analyses are done with the rating scale model default, using WINSTEPS
(Linacre, 2008). Further analyses are performed using IBM SPSS Statistics 21.

Qualitative data
Coding and theme analyses are undertaken using NVivo 10 (QSR, 2012).
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4.9.

Summary

This study used both quantitative and qualitative methods to collect data on the value
added service of the IAF and its impact on corporate governance. The first part of the
study involved a survey of the perceptions of CAEs based on aspects of internal audit
activities, audit committee involvement, collaborations or combined assurances, and
areas of internal audit findings. The questionnaire and the Rasch measurement are
justified in detail.

The second part involved research interviews with five CAEs from various industries
using purposeful sampling. Data are collected through semi-structured interviews and
by perusing statements in the annual reports. The main objective in this phase is to
gather further information on the CAEs opinions about their activities, interactions with
the ACs and the perception of their value added service to the organisation. The results
of the analysis and discussion of the internal audit survey using both CTT and the Rasch
measurement are set out in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER 5 : QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS AND HYPOTHESES
TESTING
The Performance of an Internal Audit Function and its Impact on Corporate
Governance
5.1.

Introduction

The chapter presents the results from the quantitative study involving survey
questionnaires. The first section reports on the response rate and the profile of the
respondents. The next section presents the initial analysis, specifically on missing
values, outliers and normality. The subsequent section discusses the construct validity
and the fit of the data to the Rasch model. This is followed with details about the
construct of the questionnaire items based on the level of difficulty and the performance
index of the probability model for the effectiveness of the IAF. Having confirmed the
construct of the instrument, the results of various hypotheses testing are then presented.
Finally, the chapter concludes with the summary of the results and discussion from the
hypotheses testing.

5.2.

Response Rate

A total of 237 survey forms were distributed to all corporate members of IIAM. One
hundred and three responses were received altogether after the third distribution of the
survey with 68 usable responses, representing a 28.7% response rate.

The response rate is considered acceptable as previous studies registered the response
rate for mail surveys ranging from 7.1% in Hong Kong to 42.1% in Denmark (Harzing,
1997, 2000). Other internal audit studies received responses from 35 internal auditors to
a total of 250 internal auditors and audit committee members (Cooper et al., 1994;
DeZoort & Salterio, 2001; Fadzil et al., 2005; Goodwin, 2003; O’Leary & Stewart,
2007; K. Van Peursem & Jiang, 2008). Two organisations did not participate in this
study because their corporate policies disallowed them from participating; a reason
similarly raised by Harzing (1997).

Paxson (1995) stated that low response rates for surveys are generally accepted as
inevitable but may be subject to non-response bias. However, Leslie (1972) found that
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surveys in the social sciences are unaffected by non-response bias due to homogeneous
group membership. As the internal auditors (CAEs) surveyed belong to the same
professional membership, minimal non-response bias is expected. Table 5-1 showed the
profile of respondents for the first set and last set of 20 responses each. For both groups,
there were six females and fourteen males. For both groups, the CAEs were mainly 30 –
39 years old and older, in the middle and senior management level with more than
seven years of experience.

Table 5-1
Profile of the first 20 and final 20 respondents based on gender, managerial level, age
and number of years of experience
First 20 respondents
Gender
Male
Female

Managerial level
14 Support
6 Executive
Middle
Senior

0
5
5
10

Total

20

20

Age
20 -29 yrs
30-39 yrs
40-49 yrs
50-59 yrs

0
6
11
3

Experience
less than 3 years
3-7 years
more than 7 years

20

1
1
18
20

Last 20 respondents
Gender
Male
Female

Managerial level
14 Support
6 Executive
Middle
Senior

0
5
11
4

Total

20

20

Age
20 -29 yrs
30-39 yrs
40-49 yrs
50-59 yrs

2
11
3
4
20

Experience
less than 3 years
3-7 years
more than 7 years

0
3
17
20

The summated ratings scale (Hair, Babin, Money, & Samouel, 2003, p. 158) for all
internal audit activities and AC involvement items is used to determine the homogeneity
of the early and late response groups. An independent samples t test is used to compare
the means of the summated ratings reported by the early response group (n = 20) to
those in the late response group (n = 20). Levene’s test and the t tests are not
statistically significant indicating that the assumption of homogeneity of variance is not
violated (see Table 5-2).
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Table 5-2
Results of independent samples t-test for the first 20 and final 20 respondents
Levene's test

t-test
95% CI

Audit
planning

Response
Early
Late

M
33.10
32.90

SD
4.97
3.85

F
3.199

p
0.082

t(38)
0.142

p(2-tailed)
0.888

Mean
Difference
0.20

Lower
-2.65

Upper
3.05

Audit
execution

Early
Late

36.05
35.05

3.79
4.83

1.456

0.235

0.729

0.471

1.00

-1.78

3.78

Audit
reporting

Early
Late

24.20
22.85

3.12
3.30

0.663

0.421

1.33

0.192

1.35

-0.71

3.41

Audit
monitoring

Early
Late

22.60
22.00

2.23
3.42

3.547

0.067

0.657

0.515

0.60

-1.25

2.45

AC
involvement

Early
Late

25.05
23.85

4.75
3.39

2.406

0.129

0.919

0.364

1.20

-1.44

3.84
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5.3.

Profile of Respondents

The descriptive statistics in Table 5-3 indicate that the majority of heads of internal
audit or chief audit executives are male (60.3%) with age groups 30-39 years old
(48.5%) and 40-49 years old (35.3%). Most of them are in the middle and senior
management levels (39.7% and 41.2% respectively), have more than 7 years’
experience (89.7%) and have earned a bachelor’s degree (57.4%) specialising in
accounting (70.6%). The accounting specialisation was still the preferred major (e.g.,
Larkin & Schweikart, 1992).

The greatest representation is from the trading and service industry (51.5%) in small to
medium sized organisations with up to 5,000 employees (75%) and revenues of below
RM0.5 billion (41.2%) and RM0.5 – 9.9 billion (35.3%). Almost 56% of the
organisations do not have any certification for their business processes while 38.2 %
have only one certification. The most common certification is ISO 9001 (32.4%).
Table 5-3
Profile of respondents (N = 68) based on gender, age, managerial level, experience,
education, specialization and background of their organisations
Characteristics of sample internal audit departments

Frequency

%

Gender

Male
Female

41
27

60.3
39.7

Age

20 -29 years
30-39 years
40-49 years
50-59 years

2
33
24
9

2.9
48.5
35.3
13.3

Managerial level

Supporting staff
Executive
Middle management
Senior management

0
13
27
28

0
19.1
39.7
41.2

Years of experience

less than 3 years
3 - 7 years
more than 7 years

1
6
61

1.5
8.8
89.7

Education

Diploma
Bachelor
Postgraduate

2
39
27

2.9
57.4
39.7
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Characteristics of sample internal audit departments

Frequency

%

Accounting
Finance and auditing
Information technology
Others(Economics, Engineering,
History)

48
11
4

70.6
16.1
5.9

5

7.4

Industry type

Property
Trading/Services
Finance
Technology
Others(Manufacturing , Unspecified)

7
35
9
11
6

10.3
51.5
13.2
16.2
8.8

Revenue

below RM0.5 b
RM0.5 – 9.9 b
RM10 – 19.9 b
above RM20 b
Unspecified

28
24
6
7
3

41.2
35.3
8.8
10.3
4.4

Number of employees

Below 1,000
1,001 - 5,000
5,001 - 10,000
Above 10,000

26
25
6
11

38.2
36.8
8.8
16.2

Certification/
Accreditation

No certification
1 certification
2 certifications
3 and more certifications

38
26
1
3

55.9
38.2
1.5
4.4

Types of certification

ISO 9001
ISO 27001, PCI DSS
SAS 70
ISO 9001, ISO 27001, ISO 20000
ISO 9001, MQA, SEMS
Safety and Environmental Health (SHE)
ISO 9001, ISO 14001, SHE

22
1
1
1
2
2
1

32.4
1.5
1.5
1.5
2.9
2.9
1.5

Area of specialization

Note:
PCI DSS -̶ Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard
MQA
̶ Malaysia Qualifications Agency
SEMS ̶ Safety and Environmental Management Systems
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5.4.

Initial Analysis

For the initial analysis, three steps were taken to ensure data quality using SPSS:
checking and imputing missing data, determining normality and doing the test for
outliers. The analysis on missing value showed 5 missing values in 4 variables, varying
from 1.5 – 2.9%. To determine whether a missing value occurred randomly, Little’s
missing completely at random (MCAR) test was used. MCAR showed that the missing
values occurred randomly (Chi-Square = 181.210, DF = 168, Sig. = 0.230, not
significant). This outcome then allowed the imputation technique for replacing the
missing values to get a total dataset by expectation maximisation (EM) as EM predicts
the best likelihood value (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006).

The test on outliers or observations with unique characteristics typically of extremely
high or low value was done to ensure that these observations would not distort the
statistical analysis in a normal distribution (Hair et al., 2006). The univariate outliers
were detected visually by boxplots. G value of 2.2 as suggested by Hoaglin & Iglewiez
(1987) was used to label the outliers. No outliers were found except for variable item 7
(AC07) and item 21 (E03) that needed consideration to constrain the cases to a
maximum (or minimum) value by the winsorizing technique. AC07 and E03 had
extreme scores (> 3 box length in the boxplot). Winsorizing these items would result in
all data for AC07 and E03 to be scaled at the maximum value of 4. Hair et al. (2006, p.
76) suggested the retention of the data unless ‘demonstrable proof indicates they are
truly aberrant and not representative of any observations in the population’. Hence, the
observations were not changed.

The data in this study are ordinal. Theoretically, ordinal data are nonparametric.
Ordinal data can have scales having a ‘greater than’ or ‘less than’ relationships,
indicating relative positions in an ordered series (Hair et al., 2006), categories such as
‘never, sometimes, usually, and always’ used in this study. A statistical explanation
based on parametric test is preferable in data analysis, even though the data are ordinal,
if there are no severe violations of normality (Allen & Bennett, 2010). The assumption
of normality was assessed visually and through descriptive statistics.
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The z scores for skewness and kurtosis of the data for audit committee involvement and
internal audit activities showed a majority of the variables were likely drawn from a
non-normally distributed population. For normality assumption, z scores for skewness
and kurtosis in a small sample should be < ±1.96 (which has a two-tailed probability of
0.05) (Allen & Bennett, 2010) and values for skewness and kurtosis need to be between
±1 (Hair et al., 2006). Further, the Shapiro-Wilk test of normality requires the
significant value to be higher than 0.05 (Allen & Bennett, 2010; Hair et al., 2006). The
Shapiro-Wilk statistics (W) for this study range from 0.481 to 0.868 at p = 0.00 (see
Appendix 7). As such, nonparametric statistics were used for hypotheses testing and
discussed subsequent to the next section on Rasch measurement analysis.

5.5.

Rasch Measurement Analysis

The Rasch model is a prescriptive model applied where investigation is made on
whether the data fit the model, in contrast to how the model fits the data, as in classical
statistical testing (T. G. Bond & Fox, 2007). In this study, the intention is to determine
the construct validity of the survey instrument before further hypotheses testing. The
initial construct validity about the internal audit activities is already established
(Abdullah et al., 2008; Abdullah & Masodi, 2012).

The current questionnaire is designed to measure the performance of the IAF based on
the level of involvement of the ACs and internal audit activities; as an extension of the
studies mentioned above. The current study also measures the impact of internal audit
activities on corporate governance. The data are analysed using the Rasch model
computer program, WINSTEPS (Linacre, 2008).

WINSTEPS uses joint maximum likelihood estimation and can estimate parameters
even when some cell frequencies are low or zero. The mathematics reparameterises the
thresholds (where there are data) in principal components such as linear, quadratic and
cubic using the structure of the components. The cell frequencies are not used directly,
rather estimation equations or functions of the cell frequencies are used as the sufficient
statistics for the parameters.

For good measurement, the process should account for the estimation of one ability at a
time and each item contributes meaningfully to the construct being investigated (T. G.
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Bond & Fox, 2007). The construct validity in Rasch hinges on data that reflect the
single underlying construct (Baghaei, 2008; Wright, 1977). The analyses relating to the
construct comprise summary item and person fit statistics to the Rasch model,
reliability, targeting and dimensionality. As mentioned in Chapter 4 section 4.6, the data
from the 68 responses are expected to produce stable estimates. The results of the
analyses show the items, as conceptually ordered, by difficulty (Andrich, 1988; T. G.
Bond & Fox, 2007; Waugh, 2009, 2010).

Total items for the model is 57 comprising 14 areas of internal audit findings and 43
IAF items; 8 items on AC’s involvement and 35 items on internal audit activities.
Responses from the survey are entered into an Excel file as per the response categories.
The suggestion by Andrich (1988, p. 63) to delete the items simply on statistical criteria
to a minimum is followed to avoid the risk of capitalizing on sampling errors, which
would lead to reduced general application of the test instrument.

5.5.1. Fit statistics
As mentioned in Chapter 4 section 4.5.3, the unit of measurement is logit or log odds.
The results yielded a Chi-Square value of 6919.33 with 3750 degree of freedom. The
Cronbach alpha (KR-20) computed by WINSTEPS is 0.93. Rasch model error or
residual is the difference between the expected Rasch item/person score against the
observed score. The fit statistics reported by the program is two chi-square ratios: infit
and outfit mean square statistics. The infit statistic is used as an indicator of misfit as it
‘gives relatively more weight to the performances of persons closer to the item value’
(T. G. Bond & Fox, 2007, p. 57).

The items’ mean is constrained to zero by the measurement model (see Table 5-4). Item
location is between -2.60 logit to 3.82 logit with a standard deviation of 1.67. Item
reliability for the difficulty estimates is very high (0.98 on a scale of 0 to 1) with
excellent item separation index of 8.08. The item reliability index of 0.98 indicates high
confidence that the order of items placement from easy to difficult along the logit
continuum is replicable across other samples.
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Table 5-4
Summary of items estimates (N = 68) showing spread of items and reliability of the
estimate
------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
TOTAL
MODEL
INFIT
OUTFIT
|
|
SCORE
COUNT
MEASURE
ERROR
MNSQ
ZSTD
MNSQ
ZSTD |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| MEAN
191.8
68.0
.00
.19
1.00
.0
.99
.0 |
| S.D.
52.1
.0
1.67
.03
.24
1.4
.25
1.3 |
| MAX.
258.0
68.0
3.82
.29
2.09
5.4
2.12
5.5 |
| MIN.
84.0
68.0
-2.60
.16
.61
-2.6
.58
-2.4 |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| REAL RMSE
.20 TRUE SD
1.65 SEPARATION 8.08 Item
RELIABILITY .98 |
|MODEL RMSE
.20 TRUE SD
1.66 SEPARATION 8.42 Item
RELIABILITY .99 |
| S.E. OF Item MEAN = .22
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

The person ability estimate mean of +0.64 logit (see Table 5-5) relative to item mean of
0 indicated that the test or survey questionnaire is well-matched or well-targeted. Person
location is between -0.90 logit to 2.51 logit. The standard deviation of 0.78 shows a
smaller variation in person measures than with item measures. The mean of the infit
mean squares at 1.02 and the outfit mean squares at 0.99 are very close to the Raschmodelled expectation of 1. The spread in modelled fit scores for the CAEs (infit t SD =
1.9 and outfit t SD = 1.6) suggests that the person ability estimates would have error
estimates within the conventional acceptable range of -2 to +2. Person reliability for the
ability estimates is very high at 0.91 with good person separation index of 3.28.
Table 5-5
Summary of person estimates (items = 57) showing spread of person and reliability of
the estimate
------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
TOTAL
MODEL
INFIT
OUTFIT
|
|
SCORE
COUNT
MEASURE
ERROR
MNSQ
ZSTD
MNSQ
ZSTD |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| MEAN
160.8
57.0
+0.64
.21
1.02
-.1
.99
-.2 |
| S.D.
18.2
.0
.78
.02
.44
1.9
.39
1.6 |
| MAX.
198.0
57.0
2.51
.26
3.17
5.8
2.64
3.5 |
| MIN.
122.0
57.0
-.90
.19
.54
-3.1
.46
-2.9 |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| REAL RMSE
.23 TRUE SD
.75 SEPARATION 3.28 Person RELIABILITY .91 |
|MODEL RMSE
.21 TRUE SD
.75 SEPARATION 3.60 Person RELIABILITY .93 |
| S.E. OF Person MEAN = .10
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Reliability depends on the construct of the test instrument and the distribution of the
respondents (Fisher, 1992).

Cronbach’s alpha is generally used as a measure of

reliability and can be affected by missing data (Fisher, Elbaum, & Coulter, 2010;
Wright, 1996). As with the item reliability, person reliability is the proportion of
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observed persons’ measures considered true, indicating the spread of person ability
across the continuum. It shows the replicability of person ordering that is expected if
these respondents were given a parallel set of items measuring the same construct
(Wright & Masters, 1982). Both person reliability and KR-20 above 0.9 in this study
indicate that the measure or instrument had excellent reliability; see Table 4-4 in
Chapter 4 section 4.6 (Fisher, 2007). Coupled with the fit statistics that the data fitted
the model, it could be deduced that the construct for the IAF model is valid and able to
provide meaningful interpretations.

5.5.2. Unidimensionality
Unidimensionality in the Rasch model assumes that variables used reflect a common
latent variable or a composite of the abilities for successful internal audit function:
internal auditors’ ability, audit committee involvement and impact on corporate
governance. The principal component analysis of the residuals showed that the raw
variance explained by measures of 62.6% closely matched the expected target of 62.9%
(see Table 5-6). The unexplained variance in the first factor of 4.3%, rates the
instrument as very good (Fisher, 2007). As such, it is deemed that the items used have a
common latent variable and that unidimensionality has not been violated.
Table 5-6
Principal component analysis of standardized residual variance (in Eigenvalue units)
Total raw variance in observations
Raw variance explained by measures
Raw variance explained by persons
Raw Variance explained by items

=
=
=
=

Raw unexplained variance (total)
=
Unexplained variance in 1st contrast =

-- Empirical -152.2 100.0%
95.2 62.6%
17.9 11.8%
77.3 50.8%
57.0
6.6

37.4% 100.0%
4.3% 11.5%

Modeled
100.0%
62.9%
11.8%
51.0%
37.1%

5.5.3. Individual item fit
The fit statistics for the 57 questionnaire items that fitted the Rasch model (see
Appendix 8) show the easiest item (item 7 – AC07 review results of internal audit) is
located at -2.60 logit and the most difficult item (item 53 – F10R conflict resolution) at
3.82 logit. Only one item (item 5 – AC05 review internal audit program) shows infit
mean squares > 2.0 showing off-variable noise that could degrade the measurement,
being an item with the potential of deletion. Bond and Fox (2007) suggested that fit
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statistics be used to detect problem items and person performance instead of the main
aim of deleting items. Based on this suggestion and that of Andrich’s (1988), no item
was deleted.
5.5.4. Rating scale design
The way a rating scale is constructed could influence the quality of the data. As a check,
category use statistics and item thresholds are reviewed (T. G. Bond & Fox, 2007;
Linacre, 1999).

Category frequencies indicate the distribution of responses across all categories.
Categories with low frequencies (recommended minimum of 10 responses per category)
would not provide sufficient observations for an estimation of stable threshold values
implying redundancy (T. G. Bond & Fox, 2007, p. 223). Table 5-7 shows the average
ability estimate for persons who chose a particular category. For example, for the CAE
who answered 2 on any item, the average agreeability or endorsability estimate is -0.31
logit which is higher than that for category 1 of -2.22 logit. The average measures
functioned as expected, increasing monotonically across the scale from -2.22 logit (1Never) to 2.07 logit (4 – Always). This indicates that persons or CAEs with lower
ability, i.e., as gathered from the responses on the internal audit activities and ACs’
involvements, endorse the lower categories (for e.g., scale of 1 or 2), and those with
higher ability endorse the higher categories.
Table 5-7
Category frequencies and average measures for the four category rating scale
------------------------------------------------------------------|CATEGORY
OBSERVED|OBSVD SAMPLE|INFIT OUTFIT||STRUCTURE|CATEGORY|
|LABEL SCORE COUNT %|AVRGE EXPECT| MNSQ MNSQ||CALIBRATN| MEASURE|
|-------------------+------------+------------++---------+--------|
| 1
1
572 15| -2.22 -2.21| 1.00 1.02|| NONE
|( -2.90)|
| 2
2
832 21| -.31 -.32| 1.00 1.00||
-1.70 |
-.86 |
| 3
3
1190 31| 1.15 1.15|
.86
.80||
.15 |
.92 |
| 4
4
1282 33| 2.07 2.07| 1.10 1.10||
1.54 |( 2.80)|
-------------------------------------------------------------------

1 NEVER
2
3
4 ALWAYS

Additionally, step calibrations or item thresholds should increase monotonically (T. G.
Bond & Fox, 2007; Christensen et al., 2013). Items thresholds are points on the scale
between adjacent response categories where the odds or chances are 1:1 of respondents
answering the adjacent categories or probability of positive response equals 0.5. A
lower category should correspond to a lower level, and a higher category corresponds to
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a higher level. The guideline for the magnitude between each threshold distance should
be between 1.4 logit to 5 logit (T. G. Bond & Fox, 2007, p. 224).

There are 3 thresholds as the items have 4 response categories (1 – Never, 2 –
Sometimes, 3 – Usually, and 4 – Always). Figure 5-1 shows that the response
categories have distinct peaks in the probability curve graph and are logically ordered.
Even though the third threshold has a distance of 1.39 logit (from 0.15 logit to 1.54 logit
for structure calibration in Table 5-7) and by strict implication the scale needs to be
collapsed to 3 categories, this is not necessary as the difference in the magnitude
requirement is very small, the curves are well-functioning and there are enough
observations in each of the response categories (see Table 5-7). As such, the rating scale
used in the survey was not revised to increase the reliability and validity of the
instrument.

Figure 5-1. Probability curves for the four-category rating scale illustrating the ordered
thresholds for categories 1, 2, 3, 4.

98

QUANTITATIVE DATA

5.5.5. Targeting
Measures or instruments used in assessing the performance of the IAF needs to be
appropriately targeted to the population being assessed. The fit statistics for persons and
items are depicted as a variable or person-item map. Persons and items are symmetrical
– both are measured on the same scale with the items calibrated at 0 logit. Figure 5-2
shows the distribution of CAEs and items measures. The means for CAEs and items
measures differ by +0.64 logit with persons’ measures spread of 3.41 logit against 6.42
logit for items measures.

Comparatively, a majority of the internal audit activities are easy to accomplish. Two
items under the AC’s involvement in reviews of internal audit are also relatively easy.
These easy items (40.35%) contributed to the mean measure of CAEs ability of +0.64
logit.

On the other hand, the identification of the impact on corporate governance through the
reported audit findings is found to be relatively difficult, items ranging from 1.21 logit
to 3.82 logit. 50% of the corporate governance items are difficult items, surpassing the
CAEs maximum ability of +2.51 logit. The easiest item for the impact factor on
corporate governance, F02R – expenditure management, is much more difficult than the
most difficult item for AC involvement, AC05 – review of internal audit program, at
+0.79 logit, and internal audit monitoring, M06 – receive reviews outside of internal
audit on checklist, at +0.25 logit. The relative distance in the positions of each
component in the IAF structure and the identification of impacts on corporate
governance shows that the overall internal audit activity could impact significantly
corporate governance. The order of difficulty (as shown in Figure 5-2) for the internal
audit activities from least to most difficult are internal audit planning, reporting,
execution and monitoring. These items are discussed further in the scale of item
difficulties.
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Person - MAP - Item
<more difficult>|<rare>
4
+ F10R maxi+3.82logit
| F13R mini+1.21logit
| F12R µFR =+2.65logit
|T F05R
| F11R
F5, 9-13, 14R are difficult items for
impact on corporate governance
3
+ F14R
| F09R
XX | F06R
X | F04R
T| F08R
2
X + F03R AC
Audit
XXX | F07R
monitoring
involvement
XXXX |S
XXX S| F01R
maxi +0.79
+0.25
XX | F02R
mini-2.60
-1.39
1
XXXXXXX +
µAC =-0.60
µM=-0.60
XXXXXXXXX |
AC05
µPerson
XXXX M|
AC06
+0.64XXXXXXXXX |
XXXXXXXX |
M06
0
XXXX +M
AC04
XX S|
AC03
M04
XXX |
AC02
XXXX |
XX |
AC01
M03
-1
T+
M05
|
M02
|
M07
|S
M01
|
-2
+
AC08
|
|
AC07
|
|
-3
+
<less difficult>|<frequent>

max. Item = +3.82logit

Person max = +2.51logit

Audit
reporting

Audit
execution
-0.16
-1.83
µE=-0.85

-0.25
-2.05
µR=-1.15

Audit planning
-0.48
-1.47
µP=-1.47
µPerson =+0.64 logit

E04
E03
E06
E11
E01
E02
E07
E08
E05
E10
E09

µItem =0.00 logit (calibrated)
R04
R05
R01
R03

R07
R02
R06

Figure 5-2. Overall person-item distribution for the internal audit function analysis
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5.5.6. Scale of item difficulties
Table 5-8 shows item descriptions on the involvement of AC, internal audit activities
and impact on corporate governance, which are ordered by item difficulty.
Table 5-8
Ordered difficulty of items by internal audit function dimensions on a linear scale
Item

Location
(Logit)

Item descriptions

Easy
AC07
AC08
AC01
AC02
AC03
AC04
AC06
AC05

P07
P09
P08
P02
P05
P03
P01
P06
P04
P10

E09
E10
E05
E08
E07
E02
E01
E11
E06
E03
E04

-2.60
-2.11
-0.72
-0.39
-0.27
-0.05
0.52
0.79

Audit committee involvement in reviews of:
results of the internal audit
management actions on recommendation
scope of the internal audit activity
functions of the internal audit department
competency of the internal audit function
resources of the internal audit function
internal audit processes
internal audit program

-1.47
-1.27
-1.09
-1.09
-0.95
-0.95
-0.78
-0.72
-0.57
-0.48

Audit planning:
evaluate policy implementation effectiveness
communicate audit plan to BOD and operations
identify processes of concern to management
set key performance metrics for audit assignments
verify communication of management policies
appoint auditors with necessary skills
set performance objectives as reference in audit program
confirm key control areas of business processes
monitor auditors’ competency for training purposes
unrestricted access to information

-1.83
-1.64
-1.39
-1.05
-0.95
-0.82
-0.57
-0.36
-0.36
-0.25
-0.16
Difficult

Audit execution:
list audit findings based on significance and impact
inform management of follow-up audits
determine from auditee changes in processes or controls
clarify root causes of audit findings
determine information availability on consistency of transactions
determine overrides to processes or controls
verify understanding of use of information or transaction handled
auditee available as scheduled
identify issues of potential waste in resources
check with auditee on how to detect errors
use statistics to review systems performance
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Item

Location
(Logit)

Item descriptions

Easy

R06
R02
R07
R03
R01
R05
R04

-2.05
-1.94
-1.55
-1.02
-0.91
-0.33
-0.25

Audit reporting:
discuss reasonableness of audit findings with management
reports specify clearly implications/potential of problems
team leaders discuss issues with management on conduct of audit
report contains status of previous audit recommendations
corrective actions seen as an avenue for improvements
report gives information on inefficiencies in resource management
reports accepted without further queries

M01
M07
M02
M05
M03
M04
M06

-1.39
-1.16
-1.12
-1.09
-0.78
-0.19
0.25

Audit monitoring:
review samples from recent records in follow-up audit
continuous update of audit procedures
review feedback on audit activities with management
receive reviews on audit reports from reporting authority
management monitors improvement activities
statistical data analyses in promoting preventive measures
receive reviews outside of internal audit on checklists

1.21
1.35
1.75
2.26
2.49
2.57
2.83
3.02
3.07
3.07
3.07
3.18
3.41
3.82

Areas of internal audit findings:
expenditure management
revenue management
rules and policies change procedure
personnel management
compliance to rules
financial performance
complaints procedure
rules enforcement
dissemination of information
information transparency
economic performance
corruption prevention
analysis of data
conflict resolution

F02R
F01R
F07R
F03R
F08R
F04R
F06R
F09R
F14R
F11R
F05R
F12R
F13R
F10R

Difficult
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5.5.6.1.
Audit committee involvement
The easiest item is the review of results of the internal audit by the AC (item AC07
difficulty of -2.60 logit), which is expected as this forms the major activity conducted
by the AC. The most difficult item for AC involvement is AC05 – review of internal
audit program, difficulty of 0.79 logit.

Specific responsibilities forwarded by the Cadbury Committee in 1992 are for ACs to
review significant findings of internal investigations and internal audit program
(Vanasco, 1994). This study provides some support towards the findings that only 65%
of ACs reviewed the coordination of audit work (DeZoort, 1997). The relative ease in
reviewing the internal audit results confirms the focus of AC on audit reports (see
Turley & Zaman, 2007). This study indicates that the review of the internal audit
program is perceived as not the standard process in ACs’ activities even though this
action is regulated by the KLSE listing requirements (Bursa Malaysia, 2009b; Securities
Commission Malaysia, 2007). This extremely difficult task for the ACs may affect the
internal audit planning and monitoring stages – which are investigated in hypotheses
testing.

The order of difficulty for the other items is almost similar to the proposed construct
(Table 4-2 in Chapter 4 section 4.4); the exception being the results shows review of
internal audit resources as more difficult (item AC04 difficulty of -0.05 logit) than the
review of the competency of the IAF (item AC03 difficulty of -0.27 logit).
In 1994, less than 40% of ACs in the US were involved in the appointment and
dismissal decisions of CAEs and of that, 14% of the CAEs had unrestricted access to
the ACs (McHugh & Raghunandan, 1994). Subsequently, DeZoort (1997) found that
67% of the ACs surveyed confirmed that they had monitored the resources allocated to
the internal audit. Unrestricted access was highlighted by the Treadway Commission
and IIA, to enhance the effectiveness of the IAF. The increase in the review of internal
audit resources in now evidenced in Malaysia even though it is not a common practice,
as indicated by the relative difficulty compared with reviews of internal audit processes
and internal audit program as shown in Table 5-8 in section 5.5.6.
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5.5.6.2.

Internal audit activities

The most difficult item for internal audit activities is the internal auditors receiving
reviews outside the internal audit on audit checklists (M06 difficulty of 0.25 logit). The
easiest item is discussing the reasonableness of audit findings with management (R06
difficulty of -2.05 logit). The following paragraphs discuss the findings in each of the
internal audit stages: planning, execution, reporting, and monitoring.

a)

Audit planning

Unrestricted access to information (P10) is expected to be the easiest due to the
presence of the internal audit charter and the involvement of AC as part of the
guidelines on internal control (Bursa Malaysia, 2009b). A survey on internal audit
practice in Malaysia noted that 96% of the respondents confirmed the existence of the
charter which would specify that the internal auditors had access to records and
personnel as necessary without any interference (IIA, n.d.; IIAM, 2009; Vanasco,
1994). The charter describes the structure and operational issues of the internal audit
function, such as audit planning, staffing and reporting matters (Bailey, 2007; IIAM,
2009). However, this item (P10) is found to be extremely difficult, at -0.48 logit in this
study.

The second most difficult item is P04, monitoring auditors’ competency for training
purposes, which was expected to be the most difficult. Similar to item P10, the other
expected easier item was confirming with an auditee the key control areas of business
processes (P06). P06 ranks third most difficult, at -0.72 logit. The difficulty of P06 is
unexpected as this item forms part of the review of internal control, the predominant
duty entrusted to internal auditors.

Fadzil et al. (2005) found that the proficiency of internal auditors who, for example, are
affiliated to professional associations and have adequate knowledge in computerized
systems, leads to lower monitoring of the internal control system. Fadzil et al. argued
that the implied competency to perform the work translates to the internal auditors full
understanding of the quality of the internal control system, and hence, less monitoring.
This study seems to corroborate Fadzil et al.’s suggestion ̶ due to the perceived
difficulty in ensuring internal auditors have the necessary knowledge, it is also difficult
to confirm key control areas of business processes within the organisation’s control
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environment. Furthermore, if the AC is actively involved in the review of audit
programs (AC05), then the restrictions placed on internal auditors’ work would not
arise. Greater emphasis would also be placed by AC on the competency of internal
auditors or providing the needed resources to ensure a more effective internal audit.

b)
Audit execution
The easiest item as expected is listing audit findings based on significance and impact
(E09) at -1.83 logit. The second expected easiest item, determining availability of
information on the consistency of transactions (E07) is located midway in the
continuum. The three most difficult items are as expected, using statistics to review
systems performance (E04 at -0.16 logit), checking with the auditee on how to detect
errors (E03 at -0.25 logit) and identifying issues of potential waste in resources in the
organisation (E06 at -0.36 logit).

The difficulty to perform items E04 and E06 is consistent with earlier findings on the
difficulty of information retrieval and determining the organisation’s productivity
(Abdullah et al., 2008; Abdullah & Masodi, 2012). The difficulties in internal audit
execution could also be related to the difficulty in gaining unrestricted access (P10).
Singam (2003, p. 335) considered auditing as a sensitive matter which is not widely
accepted in South East Asia including Malaysia. Singam added that the uneasiness
might stem from Backman’s (1999) assertion that Asian management of corporations
perceive themselves as infallible of wrong doing, and tend to uphold secrecy and are
averse to transparency.

The difficulty for checking on error detection (E03) appears to be related to the
difficulty of confirming key control areas of business processes (P06) in the planning
stage. Another explanation for the difficulty is the lack of expertise in information
systems alluded to in other studies (Cooper et al., 1994; Cooper et al., 1996).
c)
Audit reporting
The expected easiest item is that the internal audit report shows the status of previous
audit recommendations (R03), but this is perceived as slightly difficult or not always
done (difficulty of -1.02 logit). The expected second easiest item is that the internal
audit reports would be accepted without further queries. However, this item is perceived
as the most difficult (R04 difficulty of -0.25 logit). Further, the results support the
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measurement construct that the following two items are difficult: the internal audit
report gives information on inefficiencies in resource management (R05 difficulty of 0.33 logit) and the identified corrective actions are seen as an avenue for improvements
(R01 difficulty of -0.91 logit).

The difficulty in the acceptance of internal audit report would have an impact on
improvements made on corporate governance pertaining to business processes
specifically. This report acceptance difficulty would imply that management finds the
audit report could not be related to the business matrix, usually used by business units to
support their performances, such as efficiencies in operations. Moreover, the
conventional auditing practice used by external auditors of reviewing previous audit
work is also used to judge the work of the internal audit (Brown, 1983). The difficulty
in providing the status of previous audit findings implies the lack of clarity and
reliability of the internal audit work, especially relating to how the previous audit
findings are used to determine the audit procedures in the internal audit program for the
ensuing audit. What is reported would also help to clarify the changes made to the
control environment and identify the areas of corporate governance is affected due to
those changes.

d) Audit monitoring
One of the expected easiest items is receiving reviews from outside the internal audit
department on the internal audit checklists (M06 difficulty 0.25 logit). Instead, M06 is
considered extremely difficult and is linked to the most difficult task in AC
involvement, AC05 ̶ review of the internal audit program. Two other related reviews
on internal audit, which are fairly easily achieved, are receiving feedback from
management (M02 difficulty -1.12 logit) and receiving feedback on the report from the
reporting authority (M05 difficulty -1.09 logit).

5.5.6.3.

Corporate governance

The easiest two items reported in audit findings, as expected, are expenditure
management (1.21 logit) and revenue management (1.35 logit). The third easiest item is
reporting on rules and policies’ change procedure (1.75 logit). However, findings on
financial performance show some difficulty (2.57 logit). The main perception about
audit has been about financial truthfulness in disclosures, which has been the primary
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aim in financial statutory audits. This aim is also emphasized in internal audits. The
focus on financial performance is supported in this study (Al Athmay, 2008). Due to the
requirements in internal control and ensuring security in the control environment, the
next easy item is F07R ̶ ensuring that change procedure is maintained.
The most difficult item is findings on conflict resolution (3.82 logit) followed by
analysis of data (3.41 logit) and corruption prevention (3.18 logit). The most probable
reasons are audit infrequency or investigative audits on an ad hoc basis. Perhaps these
are areas where the expertise of auditors is lacking especially with technological
advancement in business processes and the technological challenges in information
systems. This reason is further supported by the 2008 survey of internal audit practice in
Malaysia where 20% of the respondents reported that none of their internal auditors had
been trained for fraud prevention (IIAM, 2009). The findings also support the
comments made on the difficulty in performing information system audit (Chambers,
2014; Cooper et al., 1994, 1996) which has the potential to detect irregularities or risks
in business processes.

The overall impact on corporate governance is difficult to achieve due to the apparent
emphasis on internal control, management and operational audits; similar to the results
of the recent study on the role of internal audit (Leung et al., 2004).

5.5.7. Internal auditors’ profile
Another aspect of Rasch measures is examining the abilities of internal auditors. Figure
5-3 shows different profiles of the respondents, categorized from leaders to laggards.
These profiles are based on the Guttman scalogram of the CAEs responses. The profiles
by Rogers (2003) in the diffusion of innovation theory could be used to explain the
different characteristics shown by the CAEs and their frequency in undertaking specific
tasks in internal audit.

The ‘leaders’ are able to perform far better than others and rate highly on the items in
the survey. The majority of the low responses are on areas of audit findings. The top
three respondents are in senior management with more than 7 years of experience.
Unexpected low responses from a CAE are found (see Appendix 9). Items perceived as
never done by the AC are the reviews on the functions of the internal audit department
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(AC02) and the internal audit resources (AC04). Two internal audit activities are also
rated low; setting performance objectives as reference in the audit program (P01) is
done sometimes, and reviewing feedback on audit activities with management (M02) is
never undertaken.

The second group, leaders with reservation, is also in senior management and very
experienced. These CAEs respond highly for the most difficult items in each stage of
internal audit activities and the ACs’ involvement in the IAF. However, a few tasks are
not usually performed. These tasks are informing management of follow-up audits
(E10), reports being accepted without further queries (R04) and using statistical
analyses in promoting preventive measures (M04).

Figure 5-3. Overall person-item distribution based on Guttman scalogram for internal
audit survey showing categories for internal auditor’s profile
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The third group, cautious leaders, comprise executives to senior managers with the
majority of them having more than 7 years’ experience. Most CAEs responded that they
“usually” undertook tasks identified as slightly difficult. As such, their performances are
above the mean (0.64 logit) as shown in Figure 5-2 in section 5.5.5.

The fourth group, the followers, comprise mainly executives and middle managers. The
most and second most difficult of each stage of internal audit activities are “sometimes”
or “never” conducted. These CAEs’ abilities are located from 0 to 0.64 logit.

The last group, laggards, perform below the mean of all CAEs. This group only at most
“usually” or “sometimes” perform the activities when doing the internal audit activities
and the AC are perceived to be not actively involved.

Following the global financial crisis, another assurance from parties not involved in
management, namely the internal auditors, is readily recognized which would
necessitate the advancement of internal auditors in their profession (A. D. Chambers,
2014). The items for internal audit activities are identified from earlier studies as best
practices in internal audit and the AC’s involvement are stated by legislation as
requirements in corporate governance. The infrequent observance of these items in the
IAF could affect the quality of the assurance function and subsequently, corporate
governance. As such, the idea mooted about ‘a cadre of super auditors’ (A. D.
Chambers, 2014) would not be easily achieved.

5.6.

Internal Audit Function Model

The construct validity of the survey instrument was earlier established and thus, the
Rasch measures generated could be used to predict outcomes of the activities measured.
The raw scores for both persons and items are the sufficient statistics for the Rasch
measures (Wright & Douglas, 1996), which are used in WINSTEPS. The success of the
IAF and having an impact on corporate governance is identified as:

Pr (successful internal audit) = µPerson - µItem
= +0.64

- 0
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With the Euler’s number (see Chapter 4 section 4.5.3), the above model, expressed as a
probable outcome, yields a value of:
Pr (xi= 1)

=

e βv −δi
1 + e βv-δi

= 65.48%

The CAEs’ responses imply that the current state of internal audit activities and the
level of involvement by the ACs in the reviews done on the IAF have achieved an
impact of 65.48% on corporate governance. This rating could be used with other rating
scales for other interpretations on performance, for example, the Auditor-General’s star
rating for accountability index in financial management skills in the Malaysian public
sector; from not satisfactory to excellent (Auditor General of Malaysia, 2008, p. 13).
The accountability index comprises various aspects in financial management, systems
and procedures and internal audit. Based on this star rating, the performance of internal
audit in this study is considered satisfactory.

To ensure a more effective IAF, the tasks identified as most unexpected, as shown in
Appendix 9, in the profiles of the CAEs need to be addressed. Fairly easy items that are
never undertaken when performing internal audit include P02 - setting key performance
metrics for audit assignments, E10 – informing management of follow-up audits, E05 –
determining from the auditee changes in processes or controls, R06 – discussing
reasonableness of audit findings with management and R02 – reports specifying clearly
implications/potential of problems. Actions may involve increasing the skills of the
internal auditors in these identified areas or promoting and ensuring the regular use of
these items which have already been identified as part of best practices in the internal
audit (Beckmerhagen et al., 2004; Buttery & Simpson, 1989; Fadzil et al., 2005;
Moeller, 2009; Swanson, 2010).

Another vital aspect for hypotheses testing is the assumption on the use of the data. The
statistical tests for hypotheses are based on a priori assumptions about the data such as
normality and independence of cases (Sick, 2008d). Ordinal raw scores cannot be used
in a regression model because of non-linearity. The Rasch model statistics linearised the
raw score (T. G. Bond & Fox, 2007). “Rasch analysis is a procedure for assessing the
quality of raw data and if the data meet certain criteria, for constructing interval-level
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measures from them” (Sick, 2008d, p. 23). Since there is fit of the data to the Rasch
model as assessed by unidimensionality and the fit statistics, this implies there is
justification to use the raw score as a meaningful and sufficient statistic for hypotheses
testing.

5.7.

Hypotheses Testing

5.7.1. Assessing goodness-of-fit under classical test theory
In contrast to the Rasch model that uses the person separation index for testing the
goodness-of-fit of the instrument, the goodness-of-fit in classical test theory is measured
by the internal consistency reliability, which is commonly done by checking the
Cronbach’s alpha with a range of 0 to 1. An appropriate minimum level is 0.7 (Hair et
al., 2003; Hair et al., 2006). The analysis (see Table 5-9) shows that the individual
variables have high reliability ranging from 0.73 to 0.91. The internal consistency
reliability of the construct for the overall audit committee involvement and the internal
audit activities showed Cronbach’s alpha of 0.914. The strength of association ranges
from good to excellent (Hair et al., 2003), indicating that the items can be combined to
measure the internal audit function in a consistent manner.
Table 5-9
Internal consistency reliability of the construct for audit committee involvement and the
internal audit activities
Cronbach's
Alpha
0.808
0.847
0.793
0.803
0.730
0.909
0.914

Variables
Audit committee involvement
Audit planning
Audit execution
Audit reporting
Audit monitoring
Overall internal audit activities
Internal audit function (overall)

N
8
10
11
7
7
35
43

5.7.2. Characteristics of internal audit functions
The importance of internal audits has been repeatedly raised whenever financial crises
or corporate failures occur. Effective management of the IAF should lead to information
that provides a measure of the impact that such internal audit has on the corporate
governance of an organisation. Quality performance can only be achieved when all
parties involved in the IAF have performed in concert to ensure the survival and
111

QUANTITATIVE DATA

sustainability of the organisation. These parties are the AC (the representative of the
board of directors in charge of the IAF), the internal auditors (independent personnel
who conduct the internal audit on business and administrative processes), and the
auditees (process owners in the organisation).

The characteristics of the IAF surveyed are shown in Table 5-10. Most internal audit
departments performed financial and operational audits (70.6% in total) and the rest
considered their department doing a combination of financial, quality and IT audits. The
majority of the internal audit department had personnel up to 5 persons (44.1%) and
above 10 persons (41.1%). The internal audit team had two major groups: members
with experience up to 7 years (10.3%) and members with experience inclusive of more
than 7 years (89.7%).
Overall, the internal auditors are considered to be managed by experienced personnel as
there are no staffs with experience below 3 years in any internal audit department. The
majority of the internal audit department staff has one expertise area (38.2%) whilst the
same percentage has expertise in three and more areas. Consistent with the financial and
operational audits performed, 91.1% of the internal audit department have members
with finance and accounting background. These characteristics are used in the
hypotheses tests, as detailed in the following paragraphs.
Table 5-10
Characteristics of the internal audit function by audit type, size, team experience and
expertise, and team size
Characteristics of sample internal audit departments
Audit type

Size of department

Frequency

%

Financial

19

27.9

Financial and quality

8

11.8

Performance / operational

14

20.6

Financial and operational
Financial, quality, operational and IT

15
12

22.1
17.6

1-2 persons

11

16.2

3-5 persons

19

27.9

6-10 persons

10

14.8

11-20 persons

16

23.5

12

17.6

more than 20 persons
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Characteristics of sample internal audit departments
Team experience

Frequency

%

3-7 years

3

4.4

more than 7 years

9

13.2

less than 3 years and 3-7 years

4

5.9

less than 3 years and more than 7 years

5

7.4

3-7 years and more than 7 years

17

25

all three categories

30

44.1

Team experience
Composition

experience up to 7 years

7

10.3

61

89.7

Team expertise

Finance

6

8.8

Accounting

14

20.6

2

2.9

6

8.8

areas

experience inclusive of more than 7 years

Finance, Accounting, Information Technology (IT)
and Engineering
Others (Operations, Administration, Business,
Legal, Investigation, Quality, Network, Marketing)
Finance and Accounting

8

11.8

Finance, Accounting and IT

7

10.3

Accounting and IT

2

2.9

Accounting and Engineering

1

1.5

Finance, Accounting and Engineering

1

1.5

Accounting and Others

5

7.3

Finance, Accounting, IT and Others

7

10.3

Finance, Accounting, IT, Engineering and Others

2

2.9

Finance, IT and Others

2

2.9

Finance, Accounting, Engineering and Others

1

1.5

Accounting, IT, Engineering and Others

1

1.5

Accounting, IT and Others

1

1.5

Finance, Engineering and Others

1

1.5

1

1.5

1 expertise area

26

38.2

2 expertise areas

16

23.6

3 expertise areas

14

20.6

12

17.6

1 person

3

4.4

2 persons

15

22.1

3 persons

23

33.8

4 persons

7

10.3

5 persons

7

10.3

2-3 persons

8

11.7

2-5 persons

1

1.5

Finance, Accounting and Others

Team expertise
composition

more than 3 expertise areas

Team size
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Characteristics of sample internal audit departments

Frequency

%

3-4 persons

1

1.5

3-5 persons

2

2.9

4-5 persons

1

1.5

5.7.3. Audit team members
Since a team needs to have at least 2 persons (Firth-Cozens, 1992), and other literature
have indicated sizes can be 3 or 5 persons (Fadzil et al., 2005; SANS Institute, 2007),
the team member composition was re-categorised into four groups based on the profile
of the internal audit function in Table 5-10 in section 5.7.2: maximum of 2, 3, 4 and 5
persons. Hypotheses 1, 1a, 1b, 1c and 1d predict that the number of audit team members
will not be associated with internal audit performance.

The Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA indicates that there are no statistically significant
difference between the overall internal audit performance assigned to the audit team
sizes of maximum 2 persons (Mean Rank = 33.47), 3 persons (Mean Rank = 40.10), 4
persons (Mean Rank = 25.88), and 5 persons (Mean Rank = 26.68), H (corrected for
ties) = 5.782, df = 3, N = 68, p =0.123, as illustrated in Figure 5-4.

Figure 5-4. The distributions of internal audit groups with various audit team member
sizes for all internal audit activities
Subsequent Kruskal-Wallis ANOVAs (see Table 5-11) indicate that there are no
statistically significant differences between internal audit performance for the various
internal audit activities among the different audit team sizes except for internal audit
monitoring: audit team sizes of maximum 2 persons (Mean Rank = 31.44), 3 persons
(Mean Rank = 41.63), 4 persons (Mean Rank = 25.56), and 5 persons (Mean Rank =
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25.91), H (corrected for ties) = 8.259, df = 3, N = 68, p =0.041, Cohen’s f = 0.37. The
effect size for ANOVA is large (Allen & Bennett, 2010).
Table 5-11
Summary of Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA (N = 68) of scores on various internal audit
activities assigned to the different internal audit team sizes
Groups
Audit planning

Audit execution

Audit reporting

Audit monitoring

Mean Rank

H

df

p

2.619

3

0.454

4.18

3

0.243

5.722

3

0.126

8.259

3

0.041*

2 persons max.

36.72

3 persons max.

37.02

4 persons max.

28.19

5 persons max.

28.36

2 persons max.

34.00

3 persons max.

39.08

4 persons max.

29.12

5 persons max.

26.32

2 persons max.

29.33

3 persons max.

39.95

4 persons max.

24.44

5 persons max.

34.91

2 persons max.

31.44

3 persons max.

41.63

4 persons max.

25.56

5 persons max.
The significance level is 0.05 (two-tailed).

25.91

For the overall audit performance and all the internal audit stages, team size with a
maximum of 3 persons records the highest mean rank score. The results suggest that the
size of the audit team positively influences only internal audit monitoring activities.
Thus, H1 to H1c, that the number of audit team members will not be associated with
internal audit performance for overall internal audit, internal audit planning, internal
audit execution and internal audit reporting, are accepted while H1d, internal audit
monitoring, is not supported.

The pairwise comparisons using the Kruskal-Wallis in the post-hoc tests on internal
audit monitoring is made to determine which groups are different from one another in
their performance. The results show the actual difference in mean rank scores between
the groups. The effect size of the significant differences is large (Allen & Bennett, p.
115

QUANTITATIVE DATA

259), calculated using eta squared value, which is 0.11 for team maximum sizes of 3
persons & 4 persons and 0.12 for team maximum sizes of 3 persons & 5 persons (see
Table 5-12).
Table 5-12
Summary of pairwise comparisons with Kruskal-Wallis on internal audit monitoring
assigned to the different internal audit team sizes
Comparison

Chi-square

N

p

ɳ²

Effect size

Audit monitoring
2 persons & 3 persons max.

3.037

49

0.081

0.06

medium

3 persons & 4 persons max.

4.341

39

0.037*

0.11

large

4 persons & 5 persons max.

0.007

19

0.934

-

-

2 persons & 4 persons max.

0.378

26

0.538

0.02

small

2 persons & 5 persons max.

0.627

29

0.429

0.02

small

3 persons & 5 persons max.

5.041

42

0.025*

0.12

large

The significance level is 0.05

Specifically, teams with a maximum of 3 persons are more likely to perform better than
teams smaller in size. The results suggest that the minimum size for an in-house IAF
that will produce effective internal audit monitoring is 3 persons. This supports the
suggestion that the optimum size should be around 3 persons to facilitate a review
process (SANS Institute, 2007). Smaller IAF team size may have insufficient manpower
to achieve effective internal audit. Although the overall internal audit and other stages
of internal audit are not significantly affected by team size, the results showed that the
smallest group perform much better than teams with maximum numbers of 4 or 5
persons; as shown by the higher mean ranks for the smallest team size in audit planning
and audit execution. Further, this finding lends support to the claim that larger groups
do not operate as well as smaller groups (Firth-Cozens, 1992). This greater performance
by the smaller team sizes (maximum member of 2 or 3 persons) may also be due to the
strategies taken such as those suggested by Benson (1995) for example, surveying the
nature and scope of operations and systems and the associated related risks.
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5.7.4. Audit team expertise
There are 4 groups of audit team members’ professional expertise. Hypotheses 2, 2a, 2b,
2c and 2d predict that high levels of professional expertise of audit team members will
be associated with high internal audit performance and in each of the internal audit
activities of planning, internal audit execution, reporting and monitoring. The KruskalWallis ANOVA indicate that there is no statistically significant difference between the
overall internal audit performance assigned to the audit team that has 1 expertise area
(Mean Rank = 31.38), 2 expert areas (Mean Rank = 33.50), 3 expert areas (Mean Rank
= 30.54), and the team having more than 3 expert areas (Mean Rank = 47.21), H
(corrected for ties) = 6.215, df = 3, N = 68, p =0.102.

The results in Table 5-13 indicate that there are no statistically significant differences
between internal audit performance in various internal audit activities among different
professional expertise except for internal audit planning; the audit team with 1 expert
area (Mean Rank = 30.25), 2 expert areas (Mean Rank = 31.28), 3 expert areas (Mean
Rank = 33.29), and the team having more than 3 expert areas (Mean Rank = 49.92), H
(corrected for ties) = 8.555, df = 3, N = 68, p =0.036, Cohen’s f = 0.38. The effect size
for ANOVA is large (Allen & Bennett, 2010).

Table 5-13
Summary of Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA (N = 68) of scores on various internal audit
activities assigned to internal audit team with different professional expertise
Mean Rank

H

Df

p

1 expertise area

30.25

8.555

3

0.036*

2 expertise areas

31.28

3 expertise areas

33.29

>3 expertise areas

49.92
4.894

3

0.180

5.686

3

0.128

Groups
Audit planning

Audit execution

Audit reporting

1 expertise area

32.65

2 expertise areas

34.44

3 expertise areas

28.86

>3 expertise areas

45.17

1 expertise area

29.40

2 expertise areas

40.31

3 expertise areas

30.50

>3 expertise areas

42.46
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Audit monitoring

1 expertise area

36.04

2 expertise areas

31.00

3 expertise areas

33.54

>3 expertise areas
The significance level is 0.05 (two-tailed).

0.887

3

0.829

36.96

The results suggest that the level of the audit team member expertise positively
influenced the internal audit planning activities. Thus, H2, H2b, H2c and H2d are
rejected while H2a is supported.

The pairwise comparisons using the Kruskal-Wallis in the post-hoc tests on internal
audit planning is made to determine which groups are different from one another in their
performance. The effect size of the significant differences is large (Allen & Bennett, p.
259), which ranges from 0.17 to 0.21 when internal audit team with >3 expertise areas
is compared to other groups (see Table 5-14). Specifically, teams with >3 expertise
areas is more likely to perform higher than other teams.

Table 5-14
Summary of pairwise comparisons with Kruskal-Wallis on internal audit planning
assigned to internal audit team with different professional expertise
Comparison

Chi-square

N

p

ɳ²

Effect size

42

0.969

-

-

Audit planning
1 & 2 expertise areas

0.002

2 & 3 expertise areas

0.028

30

0.867

-

-

3 & >3 expertise areas

5.173

26

0.023*

0.21

large

1 & 3 expertise areas

0.429

40

0.512

0.01

small

1 & >3 expertise areas

7.870

38

0.005*

0.21

large

2 & >3 expertise areas

4.622

28

0.032*

0.17

large

The significance level is 0.05

The results suggest that audit teams with >3 expertise areas positively influence internal
audit planning activities. For the overall audit performance and all the internal audit
stages, audit teams with >3 expertise areas record the highest mean rank score. This
implies that in-house IAF teams that will produce effective overall internal audit require
a minimum of 4 expertise areas. Less than 4 expertise areas in teams are not sufficient
to bridge the skills gap in the manpower to achieve effective internal audit especially at
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the planning stage. Since planning is the first stage in the audit process, the effect of
ineffective performance may roll-over into the immediate next two stages; execution
and reporting, thereby affecting the overall internal audit.

The importance of internal auditors with various expertise supports the study on the
element of competency of internal auditors. In evaluating competency of internal
auditors, external auditors consider ongoing training to be important and the training
should cover thoroughly the company’s operations, policies and procedures (Haron et
al., 2004). An IAF of a company with diverse business activities that spans across
industries will require its team members to have various expertise. Both monitoring the
competency for training (P04) and appointing internal auditors with the necessary skills
(P03) would also help the internal auditors to better identify processes of concern to
management (P08), making internal audit planning more effective in assessing business
processes for improvements through informed judgments. Although competency
monitoring is infrequent or difficult to achieve (see Table 5-8 section 5.5.6.), the
connection to whether external auditors are able to rely on the work of internal auditors
based on their competency provides significance to this aspect of the IAF structure.
Section 5.7.5 provides further discussion about how team expertise relates to audit team
experience.

5.7.5. Audit Team Experience
Hypotheses 3, 3a, 3b, 3c and 3d examine the impact of audit team experience on the
overall internal audit performance and on each of the internal audit activities of
planning, internal audit execution, reporting and monitoring. Similar to previous
analyses on auditors’ experience (Brown, 1983; O’Leary & Stewart, 2007; Shelton,
1999), the variable was collapsed into two categories. Team experience composition
with experience up to 7 years was categorized as less experienced and those with
experience inclusive of > 7 years was categorized as more experienced (see Table 5-10
in section 5.7.2.).

The Mann-Whitney U test on various internal audit activities

indicates that the level of internal audit performance with the more experienced audit
team is not significantly higher than those with less experienced team as shown in Table
5-15.
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Table 5-15
Summary of Mann-Whitney U test (N = 68) of whether various internal audit activities
are related to internal audit team with different professional experience
Less experienced

More experienced

Mean Rank

n

Mean Rank

n

U

z

p

Overall internal audit

32.07

7

34.78

61

230.50

0.343

0.731

Audit planning

29.93

7

35.02

61

245.50

0.648

0.517

Audit execution

30.50

7

34.96

61

241.50

0.567

0.571

Audit reporting

33.21

7

34.65

61

222.50

0.183

0.855

7

33.99

61

182.50

-0.629

0.529

Audit monitoring
38.93
The significance level is 0.05 (two-tailed).

The results suggest that the team members’ level of experience do not influence the
overall internal audit activities and the various stages of internal audit. Therefore, H3 to
H3d are not supported.

Experience in only one skill area over a number of years may not contribute to other
skills which are required when the internal auditors are faced with different situations
such as those arising from new business ventures. Almost 90% of the respondents in
this study have teams with experience > 7 years. In contrast, an earlier study on
auditors’ experience has surveyed almost equal numbers of auditors (Brown, 1983) and
found that there was no significant difference in the judgements made by the two
groups. The results in this study are consistent with Brown’s (1983).

A significant part of the internal audit process, is the internal audit team composition. In
this study, the number of team members, with a maximum of 3 members, influences
internal audit monitoring. Since experience does not affect internal audit performance,
the results suggest that expertise is more important than the number of years of
experience. Team expertise affects the effectiveness of internal audit planning. Years of
experience had pointed to better error detection due to knowledge retrieval (Tubbs,
1992) during the audit execution. However, the auditors had difficulty detecting the
specific violated internal control objective (Tubbs, 1992). The probability that the
difficulty in this detection of violations is still present could be attributed to the
difficulty in confirming key control areas of business processes and checking with the
auditee on how to detect errors (items P06 and E03 in Table 5-8 in section 5.5.6.),
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which is part of risk management. Additionally, reviewing systems performance (item
E04) is also infrequently done, suggesting a lack of expertise.

5.7.6. Combined audits
Hypotheses 4, 4a, 4b, 4c and 4d examine the impact of combination of audits
undertaken by CAEs on the overall internal audit performance and on each of the
internal audit activities of planning, internal audit execution, reporting and monitoring.
The Mann-Whitney U test indicates that the level of internal audit performance where
combined audit is present is not significantly higher than those where combined audit is
not practiced, as shown in Table 5-16.
Table 5-16
Summary of Mann-Whitney U tests (N = 68) based on internal audit activities where
combined audit is present ( n = 18) and no combined audit (n = 50)
No combined audits
Overall internal audit

Combined audits

Mean Rank

n

Mean Rank

n

U

Z

p

33.79

50

36.47

18

485.50

0.494

0.621

Audit planning

35.52

50

31.67

18

399.0

-0.711

0.477

Audit execution

33.35

50

37.69

18

507.5

0.802

0.422

Audit reporting

32.33

50

40.53

18

558.5

1.516

0.129

Audit monitoring
34.02
The significance level is 0.05.

50

35.83

18

474.0

0.335

0.737

The results suggest that combined audits do not influence the overall internal audit
activities and the various stages of internal audit. Therefore, H4 to H4d are not
supported.

50 respondents (73.5%) stated that they did not do combined audits (see Table 5-16).
Even though combined audit is not significant, this study provides new evidence on the
use of combined audits in internal audit as a strategy, perhaps to increase the
effectiveness of internal audits through streamlining of procedures, such as by
specifying the essential elements in environmental and quality management systems in
the operational audits (Benson 1995; Pun et al., 2001). Moreover, combined audits have
not been defined by IIAM except they have been used in the private sector (Hala, 2008),
although this audit strategy was alluded to in audits in the public sector (Benson, 1995;
Khemakhe, 2001). The situations described by the respondents are combinations of
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legal compliance, risk assessments, performance audits, health and safety audits,
information system, and human resource audits.

5.7.7. Audit collaborations
Out of 68 respondents, 20 (29%) indicate that there are no collaborations with other
departments in the internal audits performed (see Table 5-17). The internal audit
departments collaborated mainly on activities inclusive of risk assessment (38.4%) and
legal compliance (32.7%). Collaborations which include information technology
totalled 39.9%.

Table 5-17
Profile of respondents (N = 68) based on collaborations in internal audit activities
Characteristics of sample internal audit departments

Frequency

%

Collaboration

No collaboration

20

29.4

with other departments

Risk assessment

3

4.4

Legal compliance

1

1.5

IT security

4

5.8

Process audit

1

1.5

Investigative audit

2

2.9

IT and investigative

1

1.5

Risk and H&S

2

2.9

Risk and process

1

1.5

Risk and legal

2

2.9

Risk and IT

2

2.9

H&S and IT

1

1.5

H&S and process

1

1.5

IT and process

2

2.9

Legal and H&S

1

1.5

Process and environmental

1

1.5

Legal, process and performance

1

1.5

Legal, IT and process

1

1.5

IT, process and HR

1

1.5

Risk, legal and IT

2

2.9

Risk, legal and process

1

1.5

Risk, legal and H&S

1

1.5

Risk, legal and performance

1

1.5

Risk, IT, process and HR

1

1.5

IT, process, performance and HR

1

1.5

Legal, process, performance and HR

1

1.5

Risk, H&S, process, performance and HR

1

1.5

Risk, legal, IT, performance and HR

1

1.5
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Characteristics of sample internal audit departments

Collaborative groups

Frequency

%

Risk, legal, H&S, IT and process

1

1.5

Legal, H&S, IT, process and HR

1

1.5

Risk, legal, IT, process, HR, investigative

1

1.5

Risk, legal, H&S, IT, process and HR

1

1.5

Risk, H&S, IT, process, performance and HR
Legal, H&S, IT, process, performance, HR
and investigative
Risk, Legal, H&S, IT, process, performance
and environmental
Risk, legal, H&S, IT, process, performance,
HR and investigative
Risk, legal, H&S, IT, process, performance,
HR and environmental

1

1.5

1

1.5

1

1.5

1

1.5

2

2.9

None

20

29.4

1 collaboration

11

16.2

2 collaborations

14

20.6

3 and more collaborations

23

33.8

Hypotheses 5, 5a, 5b, 5c and 5d examine the effect of collaborations in internal audit on
the overall internal audit performance and on each of the internal audit activities of
planning, internal audit execution, reporting and monitoring. The Kruskal-Wallis
ANOVA indicates that there is no statistically significant difference between the overall
internal audit performance and performances in various internal audit activities by the
audit team with different levels of collaborations as shown in Table 5-18.

Table 5-18
Summary of Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA (N = 68) based on internal audit activities where
different levels of collaborations in internal audit is present
Mean Rank

H

df

p

None

35.20

1.712

3

0.634

1 collaboration

40.18

2 collaboration

29.89

3 & more collaboration

33.98

None

37.25

0.643

3

0.887

1 collaboration

34.27

2 collaboration

34.11

3 & more collaboration

32.46

Groups
Overall internal audit

Audit planning
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Mean Rank

H

df

p

None

32.68

1.634

3

0.652

1 collaboration

37.59

2 collaboration

30.04

3 & more collaboration

37.33

None

33.85

2.381

3

0.497

1 collaboration

42.00

2 collaboration

29.93

3 & more collaboration

34.26

None

35.22

4.59

3

0.204

1 collaboration

43.55

2 collaboration

26.64

3 & more collaboration

34.33

Groups
Audit execution

Audit reporting

Audit monitoring

The significance level is 0.05.

The results suggest that the levels of collaborations in the performance of internal audits
do not influence the overall internal audit activities and the various stages of internal
audit. Therefore, H5 to H5d are not supported.

In cases where expertise is not present, collaboration with others through use of experts
may be necessary. Among the necessary skills identified by both CAEs and top
management namely, chief executive officers, for internal auditors are information
technology and risk analysis (Cooper et al., 1994). Knowledge about information
systems’ design and how certain deficiencies in business processes would impact on the
whole organisation are vital. The professional standards on internal auditing enjoin
quality auditing that may provide dependable and appropriate information to support
business processes (Dittenhofer, 2001c). The standards suggest that information
gathered during audits should be analysed using advanced techniques, which may make
the use of experts in internal audit more important when evaluating business processes.

With the perceived difficulty to unrestricted access to information and availability of
auditees during the audits (items P10 and E11 in Table 5-8 in section 5.5.6.), the
provision of appropriate information would have been hindered. To overcome this
limitation and possible inadequacy in the checks or assessments made, collaborations
may be necessary. At least one collaboration, with another department or experts, would
have increased the internal audit performance, as shown by the highest mean ranks in
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Table 15-18. However, with the number of collaborations noted in three specific areas,
namely, information technology, risk management and legal compliance, the quality of
information from internal audit activities should benefit the organisations.

Although risk management is given greater focus (38.4% of responses for collaborative
activities), as shown in Table 5-17, and considered a required competency (IIAM,
2009), this audit area remained problematic. Items related to risk management such as
confirming key control areas of business processes and checking with the auditee on
how to detect errors (items P06 and E03 in Table 5-8 in section 5.5.6.) are not usually
practised.

5.7.8. Competency of audit committee
Ninety one per cent of respondents indicate that the CAEs report to the ACs, 6% to the
heads of department/management meetings and 3% to the CEOs. A majority of the
organisations have 3 members in the AC (70.6%) and the others have 4 members
(10.3%), 5 members (16.2%) and 7 to 8 members (2.9%). The number of AC members
is similar to that in the study by Haron et al. (2010) and complied with the minimum
requisite number (Haron et al., 2005).

Hypotheses 6, 6a, 6b, 6c and 6d examine the effect of the professional competency of
AC members on the overall internal audit performance and on each of the internal audit
activities of planning, internal audit execution, reporting and monitoring.

The Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA indicates that there is no statistically significant difference
between the overall internal audit performance and the internal audit performance at
various internal audit activities assigned to the AC with different professional
competencies as shown in Table 5-19. The results suggest that the levels of professional
competency of the AC do not influence the overall internal audit activities and the
various stages of internal audit. Therefore, H6 to H6d are not supported.
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Table 5-19

Summary of Kruskal-Wallis ANOVA (N = 68) based on internal audit activities where different
professional competencies of audit committees is present
Groups
Overall internal audit

Audit planning

Audit execution

Audit reporting

Audit monitoring

Mean Rank

H

df

p

0.593

3

0.744

1.344

2

0.511

0.712

2

0.700

0.091

2

0.956

0.492

2

0.782

1 professional

35.15

2 professionals

30.96

3 and more professionals

36.18

1 professional

33.72

2 professionals

31.54

3 and more professionals

39.68

1 professional

34.75

2 professionals

31.04

3 and more professionals

37.25

1 professional

34.68

2 professionals

33.18

3 and more professionals

35.32

1 professional

35.90

2 professionals

32.46

3 and more professionals

32.54

The significance level is 0.05.

Goodwin (2003) found that the greater number of AC members with accounting
expertise, the more involved they are in the review of the work of internal audit. The
results in this study are inconsistent with Goodwin’s findings since the majority of the
respondents have only three members, with one of them having accounting expertise.
The establishment and role of the AC with the minimum number and professional
background of the members are stated clearly in the listing requirements in Malaysia.
All listed companies who participated in this study have complied with the composition
and financial background requirements. Earlier concerns were made on the level of
interaction of ACs with internal auditors and the performance of internal auditors, even
though on the surface, the compliance was established based on disclosures in financial
reports (DeZoort, 1997; Haron et al., 2005).

The Treadway Commission and IIA asserted that regular interactions between ACs and
CAEs would assure the independence and effectiveness of the IAF (Bailey, 2007;
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Vanasco, 1994). These interactions are tested in three areas under the reviews by ACs:
internal

audit

planning,

internal

audit

execution

and

reporting

of

audit

recommendations.

5.7.9. Review of internal audit plan by audit committee
Hypotheses 7 and 7a examine the effect of the reviews of internal audit plan by the AC
on the overall internal audit performance and the internal audit planning activities. The
Mann-Whitney U test indicates that the level of overall internal audit performance
where ACs with high involvement in the review of audit plan (Mean Rank = 39.77, n =
42) are significantly higher than those of the ACs with low involvement (Mean Rank =
25.98, n = 26), U = 767.50, z = 2.797, p = 0.005, two-tailed, Cohen’s r = 0.339. The
level of internal audit planning where ACs have high involvement in the review of audit
plan (Mean Rank = 39.70, n = 42) is also significantly higher than those of the audit
committees with low involvement (Mean Rank = 26.10, n = 26), U = 764.50, z = 2.765,
p = 0.006, two-tailed, Cohen’s r = 0.335. This effect-size (Cohen, 1988) can be
described as ‘medium’ for both the overall internal audit internal performance and the
audit planning activities. The results suggest that the levels of review of the internal
audit plan by the AC do influence the overall internal audit performance and the internal
audit planning. Therefore, H7 and H7a are supported.

Goodwin (2003) noted that meetings with CAEs or reviews of internal audit work
occurred more frequently when the ACs’ have more accounting experience. The ACs’
reviews comprised, among others, items related to the audit programs/plans, budgets,
difficulties or restrictions on internal audit scope, results of internal auditing and
management responses to the findings. Except for the last two items, the reviews in
Goodwin’s study were focused on internal audit planning. Although the accounting or
professional background is not significant to the performance of IAF (see section 5.7.8),
the results on ACs’ reviews in the planning stage in this study, specifically the scope
and function of internal audit together with IAF’s competency, supports the importance
of ACs’ reviews in areas identified in previous studies (Goodwin, 2003; Mat Zain &
Subramaniam, 2007). Section 5.7.11 provides further discussion about how AC’s
reviews relates to overall internal audit performance and the difficulties experienced by
internal auditors in their audit work.
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5.7.10.

Review of internal audit execution by audit committee

Hypotheses 8 and 8a examine the effect of the reviews of the conduct of internal audit
by the AC on the overall internal audit performance and the execution of internal audit
activities. The Mann-Whitney U test indicates that the level of overall performance of
internal audit where ACs showed high involvement in the review of the conduct of
internal audit (Mean Rank = 43.59, n = 23) is significantly higher than those of the ACs
with low involvement (Mean Rank = 29.86, n = 45), U = 765.50, z = 2.711, p = 0.007,
two-tailed, Cohen’s r = 0.329 (medium effect-size). The level of internal audit
execution where ACs show high involvement in the review of the conduct of internal
audit (Mean Rank = 40.83, n = 23) is almost significantly higher than those of the ACs
with low involvement (Mean Rank = 31.27, n = 45), U = 663.00, z = 1.893, p = 0.058,
two-tailed. The results suggest that the levels of review of the conduct of internal audit
by the AC do influence the overall internal audit performance and the internal audit
execution. Therefore, H8 and H8a are supported.

The findings indicate that reviews made on resources of IAF, internal audit program and
internal audit processes are important criteria for high performance of internal audit.
The importance of these items is consistent with other studies (Goodwin, 2003; Mat
Zain & Subramaniam, 2007). Additionally, the low reviews by ACs on internal audit
programs and processes (see Table 5-8 section 5.5.6.) support the views expressed by
CAEs that AC members have less knowledge to provide feedback in these areas without
the assistance of the CAEs (Mat Zain & Subramaniam, 2007). Greater reviews by ACs
are likely to assist the internal auditors in performing their work especially when access
to information and personnel may hinder the achievement of the internal audit objective.
Additionally, these reviews would be one way to improve the overall exchange of
reliable information about governance issues in the organisations and aid the ACs in
their oversight of IAF.

Section 5.7.11 provides further discussion about how the reviews on audit execution
relates to overall internal audit performance and the difficulties experienced by internal
auditors in their audit work.
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5.7.11.

Review of actions on internal audit recommendations by audit committee

The report on internal audit recommendations generally includes audit findings for the
current audit as well as the status of previous audit findings. The status of previous audit
findings necessitate the internal auditors to take follow-up actions which will involve,
among others, reviewing samples of data from recent transactions, receiving reviews
from reporting authority, and reporting on the assessment of risk management. As such,
the test for the review of AC members of actions taken on internal audit
recommendations include both reporting and monitoring of the internal audit activities.

Hypotheses 9 and 9a examine the effect of the reviews of the actions taken on internal
audit recommendations by the AC on the overall internal audit performance and the
reporting and monitoring of internal audit activities. The Mann-Whitney U test indicate
that the level of overall internal audit performance where ACs show high involvement
in the review of actions taken on internal audit recommendations (Mean Rank = 37.20,
n = 58) are significantly higher than those of the audit committees with low
involvement (Mean Rank = 18.85, n = 10), U = 446.50, z = 2.712, p = 0.007, two-tailed,
Cohen’s r = 0.329 (medium effect-size). The level of internal audit reporting and
monitoring where ACs with high involvement in the review of actions taken on internal
audit recommendations (Mean Rank = 36.41, n = 58) is almost significantly higher than
those of the audit committees with low involvement (Mean Rank = 23.45, n = 10), U =
400.50, z = 1.920, p = 0.055, two-tailed. The results suggest that the levels of review of
the actions taken on internal audit recommendations by the AC influence the overall
internal audit performance and the internal audit reporting and monitoring activities.
Therefore, H9 and H9a are supported.

All areas are influenced positively by reviews by ACs: internal audit planning, internal
audit execution and reporting of audit recommendations. Although greater levels of
professional competency do not affect the reviews made by ACs, better interaction with
the CAEs would be beneficial in improving the effectiveness of the IAF. ACs should be
involved in determining their qualifications and continuing education (Schneider, 2010).
This study suggests that the active support from the AC influences internal audit
performance, more so when the success of the IAF relies on the personnel’s expertise
level (H2 and H2a) and the size of the internal audit team (H1d) especially in the
planning and monitoring stage of internal audit. The internal audit team is expected to
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provide valued feedbacks about the organisations’ state of corporate governance,
specifically the internal control and the performance of business processes (IIA, 2010b;
Gill & Cosserat, 1993; Haron et al., 2010). Similar to the successful implementation of
any performance system (Waal, 2003), a performing internal audit team is one that
executes the internal audit stages properly. The items identified during the monitoring
stage or follow-up audits will determine the scoping and the areas to be audited in the
next audit.

The resultant possibilities of inadequate scoping of internal auditing or insufficient
interactions of ACs in internal audit activities are fraudulent acts and lack of integrity in
financial reporting (Vanasco, 1994). Pertinent areas that may be affected are risk
management and prevention of fraud. The insufficient participation of ACs in three
particular instances (see Table 5-8 in section 5.5.6. and section 5.5.6.1.) — reviews on
the internal audit resources, processes and programs — suggests difficulties in various
internal audit activities such as:
Audit planning
•

Unrestricted access to information

•

Confirming key control areas of business processes

Audit execution
•

Checking with auditees on error detection

•

Monitoring auditors’ competency for training purposes

•

Reviewing systems performance

Audit reporting
•

Internal audit reports accepted without further queries

•

Reporting on inefficiencies

Audit monitoring
•

Statistical analyses in promoting preventive measures

•

Receiving reviews on audit checklist

5.7.12. Impact on corporate governance
Hypothesis 10 examines the impact of internal audit performance on corporate
governance. It is proposed that high levels of internal audit performance will be
associated with a greater number of recommendations for improvements of elements in
the corporate governance framework. The Mann-Whitney U test indicate that the level
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of recommendations for improvements of elements in corporate governance for groups
with high internal audit performance (Mean Rank = 37.95, n = 51) is significantly
higher than for those with low internal audit performance (Mean Rank = 24.15, n = 17),
U = 609.50, z = 2.503, p = 0.012, two-tailed, Cohen’s r = 0.304 (medium effect-size).
The results suggest that the level of internal audit performance has impacted on
corporate governance. Therefore, H10 is supported.

The internal auditing standards have highlighted that audit reports should bear
significant findings and what actions had been made by senior management (Vanasco,
1994). The suggestions by Gramling and Hermanson (2009) and Sarens (2009) of the
usefulness of the internal audit reports and the frequency of actions based on the audit
recommendations on corporate governance are pertinent. This study perceive that high
performance in internal audit or the increase observance of the tasks identified as best
practices influences the number of audit recommendations to aid management in
making improvements to business processes. Areas where issues are raised, whether
positive or negative findings, have largely been in financial management that relates to
disclosure items in the financial statements, i.e., expenditure and revenue managements
(refer to Table 5-8 in section 5.5.6. and section 5.5.6.3.). The increase in responsibility
and perceived high success (77%) in fraud detection (IIAM, 2009) did not emerge in
this study; rather, corruption prevention and conflict resolution are found as very
infrequently reported. This could mean that if fraud investigations are increasingly
conducted as claimed in the IIAM’s survey, there were no issues to be raised since no
recommendations on improvements need to be made. Consequently, the respondents
have reported very few findings in the areas of corruption and conflict resolution.

5.8.

Summary

This chapter presents the results from the analysis of data on the internal audit functions
in public listed companies in Malaysia. All items to measure the performance of the IAF
and its impact on corporate governance produced a measure that in Rasch measurement
is linear and unidimensional. The fit statistics showed that there is construct validity
with an excellent agreement between item-person as measured by person separation
index of 3.28 with person reliability of 0.91. The overall Cronbach’s alpha for the IAF
is 0.91. As such, the instrument can be used as a good measure in evaluating the
effectiveness of the IAF.
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The research questions on the effectiveness of the IAF and its impact on corporate
governance are addressed by ten main hypotheses. The summary of the results of the
hypotheses testing is shown in Table 5-20.

Table 5-20
Summary of hypotheses testing
Hypotheses

p

Sig. /
Not Sig.
(NS)

H1

Number of audit team members will not be associated with
overall internal audit performance

0.123

NS

H1a

Number of audit team members will not be associated with
internal audit planning

0.454

NS

H1b

Number of audit team members will not be associated with
internal audit execution

0.243

NS

H1c

Number of audit team members will not be associated with
internal audit reporting

0.126

NS

H1d

Number of audit team members will not be associated with
internal audit monitoring

0.041

Sig.

0.102

NS

H2

High levels of professional expertise of audit team members will
be associated with high overall internal audit activities

H2a

High levels of professional expertise of audit team members will
be associated with high internal audit planning

0.036

Sig.

H2b

High levels of professional expertise of audit team members will
be associated with high internal audit execution

0.180

NS

H2c

High levels of professional expertise of audit team members will
be associated with high internal audit reporting

0.128

NS

H2d

High levels of professional expertise of audit team members will
be associated with high internal audit monitoring

0.829

NS

0.731

NS

0.517

NS

H3
H3a

High levels of experience of audit professionals will be
associated with high overall internal audit activities
High levels of experience of audit professionals will be
associated with high internal audit planning
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Hypotheses

p

Sig. /
Not Sig.
(NS)

H3b

High levels of experience of audit professionals will be
associated with high internal audit execution

0.571

NS

H3c

High levels of experience of audit professionals will be
associated with high internal audit reporting

0.855

NS

H3d

High levels of experience of audit professionals will be
associated with high internal audit monitoring

0.529

NS

H4

A combination of audit activities will be associated with high
overall internal audit activities

0.621

NS

H4a

A combination of audit activities will be associated with high
internal audit planning

0.477

NS

H4b

A combination of audit activities will be associated with high
internal audit execution

0.422

NS

H4c

A combination of audit activities will be associated with high
internal audit reporting

0.129

NS

H4d

A combination of audit activities will be associated with high
internal audit monitoring

0.737

NS

H5

Number of collaborations of audit activities will be associated
with high overall internal audit activities

0.634

NS

H5a

Number of collaborations of audit activities will be associated
with high internal audit planning

0.887

NS

H5b

Number of collaborations of audit activities will be associated
with high internal audit execution

0.652

NS

H5c

Number of collaborations of audit activities will be associated
with high internal audit reporting

0.497

NS

H5d

Number of collaborations of audit activities will be associated
with high internal audit monitoring

0.204

NS

0.744

NS

0.511

NS

H6

H6a

High levels of professional competency of audit committee
members will be associated with high overall internal audit
activities
High levels of professional competency of audit committee
members will be associated with high internal audit planning
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Hypotheses

p

Sig. /
Not Sig.
(NS)

H6b

High levels of professional competency of audit committee
members will be associated with high internal audit execution

0.700

NS

H6c

High levels of professional competency of audit committee
members will be associated with high internal audit reporting

0.956

NS

H6d

High levels of professional competency of audit committee
members will be associated with high internal audit monitoring

0.782

NS

0.005

Sig.

0.006

Sig.

0.058

Sig.

0.007

Sig.

0.007

Sig.

0.055

Sig.

H7

H7a

H8

H8a

H9

H9a

H10

High levels of review of internal audit plan by audit committee
members will be associated with high overall internal audit
activities
High levels of review of internal audit plan by audit committee
members will be associated with high internal audit planning
High levels of review of the conduct of internal audit by audit
committee members will be associated with high overall
internal audit activities
High levels of review of the conduct of internal audit by audit
committee members will be associated with high internal audit
execution
High levels of review by the audit committee members of
actions taken on internal audit recommendations will be
associated with high overall internal audit activities
High levels of review by the audit committee members of
actions taken on internal audit recommendations will be
associated with high internal audit reporting and monitoring

High levels of internal audit performance will be associated with
0.012
a greater number of recommendations for improvements of
elements in the corporate governance framework
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Of the ten major hypotheses, hypotheses relating to the ACs’ interactions with internal
audit activities and the impact of internal audit activities on corporate governance are
supported. The hypotheses about the structure of IAF on the internal audit activities
about the number of team members and the level of expertise are also supported.

The following chapter presents the qualitative results and discussion relating to
interviews made with the CAEs on their internal audit functions. The perception on the
value-add service of internal audit is examined in relation to institutional and
identification theories.
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CHAPTER 6: QUALITATIVE DATA
In-Depth Interviews with Chief Audit Executives

6.1.

Introduction

Six companies were approached for the interviews. As mentioned in Chapter 4
Methodology, the companies were suggested by the Chairman of the Audit Oversight
Board, Malaysian Securities Commission and are listed on various industry sectors.
One of them declined the interview on the day of the interview. This chapter presents
the results of five in-depth interviews with the CAEs or the representatives for the IAF
about the manner internal audit is conducted and the involvement of the AC.

Discussions are related to the results in the quantitative phase in Chapter 5. The
theoretical framework in Chapter 2 regarding theories of agency, legitimacy,
institutional and organisational identity is also included.

6.2.

Respondents’ Profiles and Views on Internal Audit

6.2.1. Company A
Company A produces and trades in consumer products with total employees numbering
below 1000. Revenue for the year 2011 totalled RM0.2billion. The IAF was established
in 2002 and is fully outsourced to external consultants, with the Head of Finance (CFO)
as the liaison officer. The reason given for outsourcing is: “We feel that this is more
cost effective.”

The board of directors’ report mentioned that the outsourcing will continue but a
detailed review is expected on the functional capabilities and effectiveness of the
service provider. Included in the 2011 annual report was a highlight on the financial
irregularities which had created severe doubts on the credibility of the company’s
financial position. The CFO is professionally qualified with over 7 years of working
experience. The audit team size from the service provider consists of 2 – 3 persons and
the auditors perform operational audits.

Reports from the service provider were presented to the audit committee. There are 2
independent non-executive directors and 1 non-independent non-executive director.
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Two directors have professional financial qualifications (chartered accountants) and the
other has a legal qualification. The AC composition complies with the Bursa Securities
Listing Requirements. The CFO will liaise with all heads of department on the status of
actions taken by management on recommendations made on the audit findings. The
status of audit findings is then reported to the AC. The CFO has said that the AC is very
involved in the audit activities.

6.2.2. Company B
Company B provides information communication and technology services specifically
software and systems developer as well as a public mobile data network operator. Total
employees are below 1000. Group revenue for the year 2011 totalled RM0.06billion.
The IAF was established in 1999 and was outsourced until 2009. The work of the
internal audit provider was perceived as having no impact on the organisation:
[…] that report is very simple. For example, they will highlight that the leave
application is not updated. […] That is not the real issue. There should be something
material like why it is not updated.
The auditors should not just take the argument that the document is private and
confidential and cannot be seen by internal audit. By right, he or she has to inform or
report to the Board […] Because of that, they cannot detect any collusion to defraud the
company.

There are 2 internal auditors. The CAE is a chartered accountant with a financial audit
background, a member of the Institute of Internal Auditors and has over 7 years of
experience. The staff internal auditor has 3 - 4 years of experience. They perform
operational, compliance and ad-hoc audits. The CAE indicated that collaborations of
internal audit activities with other departments are in the area of legal compliance,
health and safety, information security, human resource, process and performance
audits. The report from a previous ISO audit on the information technology system was
forwarded to the CAE. Further, combined audit assignments with the Procurement
Department are done for investigative audits.

Internal audit plans and reports together with the status of internal audit findings were
presented and reviewed by the AC. AC membership comprise 2 independent nonexecutive directors and 2 non-independent non-executive directors. One director has a
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professional financial qualification (chartered accountant) and 2 others have a legal and
administration background. The AC composition did not comply with the Bursa
Securities Listing Requirements on the majority of AC members to be independent
directors upon the resignation of one its members. The 2011 annual report stated that
the vacancy will be filled. The AC is involved in the audit activities for example,
Sometimes I have been asked to look at new company projects. […] I have been
interviewed by AC before my appointment. For reporting, one week before AC
meeting, report is given and they will have a meeting with the general managers. AC is
quarterly, same day as with Board meetings.

The CAE believes that their work in internal audit is value-adding to the organisation
with the following emphasis:
[…] in the open conference, we told them the function of internal audit and express
what we do is not to find mistakes. […] We are looking for ways to improve. So far,
they are very supportive of our recommendations.
They can use my report as a medium as many situations may have not been brought to
the attention of the Board. In the management responses, these are the weaknesses that
they need to improve and they can tell their story and fine-tune how to solve that
problem with the help of my report.

The CAE also supports the presence of an effective internal audit;
To my mind, Bursa requires the internal audit function to protect the shareholders’
interests, as a check and balance on how management use the money, regardless
whether it is in-house or outsourced, as long as you have an internal audit function. So
by right, a proper internal audit department is very important.

6.2.3. Company C
Company C provides an integrated brown field services for the upstream oil and gas
industry including project management, procurement and logistics. It is certified with
ISO 9001. Total employees are above 2,000. Group revenue for the year 2011 totalled
RM0.6billion. The IAF was established in 2007 at the Group level and is outsourced
until 2009 to a service provider. With the change in board of directors in late 2010, the
AC decided to outsource the service to an audit firm and the firm is still auditing in
specific areas: inventory, procurement and accounts payable. The internal audit
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department was set up in July 2011 and the first internal audit plan was presented to the
AC in November 2011. The in-house IAF is important due to:
[…] the Board stipulated that we should have an in-house IA function. […] when we
outsource the service, there will be limited service […] they can’t be doing any ad-hoc
task.
Secondly, their work is part of their business and the work involved will be calculated
based on the fees. Nothing more, nothing less.
[…] the Board sees the function of the internal audit is vital to the company. So from
time-to time, I have been requested to do or verify certain things. If you outsource this,
then you cannot do that unless you pay for it.
Previously, the holding company did not have a permanent team in this company. The
holding company has their own issues and may station 1 or 2 very junior audit staff
mainly to do compliance.

The department has 1 internal auditor with 3-7 years’ experience and 4 with experience
of above 7 years. Their backgrounds are in information technology, finance, accounting,
marketing and engineering. They perform financial, compliance and ad-hoc audits. Due
to staffing and scale of economies, the audit is done by 2 teams: permanent and
temporary. The CAE further added:
The permanent team is the one […] very familiar with the audit work. […] The
temporary team will be on and off assignments; whenever we need them.

As such, there are collaborations of internal audit activities with other departments in
the area of legal compliance, health and safety, information security, human resource
and process audits. There is another department, Quality Assurance Department,
reporting to the Chief Executive Officer, that conducts internal audit for ISO matters.

The CAE reports to the AC. AC members comprise 2 independent non-executive
directors and 1 non-independent non-executive director. One director has professional
financial qualifications (chartered accountant) and 2 others have legal, contract
procurement and maritime backgrounds. The AC composition complies with the Bursa
Securities Listing Requirements. The AC is perceived as being very active in the
internal audit activities, for example,
We have also established the whistle blower policy. […] The Board or the AC asks me
to report on the complaints status I receive i.e., how many complains, what are the
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issues, which are valid etc. […] When we report to AC, AC asks us to put that as part of
our audit scope.
AC measures our performance. […] For me, I will discuss the performance with AC
Chairman and CEO.

The CAE also believes that internal audit is of value. The following reasons were given:
But we also work hand in hand with management. They will ask us how to comply with
governance, internal control or have they done it the right way.
Earlier this year, we have a change in the CEO. To him, IA is a value added service
because now, he knows that everything is conducted according to the policies,
procedures and within reasonable control environment.

6.2.4. Company D
Company D provides business process outsourcing services worldwide and is a top 100
Global Offshoring Company. It has SAS 70 certification and in the process of ISO
certification for its data centre and building maintenance. Total employees are 1,500.
Group revenue for the year 2011 totalled RM0.2billion. The IAF was established in
2003 and was outsourced until 2006 to an audit firm. The internal audit department was
set up in July 2011. The views on outsourcing are:
If you outsource then the continuity of business knowledge is not there because we can
expect turnover in the team. […] it is much more expensive. It cost less if you only get
them to do audit only 1 or 2 times a year.
They cover only a broad area for example, accounts receivable and accounts payable.
I’m looking at co-sourcing from IT department since we have only 1 IT specialist.

The department has 5 internal auditors with the CAE having more than 7 years of
experience with accounting background. The others have 3-7 years’ experience in
information technology, finance and accounting. They perform performance, financial,
information technology, operations and customer satisfaction audits. Internal audit team
size is 2 persons. Work done by the quality assurance audit is not considered as internal
audit, as follows:
We call business unit report as QA/QC report because the reports are very operational.
[…] They will zoom in on the persons who have not complied.
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The QA report is very specific to the type of checks being made. Only internal audit
issue audit report.
The ISO audit findings are presented only at the ISO management meeting and do not
go to the audit committee.

Collaboration of internal audit is done only on risk assessment with all business units
because of the nature of the company’s business. The CAE explained:
Our group is very diversified ̶ many businesses ̶ and each business is unique.
We need to understand the business and have to know what the key processes are.
From the key processes, then I will look into what are the controls in place.

The IAF reports administratively to the chief executive officer and functionally to the
AC. All 3 AC members are independent non-executive directors. One director has
professional financial qualifications (chartered accountant and taxation) and 2 others
have banking and administration backgrounds. The AC composition complies with the
Bursa Securities Listing Requirements. The CAE stated:
Audit committee looks at the function and scope of internal audit, competency of IA
and staffing matters. … I have no restricted access to them.

The CAE sees the contribution of internal audit in the efficiency of business processes
in the following areas:
[…] our group structure came about through mergers and acquisitions of various
companies. […] we acquire also the set of culture and the set of people. So that is where
internal audit comes in and we suggest streamlining the benefits, job structure, job
grades, and procedures. They have done this in stages.
For cheque processing, we have never pass the compliance audit by the banks with
flying colours […] After our audit, for the first time the business unit pass the clients’
audit without exceptions.
We did the IT audit and give input to the process on migrating to a new system. Our
views are taken into account in the requirements for the new system.
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6.2.5. Company E
Company E is an integrated solutions provider and one of the leading communications
company in Asia. The workforce is over 26,500 employees. Group revenue for the year
2011 totalled RM9.1billion. The in-house IAF was established for more than 10 years.

The department has 40 internal auditors. The CAE is a chartered accountant, a member
of the Institute of Internal Auditors and CPA Australia with over 7 years of experience
in the accounting and banking industry. Internal auditors have 3-7 years’ experience in
information technology, accounting, finance, engineering and network. The CAE added:
Audit team is from 3-5 people. Normally there will be a team leader, member and
account manager [...] who has the business skill.

The internal audit department also serves as a training ground:
The desire is to bring people in and out as a training area for people to move on to a
higher level, so that they have an overall view or helicopter view of the organisation and
also developing skills for staff to be absorbed into the management team.

They perform financial, operational and investigative audits. Other departments conduct
assurance

activities

on

regulatory

compliance,

revenue

assurance

and

telecommunication frauds. Collaboration of internal audit is done only on risk
assessment and, health and safety audits, for example,
[…] we do control self-assessments whereby we assist a business unit, for example, if it
has a bad internal control and risk management system, we have a session with them,
following certain process and procedure to get them to identify what are their risks and
what controls that are supposed to be in place.
[...] risk management unit was set up in 2006 […] we are concern about risk and they do
not have enough people to do it, so we help out as part of the value adding services.

The IAF reports to the AC. All four AC members are independent non-executive
directors. One director has professional financial qualifications (chartered accountant
and taxation) and the others have public administration, business and economics
backgrounds. The AC composition complies with the Bursa Securities Listing
Requirements. AC’s involvement is mainly in the following areas:
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The AC approves our audit plan (scope plus areas), manpower, and function of the audit
department.
AC looks at results of internal audit. […] The responsibility on the actions is on the
management.

The active presence of the internal audit department in corporate governance is
reflected as:
I see there are lots of issues on organisation structure in the sense that as usual as the
company becomes big, they become silos […] compartmentalised into their line of
business […] be very protective of their own area. This is something I’m trying to break
the mindset; that at the end of the day, when they complete their job, they don’t just
pass it to someone else and don’t care about it.
I would actually rate on the whole performance of the audit; from the issues, how
satisfied or how happy are the audit client because sometimes you might step on their
toes, and efficiency of the audit. Most importantly, the coverage of the major areas […]
There is no point of just going in and looks at compliance and non-compliance unless
the objective is just to do compliance.

6.3.

Data Analysis

The initial review of the interview data and the information in the annual reports was for
100 frequently used words including stemmed words. The results show the most
frequently quoted words are those related to the audits and the major players in the
organisations; board of directors and its’ committees, managers and the management
(Figure 6-1). Report is frequently cited with review, independent, execution, business,
control and financial.

The transcribed interviews and text from the annual reports regarding internal audit
activities were analysed using three sub-processes in thematic analysis: data reduction;
data display and conclusion drawing/verification (Bryman, 2012; King, 2004b; Miles &
Huberman, 1994). A detailed reading of the transcripts and archived information from
the annual reports on corporate governance, specifically, the statement of internal
control, AC and external audit report led to the identification of key themes or codes.
An initial coding template (see Table 4-7 in Chapter 4 section 4.8.3) was used to
organize the codes in a meaningful way.
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Figure 6-1. Words frequently used in the interviews with CAEs and the annual
reports of their organisations relating to internal audit

The focus during coding is on aspects that would answer the research questions and
capture at a general level what are involved in the IAF. The unit of analysis is the
sentences in the transcripts and the annual report. In line with the functional approach in
understanding the practices of the IAF and the interaction with AC, the central focus in
analysing the interviews is highlighting both the commonalities and the differences
within and between these five interviews.

Common themes that emerged were grouped under the following high-order codes: i)
establishment, ii) audit committee, and iii) corporate governance. The next section
describes the differences in the profiles of the IAFs as described by their CAEs.
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6.4.

Key Differences in Profiles

All five participating companies have many similar important characteristics that may
affect the perception on the manner the internal audit function is managed (see Table 61). In line with the suggestion by Bryman (2012), the interviews exemplify the IAF in
public-listed companies, providing an appropriate context for answering the research
question and allowing for the examination of key areas in IAFs.

Only one company has a fully out-sourced IAF. The audit report for the year 2011 of
this company was qualified. The Head of Finance acts as the liaison officer with the
provider of internal audit services and the AC.

The similarities in the companies’ characteristics include that all companies report on
the internal audit activities to the AC, and comply with the requirements of a minimum
of three non-executive directors as members, AC chairman being independent, and at
least a director be a member of MIA or association of accountants. Only one company
did not comply with the requirement for the majority of AC member to be independent,
which was disclosed in the annual report.

All CAEs have more than 7 years of working experience and are members of
professional accounting and auditing associations. All four companies with in-house
internal audit function indicated that collaborations were made in certain activities such
as process audits, legal compliance, health and safety audits, information security audits
and risk assessments. There is no combined audit undertaken.
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Table 6-1
Overview of the characteristics of the five interviews
Characteristics
Company A
Company B
Industry sector
Number of employees
Financial information
(revenue range in 2011)
External audit report
Type of internal audit function

AC composition:
Independent Non-Executive
Non-Independent Non-Executive
Background:
Finance

Legal
Administration and others
CAE/representative gender
Age group
Professional qualification
Working experience
Number of internal auditors
Collaboration of internal audit
activities with other departments

Consumer product
Below 1000

Technology
Below 1000

2
1

2
2

2 – CA(M), FCA

Below RM0.5b
Qualified
Established in 2002.
Out-sourced.
Officer-in-charge:
Head of Finance

Company C

Company D

Company E

RM0.50 – 9.9b
Unqualified
Established in 2007.
Audits done by group
internal audit and outsourced.
In-house 2011

Below RM0.5b
Unqualified
Established 2003.
Out-sourced until 2006

RM0.50 – 9.9b
Unqualified
In-house >10years

Trading/Services
1001 - 5000

Below RM0.5b
Unqualified
Established in 1999.
Out-sourced until 2009

Trading/Services
1001 - 5000

Trading/Services
Above 10000

2
1

3
-

4
-

1 - LLB
-

1 - FCCA, MIA member

1 – ICSA, ACI Arb.
1 – Public
Administration

1 –FCCA, MICPA, CA(M)

Female
30-39
ACCA
>7 years
0
None

Female
40-49
CA(M), AIIA
>7 years
2
Process audits, legal
compliance, health and
safety
audits,
information
security
and human resource
audits.

Male
40-49
CA(M)
>7 years
4
Process audits, legal
compliance, health and
safety audits, information
security and human
resource audits.

2 – CA(M), MICPA,
ICAEW
1 – Public policies and
Administration

1 – MIA member, FCCA,
MICPA, CIMA
3 – Public Administration,
Economics, Business and
Marketing
Male
40-49
CA(M), CPA, AIIA
>7 years
40
Health and safety audits,
risk assessment

1 - FCI Arb.
1 – Master Mariner
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Female
30-39
CIA
>7 years
5
Risk assessment
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6.5.

Establishment of IAF

6.5.1. Outsourced IAF
The respondents have at some stage been involved in the outsourcing of the IAF. The
services were provided by an independent internal audit firm, external consultants or the
holding company. The following areas were assessed or addressed as stated in the
annual reports and the interviews:
•

detailed review of prevailing internal controls;

•

adequacy, efficiency and effectiveness of the Group’s internal control systems;
and

•

accounts receivable and accounts payable.

There are two rationales given for outsourcing:
•

more cost effective; and

•

the complexities of the business involved technology and required special or
technical skills to be audited.

The reasons against outsourcing the IAF are:
•

much more expensive ̶ “It cost less if you only get them to do audit only 1 or 2
times a year, which equals to 1 or 2 audit reports” (Company D);

•

the services were limited ̶ “… their work is part of their business and the work
involved will be calculated based on the fees” (Company C);

•

ad-hoc tasks requested by board of directors could not be performed;

•

no continuity of business knowledge because of turnover in the audit team;

•

the auditors were unsure of areas with high potential for risk to be incorporated
in the audit plan;

•

reports were very general;

•

report was very simple;

•

report did not mention the real issue ̶ “There should be something material like
why it is not updated” (Company B);

•

outsourced function was not making any impact;

•

•

audit coverage was broad, for example, accounts receivable, accounts payable,
inventory and procurement;
the auditors cannot detect any collusion to defraud the company;
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•

•

no assurance of the qualification of the actual staff that was put to do the audit
even though the person in charge seemed to have high qualification; and
“…the holding company have their own issues and may station 1 or 2 very
junior audit staff mainly to do compliance” (Company C).

Almost 33% of listed companies in Malaysia have outsourced IAF (Ahmad & Taylor,
2009). One of the audit areas in outsourcing noted above is the review of internal
controls. Assiri and Sherer (cited in Turley & Zaman, 2004, p. 317) submitted that the
internal auditors believed that ACs would have difficulties to assess the effectiveness of
the organisation’s internal control if the IAF was outsourced. This notion is supported
as well, in this study by the ACs who noted the following about the outsourced function
in their organisation that:
due to the financial irregularities that have come to the Board’s attention after the end of the
financial year under review, the Board believes that there would be a need to review the
effectiveness of the internal audit function to ensure that appropriate action is taken to
enhance and strengthen the internal control environment. (Company A)

The reasons against outsourcing far outweigh those in favour. In summary, in-house
internal auditors understand the companies’ activities better than out-sourced auditors,
reported on real issues that would affect business processes and are available to do adhoc audits. Most of the views reflect those who considered internal audit as a “core”
function in organisations (e.g., K. Van Peursem & Jiang, 2008). The above findings also
support the findings that companies with outsourced IAF are less able to detect
management biasness and opportunistic behaviours (Johl et al., 2013).

The professional body, IIA, is not in favour of total outsourcing of the IAF particularly
due to the adverse impact on the organisation’s control environment (Vanasco, 1996).
The major contentions forwarded against outsourcing, for example, to accounting or
audit firms, are related to the independence of the providers. Internal auditing is viewed
as a key management function which would be in conflict with the provider’s
responsibilities being independent of management. A fully outsourced service is also
seen as an indirect advocate of management’s claims on the status of the internal
control.
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The views of the CAEs imply the lack of effectiveness in the services provided when
the IAF is outsourced. Moreover, this view was previously supported not just by the
CAEs but by the AC chairmen in concluding that an in-house IAF was more effective
than that which was outsourced (Soh & Martinov-Bennie, 2011).

6.5.2.

In-house IAF

6.5.2.1.

Auditors’ competency and collaborations

CAEs are the leaders for the internal audit team. Since they are in senior management
and expected to make a difference to business improvements and areas of corporate
governance, the CAEs need to be leaders with high achievements, who show high
abilities to perform internal audit practices. As leaders, the CAEs should be occupying
the positions of leaders; perhaps the three classifications of leaders (see Figure 5-3 in
Chapter 5 section 5.5.7.) on the depiction of CAE’s profiles based on Guttman’s
scalogram). A significant result which would impact greatly on business performance is
the willingness of one of the CAEs to ensure quality services within the organisation.
The CAE clarifies:
I do not want to be the stumbling block, to prevent people from taking the initiative,
provided they understand the necessary controls needed; whereas in this company,
everyone wants me to certify things. So, this is a cultural change […] that I want to
make. As the company becomes big, they become silos […] compartmentalised into
their line of business […] very protective of their own area. This is something I’m
trying to break the mindset; that at the end of the day, when they complete their job,
they don’t just pass it to someone else and don’t care about it. (Company E)

To adequately fill the supporting role for management and making a difference or an
impact on the business performance, the internal audit needs to be effective. Performing
teams would have members who are clear on their goals and able to ensure their team
members have the required knowledge (Rentsch et al., 1994; Rousseau et al., 2006).
Moreover, internal auditors have been known to meet the expectations of ACs and
senior management, even to the degree that the expectation is to compensate senior
managements’ loss of control through business complexity (Sarens & De Beelde, 2006).

Smaller internal audit team sizes, specifically teams with a maximum of 3 members, are
found to perform better than bigger groups (see Chapter 5 section 5.7.3). Audit
strategies that support those that are mentioned to improve audit coverage as suggested
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by Benson (1995) such as the review of the operations and systems together with the
associated risks are clarified as follows:
Internal audit needs to look at which areas to audit and that is why I review at the macro
level on my appointment. They do not have a risk profile. My approach was to go for
general audit because previously it was outsourced. (Company B)

Although, the CAEs perceive that an in-house IAF is more beneficial to the
organisation, they did not discount the need to have other skills within the internal audit
team. Business processes are diverse according to the nature of business each
organisation is engaged in. The diversity in the audit team to include non-financial
experts is now becoming an audit strategy through various ways including collaborative
audits with other departments. This can be seen clearly in the types of collaborative
activities as shown in Table 5-17 in Chapter 5 section 5.7.7. Similarly, Sarens and
Lamboglia (2014) concluded that outsourcing or co-sourcing was done to fill the gap in
skills in personnel in the organisation in managing the IAF. Even though the internal
audit performance is not positively influenced by the level of collaborations (H5),
collaboration is still important to ensure the team’s effective performance. This point is
supported by the following comments:
[…] we have 2 teams approved by the AC; one is the permanent team and the other,
temporary. The permanent team will the one who will know how to do the work […]
very familiar with the audit work. The temporary team will be on and off assignments;
whenever we need them. […] the HSE team are the ones who do the HSE inspections.
They are very familiar with the work and secondly, HSE will have 1 staff to assist us
during our visit. They will come together with us and visit the areas. (Company C)
To get IT auditors is difficult and very limited. I’m looking at co-sourcing from IT
department since we have only one IT specialist. I have highlighted to [the] audit
committee that we might be doing co-sourcing. (Company D)

6.5.2.2.

Critical audit activities

The supportive role of internal auditors for management specifically senior management
are always asserted in areas such as identifying business improvements, risk
management and matters of fraud and corruption (Goodwin-Stewart & Kent, 2006;
IIAM, 2009; Thomson Reuters, 2012). Having the support of the senior management
especially the chief executive officers is important as well, such as for unrestricted
150

QUALITATIVE DATA

access to staff, information and documentation (Sarens & De Beelde, 2006). The
interviewed CAEs confirm this support; that they report administratively to the chief
executive officers.

All CAEs say that planning is critical or most critical. “Internal audit needs to look at
which area to audit and that is why I review at the macro level on my appointment.”
(Company B). The following are said regarding planning:
•

The audit plan is related to the business strategy;

•

We identify the scope, the objective and the area that is going to be audited;

•

If we do the scoping wrongly, we might not be able to cover the important areas
or risky areas since we can’t audit the whole company;

•

go for general audit because previously it was outsourced;

•

audit plan is discussed among the chief financial officer, chief operating officer
and heads of department;

•

get feedback whether there are any issues that management want to raise or are
of concern;

•

give priority to the areas with significant risk or related to issues highlighted by
management during the year;

•

audit plan will look at previous audit findings and current company projects;

•

communicate through e-mail and phone […] explain this is what I am going to
do; and

•

met with the heads of department to look at the checklist to inform them and to a
certain extent agree on the areas of audit.

Many of the comments above could be related to the business processes and the
interactions with the process owners. Expertise is required to ensure this planning
activity is well conducted. The internal audit survey in this study has found that audit
teams with high professional expertise, specifically teams with more than 3 expertise
areas, have affected audit planning (H2a).

In the second stage of the internal audit, risk assessment is mentioned several times.
The importance of risk management is highlighted by a CAE, as follows:
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They do not have a risk profile. […] The main weakness is that there is no risk
management person to highlight the risk, and properly plan the project. (Company B)

This focus on risk and business processes are in line with recent developments in
internal audit worldwide (e.g., Soh & Martinov-Bennie, 2011; IIAM, 2009; Thomson
Reuters, 2012). Consistent with the analysis on questionnaire items difficulties (Chapter
5 section 5.5.6.2. b) Audit execution), two difficult items related to risk management in
the quantitative stage ̶ confirming key control areas (P06) and error detection with
auditees (E03) ̶ are reiterated in the following comments, indicating their importance in
the internal audit process:
People are doing things without understanding why they do it […] it is to determine the
pulse or the consciousness of that manager. So when we ask him, he knows almost
everything about the process. […] to get them be exposed to the methodology of how to
assess their risks and react to those risks. (Company E)

For the next stage, adequacy of the internal audit report has frequently been referred to
in the discussions of the effectiveness of the IAF. The CAEs (Company C and E)
clarified that the internal audit reports presented to the ACs would give the board of
directors the assurance that management reports are credible and management have
complied with regulatory requirements. Further details about reporting to the AC are
made in section 6.6.

In the final stage of the internal audit, monitoring of team members’ activities and
follow-up activities are also taken up seriously:
They have not really identified the root cause. For example, the person did not sign, but
I want to know why. It could have been that the manager could not care less. Now, this
is where my staff has not got the exposure [...] when they go and audit, they don’t dare
to speak to the higher level and just speak to their counterpart and just look at the
activities. So from now on I insist on knowing certain things. (Company E)

6.6.

IAF Relationship with Audit Committee

The CAE’s independent work within the organisations was described as being “the ears
and eyes of the Board” (Company C). ACs’ expectation of internal audit activities has
greatly been on performance and compliance:
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At the end, what will make the AC happy are two things. First, when we […] can certify
that this department is well controlled; management knows how to manage all their
issues and they have delivered their results. Second, for areas that checks are only on
compliance; who are they that have not done their work. (Company E)

From the description on the profiles of the companies interviewed, all respondents
consider their ACs is very involved with the IAF. The resources including competency
of the IAF are considered important and the review formed part of the duties of the ACs
(Bursa Malaysia, 2009b). All CAEs were interviewed and their appointment decided by
the AC. The review by ACs on audit plans included approving the annual budget,
suggestions on audit areas and the competency of the IAF. The review on audit reports
also included “format and depth, rating and opinion, nature of content or what is to be
presented” (Company E). When question about the review of internal audit process, the
CAE clarify:
[…] as far as I’m concern the AC do not give direction per se. But I’m being paid;
supposed to be the expert in the processes. (Company E)

This comment serve to describe the perceived difficulty noted about the reviews by ACs
on the internal audit process (AC06) and audit program (AC05). However, an
unexpected involvement of the AC in the internal audit process is highlighted by other
CAEs:
They were very supportive and if we have any issues or challenges in performing the
audit, I have no restricted access to them. I can talk to them to get their directions on
what to do next. They will inform management what may affect internal audit.

(Company D)
The Board sees the function of the internal audit is vital to the company. So from timeto time, I have been requested to do or verify certain things. (Company C)

Generally, the results of the interviews indicate that the CAEs are well supported by the
ACs and further explain why the involvements by ACs in the various internal audit
activities: review of internal audit plan (H7 and H7a), review of the conduct of internal
audit (H8 and H8a), and review of actions taken on internal audit recommendations (H9
and H9a); are significantly associated with the performance of internal audit. The
comments above from the CAEs provide further insights to earlier studies on the level
of involvement by ACs and the reporting lines of the IAF (Leung et al., 2004; Mat Zain
& Subramaniam, 2007; Soh & Martinov-Bennie, 2011).
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6.7.

Corporate Governance

The final component investigated in this study is the impact of IAF on corporate
governance measured by the number of recommendations for improvements. IAF
should add value and contribute to business performance in areas of improvements (Soh
& Martinov-Bennie, 2011). H10 proposes that high internal audit performance will be
associated with increased recommendations for improvements of elements in the
corporate governance framework. This hypothesis is supported (see Chapter 5 section
5.7.12). The expectation in providing an impact from the internal audit process and the
importance of the reported audit findings is clarified by a CAE:
The next critical [stage] is the exit meeting where you table your findings [...] The audit
findings and the basis of the findings; those are very important to determine whether we
have made any impact on the company.” (Company B)

Specific areas identified to be reported (Bursa Malaysia, 2000; Fadzil et al., 2005;
IIAM, 2009; Liew, 2007) include the following:
•

assurance on internal control which encompass key controls and procedures;

•

assurance on risk management; and

•

business improvements, specifically in providing advice on identifying
opportunities for revenue enhancement and cost savings.

The empirical evidence shows that internal audit performance is associated with the
components of corporate governance (H10). The areas being focused by the CAEs
interviewed are:
•

financial audit;

•

cost savings;

•

procurement and asset maintenance;

•

revenue management or assurance (contract performance, revenue leakage,
billing system, customer satisfaction);

•

project performance (completion, not following budget, costing before project
kick-off, or not as scheduled or situations that could drag the projects)

•

compliance to policies and procedures (internal and external, including
regulatory bodies);

•

risk management (risk register and prioritization, risk controller, risk assessment
capability, disaster recovery and business continuity plan);
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•

control measures and efficiency of processes (sufficiency of controls, over
control, improving predetermined controls, compensating controls);

•

information technology (computerized systems, migrations);

•

complaints and whistle blowing;

•

fraud investigations;

•

human resource management (approving authority, job structure and salary
scheme, competency, general claims, disputes);

•

retesting areas assessed in quality audits or business reports for assurance; and

•

assessment of quality assurance program (management representative and
document controller have taken appropriate actions on their audit findings and to
ensure that for the next quality audit, actions such as updating the standard
operating procedures and job descriptions are done).

Overall, these audit areas could be easily grouped with the components of corporate
governance as mentioned in the research framework based on those of the World Bank
(see Figure 2-2 in Chapter 2 section 2.4.). The corporate failures mentioned earlier in
the beginning of this study (see Section 1.1 in Chapter 1), had raised the issues of
irregularities in business transactions and other financial misconduct. The areas given
focus by the CAEs as noted above adequately cover the reviews or assessments on these
concerns on irregularities and misconduct. As noted by Backman (1999, p. 24) the legal
system in Malaysia “is relatively open, free of corruption, and fair.” Further, Backman
had alluded that the stock market in Malaysia is well-regulated. The initial findings
regarding infrequent reports on fraud and corruption prevention (see section 5.5.6.3. in
Chapter 5) lend support to Backman’s statements. The overall index on IAF
performance of 65.48% (see Chapter 5 section 5.6) has given an assurance that the
CAEs has performed satisfactorily in creating an impact on corporate governance, based
on the scale used by the Malaysian Government in performance measurement (Auditor
General of Malaysia, 2008).

However, more research on this topic needs to be undertaken to provide further
information how the findings in these areas of corporate governance effect the business
processes and their performances.
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6.8.

Agency of Value

Three of the respondents had outsourced the function until recently. The CAEs
interviewed acknowledge their agency relationship in acting “as a check and balance on
how the management use the money […] Actually, the function of internal audit is more
of the CEO’s function.” (Company B)

As pointed out by one of the CAEs, the presence of an IAF either outsourced or inhouse is to comply with the listing requirements. Consequently, due to this compliance,
the general public and the shareholders would perceive that there is good internal
control and have confidence in the organisation. The organisation would legitimise the
action to determine and continue with the type of IAF even though the IAF is
ineffective, for example, as shown by the statement on the review of the effectiveness of
IAF mentioned by Company A in section 6.5.1.

The in-house IAF shared common characteristics or homogeneity as stated in the
institutional theory forwarded by DiMaggio and Powell (1983). As revealed earlier in
the similarities of the CAEs’ profiles, the interviewed CAEs are qualified and
experienced professionals. Their profiles are also similar to the majority of the
respondents of the survey (see Table 5-3 Chapter 5 section 5.3).

Further, in ensuring that the internal audit would be of benefit to the organisation, the
CAEs would work closely with the management, including having feedback on the
audit checklists (see item M06 in Chapter 5 section 5.5.6.2. d)) while maintaining their
independence. They pointed out:
Their feedback is very important because they are in the business. (Company D)
[…] look at which direction is the company moving to [...] which area that has high risk
that we need to audit. One of the company’s objectives is the need to minimise the cost
of maintaining …. (Company C)

Overall, CAEs believe that they are valued as part of a team, whose actions, could affect
the performance of their organisations. Team performance would require team members
being able to set goals in congruent with the team’s purpose and provide feedback for
improvements (Rousseau et al., 2006). Dittenhofer (1997) had earlier suggested that
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internal auditors should act as though they are a part of the management team; as a
collegue or adviser to management, to gain their trust and not be classified as an
outsider. Additionally, organisational identity dictates the roles of a unit or a group and
most of the motivations for the actions of the team members which are consistent with
the organisation’s goals (M. Mills, Bettis, Miller, & Nolan, 2005; M. R. Mills & Bettis,
2006). An observation about leaderships is made by Khaliq (2001). He noted that
“Asians generally put high value on friendship, good relations with people and the
ability to adapt rather than to confront” and this trait is also attributed to Malaysians
(Khaliq, 2001, p. 86 & 92). It is worth noting that the CAEs sense of identity as a team
member, and being a valued team member of their organisations are strong, as
explained below:
When I go to each department and talk to the head of departments, in the open
conference, we told them the function of internal audit and express what we do is not to
find mistakes. We are part of the company even though we are independent. We are
looking for ways to improve. So far, they are very supportive of our recommendations.
(Company B)
I always tell them if they have problems within their department for example, business
projects, they could make use of my report as a tool. […] they can tell their story and
fine-tune how to solve that problem with the help of my report. Management are more
open to our suggestions. (Company B)
At least we can give a comfort level to the management that what we are doing are
according to the procedure and the international framework. […] we also work hand in
hand with management. They will ask us how to comply with governance, internal
control or have they done it the right way. (Company C)
For planned audit, we look at process input and tell management what they can do
better. We do not focus too much on compliance. Our focus is now to be their business
partner. […] We will mention that there are other compensating controls that achieve
the same objective. They can remove the control from the procedures instead of keeping
the control and not doing it. (Company D)
The desire is to bring people in and out as a training area for people to move on to a
higher level, so that they have an overall view or helicopter view of the organisation and
also developing skills for staff to be absorb into the management team. (Company E)
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6.9.

Summary

This chapter has clarified the empirical findings in Chapter 5, among others, about the
activities in the IAF and the relationship between internal auditors and the ACs. The
combination of findings, both quantitative and qualitative, provides support for the
conceptual premises that internal audit is not just an agency with its legitimacy in the
organisations being dictated by the fulfilment of regulatory requirements. The high
commitment towards team performance of the CAEs, being a member of the
organisation specifically senior management, points towards the internal auditor as an
agency of value.

The next chapter concludes this study with the summary of the main findings,
implications of the findings, areas of limitations and ends with avenues for future
research.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
The Performance of the Internal Audit Function on Corporate Governance

7.1

Introduction

This study investigated the effectiveness of the IAF in three areas: AC reviews on IAF,
internal audit activities and the internal audit findings on areas of corporate governance.
This study uses a convergent mixed method where data are collected through a
questionnaire survey and in-depth interviews with CAEs of public listed companies in
Malaysia. The quality of the survey data was assessed using the Rasch model which
provided detailed information about the responses given by the CAEs in terms of
internal auditors’ ability and the perceived difficulty of conducting the internal audit
questionnaire items. Non-parametric tests are then applied to test the hypotheses. The
interview data were analysed by themes and comparisons made on the views expressed
by the CAEs about their IAFs and how they felt about their contributions to their
organisations.
This chapter begins with a summary of the research questions and the main conclusions
on the investigation made which merges both the results from the quantitative and
qualitative phases. The remaining sections discuss the implications for research, policies
and practices, research limitation and suggestions for future research.

7.2

Investigation on Internal Audit Function

The first recommendation for directors to report on the effectiveness of internal control
was made in the 1992 Cadbury Committee report (Vinten, 2002). The regulatory
provision for the listed companies also added that ‘companies that do not have an
internal audit function should from time to time review the need for one’ and if there is
one, to ‘review annually its scope of work, authority and resources’ (Vinten, 2002, pp.
28-29). These statements are the essence in the listing requirements about IAFs in
Malaysia (Bursa Malaysia, 2000, 2009a, 2009b) which are investigated in this study.
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The guiding research question is:
How effectively has the IAF in Malaysian public listed companies been practiced, in
line with the level of collaborations and/or combined assurances, in an environment of
espoused organisational excellence?

In addressing this question, the following areas were investigated and tested relating to:
I. What are the factors determining internal audit performance?
II. How does the AC affect the performance of the IAF?
III. How has internal audit enhanced corporate governance?

The factors outlined in the conceptual framework in Chapter 3 section 3.2 included
internal audit structure: team size, member expertise and experience, combined audits
and collaborations in audits; AC’s involvement in the IAF: ACs’ composition, reviews
of internal audit planning, conduct of audit and audit recommendations; activities in
each internal audit stage; and the areas of corporate governance where findings were
made by internal audit. Results indicate that some of the factors did contribute to the
effectiveness of IAF and impacted on corporate governance.

I.

What are the factors determining internal audit performance?

To analyse this, the Rasch measurement model is used to examine what activities are
critical to the conduct of internal audit (see Chapter 5 Figure 5-2 section 5.5.5. and
Table 5-8 in section 5.5.6.). With the non-parametric tests and further information from
the interviews with CAEs, the following conclusions are made:
1. The qualitative analysis has identified that an in-house IAF contributes in
determining the effectiveness of internal audit performance. By having an inhouse function, the scope of internal audit are better able to cover specific risk
areas and all business processes that would impact generally on governance (see
Chapter 6 sections 6.5.1 and 6.5.2.1). The findings support other studies and
views that indicate that an in-house IAF is more able to support ACs in ensuring
the effectiveness of an organisation’s internal control (e.g., K. Van Peursem &
Jiang, 2008; Soh & Martinov-Bennie, 2011; Vanasco, 1996).
2. At all stages of the internal audit, certain internal audit tasks, prescribed as best
practices, are more difficult to perform such as confirming key control areas
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with auditees (P06), getting unrestricted access to information (P10), monitoring
auditors’ competency (P04), checking with auditees on how to detect errors
(E03), using statistics to review systems performance (E04), audit reports are
accepted without further queries (R04) and receiving reviews on checklists
(M06). A majority of the findings are consistent with previous related studies on
specific areas of internal audit (Abdullah et al., 2008; Abdullah & Masodi, 2012;
Cooper et al., 1994; Cooper et al., 1996; Fadzil et al., 2005). The difficulties
may relate to areas of competencies that the internal auditors could improve
through up-skilling training activities.
3. Internal audit monitoring, comprise mainly of follow-up audits on audit
recommendations and improvement activities, is relatively more difficult than
other stages of internal audit (see Figure 5-2 in Chapter 5 section 5.5.5). Audit
team size, specifically team size of a maximum of 3 persons, significantly
contributes to effective audit monitoring (H1d in Chapter 5 section 5.7.3). The
findings on team size support the importance of having a team with an optimum
size to facilitate the review process (Firth-Cozens, 1992; SANS Institute, 2007).
4. Audit team expertise instead of team experience affects internal audit planning.
The post-hoc test showed that team expertise covering more than three areas
significantly affects internal audit planning (H2a in Chapter 5 section 5.7.4). The
interviews with CAEs also have indicated the importance of team dynamics,
specifically size and expertise, to facilitate their internal audit activities.
5. The findings from the in-depth interviews with the CAEs showed that the CAEs
view internal audit planning and monitoring as very important to ensure
effectiveness in internal auditing (see Chapter 6 section 6.5.2.2). These views
support the earlier findings in the quantitative analyses.
6. Even though the quantitative analysis did not show that collaborations are
positively associated with internal audit performance, the interview data
highlighted that collaborations are seen as a strategy for CAEs to perform
effective audits to manage the gap in team expertise, such as audits of risk
management, legal compliance and information technology (see Chapter 6
section 6.5.2.1). This finding supports Sarens and Lamboglia’s (2014)
conclusion that co-sourcing is done to breach the gap in expertise.
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7. Combined assurance does not affect internal audit performance according to the
quantitative analysis. However, the presence of combined assurance (26.5%) as
shown in Table 5-16 in Chapter 5 section 5.7.6 suggests that combined
assurance is recognised as a strategy used in internal audits (Benson, 1995; Pun
et al., 2001). The result of this study provides additional knowledge about this
internal audit strategy which could be investigated further.

II. How does the AC affect the performance of the IAF?
This research examines the IAF of listed companies, and an in depth explanation is
made on the listing requirements on corporate governance in Malaysia in Chapter 2
sections 2.2.3. and 2.5. Various components of the IAF are investigated and the
majority of the hypotheses that are supported relate to the interactions of ACs with the
IAF (see Table 5-20 in Chapter 5 section 5.8). The following conclusions are derived
from the reviews by ACs on the IAFs:
1. Different professional competencies of AC members do not influence internal
audit performance. A majority of the respondents (70.6%) has 3 members in
their ACs, which is the minimum number specified by the listing requirements.
One of the members must have a financial background. The data from this study
is consistent with those in previous studies (Haron et al., 2005, 2010; Mat Zain
& Subramaniam, 2007). The qualitative data also shows that this requirement on
professional background (see Table 6-1 in Chapter 6 section 6.4) is complied
with. Even though ACs’ professional competency does not influence internal
audit performance, the interviewed CAEs view the ACs as supportive of the
internal audit activities.
2. At the professional and regulatory level, effective relationship between ACs and
the IAF has always been highlighted (Bursa Malaysia, 2009b; Deloitte, 2012;
MIA, 2012; Vanasco, 1996). The current study is the first investigation on the
specific regulatory requirements of Malaysian public listed companies regarding
this relationship. The quantitative analyses show that the active reviews made by
ACs in each stage of internal audit affect the performances of the related stage in
the internal audit process, specifically:
•

Reviews of internal audit planning by ACs affect positively internal
audit performance and the internal audit planning (H7 and H7a).
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•

Reviews of internal audit execution by ACs affect positively internal
audit performance and the conduct of internal audit (H8 and H8a).

•

Reviews of actions on internal audit recommendations by ACs affect
positively internal audit performance and the internal audit reporting
and monitoring (H9 and H9a).

The results support the recommendation by Schneider (2010) that ACs be
involved in the determination of IAF resources and competency. The qualitative
data also support the findings about the CAEs’ appreciation for the ACs’ active
participation in the CAEs’ appointments and the monitoring of management’s
actions on internal audit findings (Mat Zain & Subramaniam, 2007). The new
empirical evidence in this study has also addressed the question on whether the
quality of ACs’ activities has a direct relationship with internal audit
performance (Haron et al., 2005; Mat Zain & Subramaniam, 2007).
3. The results of the Rasch analysis shown in Table 5-8 in Chapter 5 section 5.5.6
and the findings in section 5.5.6.1 confirm the finding that the reviews of
internal audit reports are always done with the greatest ease (Mat Zain &
Subramaniam, 2007; Turley & Zaman, 2007). However, the most difficult task
or relatively infrequent reviews by the ACs are the reviews of audit programs,
internal audit processes and the resources of IAF. The quantitative results on
these infrequent reviews by ACs are consistent with the views expressed by the
CAEs in the in-depth interviews (see Chapter 6 section 6.6). The expectation
that CAEs are the expert in the internal audit activities, as mentioned by the
CAE of Company E, may be the most probable reason for these infrequent
reviews and could be investigated further.
Overall, the focus on ACs interaction with IAF is justified. The robust results on the
hypotheses tested indicate that the reviews by ACs on all stages of the internal audit
activities are significant to the effectiveness of internal audit, and concurrently, have an
impact on corporate governance.
III. How has internal audit enhanced corporate governance?
The third area investigated is how internal audit has enhanced corporate governance.
Corporate governance is said to be beyond compliance and its purpose is to provide for
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avenues of improvements in organisations (Arguden, 2010). There should be definitive
areas identified in the corporate governance framework where improvements could be
made by the senior management arising from the internal audit findings. The World
Bank’s (1991) framework for corporate governance (see Chapter 2 section 2.4) is used
in this study to identify the findings raised by the IAFs in recent years. The Rasch
analysis successfully map the relative difficulty of the internal audit findings based on
the dimensions of corporate governance against the dimensions in the internal audit
process and the involvement of ACs in the review of the internal audit activities (see
Figure 5-2 in Chapter 5 section 5.5.5.). Overall, corporate governance items are more
difficult to be determined then items tested for AC's involvement and the internal audit
activities. The following conclusions are made:
1. High levels of internal audit performance are associated with increased
recommendations for improvements of elements in the corporate governance
framework (H10). The expectation that internal audit needs to have an impact on
corporate governance is also mentioned in the in-depth interview (see comments
by CAE of Company B in Chapter 6 section 6.7).
2. The World Bank’s corporate governance framework (1991) is appropriate in
determining the impact of internal audit on corporate governance. The
dimensions as shown in Figure 2-2 in Chapter 2 section 2.4 provide a basis for
the linkage between IAF quality and its’ impact on corporate governance
(Sarens, 2009). This initial linkage could be explored further to find out the
extent of improvements made and the impact on business processes.
3. The quantitative analysis identifies that internal audit findings on financial
matters such as expenditure and revenue management remain the major issues
frequently raised by IAFs. The results suggest that these areas are constantly
being assessed in the audit plans, being areas customarily assessed (Al Athmay,
2008). The qualitative data also identify similar areas being given focus by the
CAEs that are related to the financial matters, such as; financial audit,
procurement and asset maintenance, and revenue leakage (see Chapter 6 section
6.7).
4. The Rasch analysis identifies issues such as corruption prevention, conflict
resolution, information transparency and economic performance are not usually
reported. These areas are areas that internal auditors could use to identify
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irregularities and if improved upon by management, could lead to better risk
management and fraud detection. In contrast, the CAEs interviewed have
indicated that they have focused on risk management, fraud investigation,
complaints and whistle blowing. The qualitative data supports the survey
findings that most IAFs personnel were trained in fraud investigation and the
internal audit used a risk-based approach (IIAM, 2009). However, IIAM (2009)
also found that 20% of the respondents have stated that none of their internal
auditors had been trained for fraud prevention, and this may have contributed to
the infrequent reporting of areas relating to corruption and conflict resolution,
taking into consideration Backman’s (1999) view that the Malaysian
environment is relatively not affected by corruption. Moreover, the results on
team expertise (H2a) and the lack of fraud detection expertise highlighted by
IIAM (2009) would also suggest that the internal auditors need to enhance their
expertise in fraud prevention. Further training in fraud prevention would also
necessarily lead to better knowledge in information system, enabling ease in
performing information system audits and risk assurance (areas where
collaborations are identified).

The theoretical framework for internal audit is firmly rooted in the agency theory, which
explains why organisations have internal audits. The IAF works within the premise that
the internal auditors are independent agents, assigned to monitor the internal control of
organisations and assessing the performance of business processes. In order to sustain
and excel in business performance, organisations would adopt strategies such as
accreditation and teamwork excellence. How these strategies affect internal auditors,
whereby CAEs are part of the senior management teams, could be interpreted in the
views expressed by the CAEs (see Chapter 6 section 6.8). The conclusions from the
collective explanations by the CAEs about their presence in their organisations as
providing value are:
1. The internal auditors believe they are independent agents even though they also
provide advisory services, such as in risk management and compliance
activities.
2. Internal auditors perceive themselves and are seen as a valued team member
who provides feedback to management in capacities more than monitoring of
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business performance. This view confirms the collegial style that could lead to
success in internal auditing forwarded by Dittenhofer (1997). One of the CAE’s
has also clarified that the IAF is a training ground for managers.
3. The identification of in-house IAF as a management team that makes a
difference to the business performance indicates their presence in the
organisation serves more than a legitimate reason and compliance to
institutional obligations (cf. Taylor, Sulaiman and Sheahan, 2001) Instead the
organisational identity and identification theory describes the position of
internal auditors better since they view their presence as part of a performing
team that is essential in ensuring the continued existence of their organisations.
The CAEs’ views agree with the actions identified by others (M. Mills, Bettis,
Miller, & Nolan, 2005; M. R. Mills & Bettis, 2006) when the members of an
organisation identify themselves with the organisation.
4. The in-house internal audit function provides more value than outsourced
providers because in-house internal auditors are familiar with the business
processes. This finding supports the views that internal audit is a “core”
function which is better able to detect management biasness and irregularities
when there is an in-house team (Johl et al., 2013; K. Van Peursem & Jiang,
2008).

7.3. Implications
7.3.1 Theoretical Implications
This study has added new knowledge on internal auditing in Malaysia. While many
studies have examined internal audit solely using agency theory or legitimacy theory,
this study additionally reviewed other theories. IAFs’ main objectives are to ensure
effectiveness of internal control and business processes amidst current business
strategies of organisational excellence. Most organisations adopt strategies which
include risk management and international certifications for their goods and services.
Excellence in services requires performing teams as described by Vaill (1982) in section
2.3.4. p. 23. The internal audit team is considered a performing team. Since the CAEs
are mainly in the middle and senior management levels (see Table 5-3 section 5.3) and
reporting to the ACs, the internal audit team could also be placed in the the senior
management team of an organisation. The positioning of IAF within their organisations
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is within the precepts of agency and institutional theories. However, the views
expressed by the interviewed CAEs of their services and their perception of their vital
presence in their organisations in assessing internal control, risk management, and being
involved in business processes in an advisory capacity, have clearly shown that their
presence is identified more with organisational identity and identification theory. Hence,
the presence of in-house IAF can be considered as an agency of value, being identified
and recognised as a valued senior management team within the corporate governance
structure.

7.3.2. Implications for Research Methodology
Research on corporate governance has only considered the OECD’s definition of
corporate governance, which deals mainly with stakeholders interests. An internal audit
involves reviewing the way business is carried out including reviewing the governance
structure, via the decision-making process and the necessary systems put in place to
disseminate information and making decision-making transparent. The use of the World
Bank (1991) corporate governance framework has provided a structure to examine
where an effective IAF has made an impact through the recommendations made arising
from the internal audit. Consistent with the suggestion by Vanasco (1994), the areas
highlighted in the audit reports that could easily be related to business processes would
better guide the senior management in what actions/improvements to make.

Unlike other studies on internal auditing that focused on specific areas such as internal
audit activities and audit committees, this study include both these areas and the
components of the IAF structure. By including team compositions such as experience,
expertise, team size, and collaborations of audits, this study provides a deeper insight
into the internal audit activities and the relationship with ACs. The audit strategies
undertaken by the in-house IAF are relevant to the effective performance of the IAF.
Without the investigations into the effects of the internal audit structure on internal
audit, the level of impact of certain audit strategies, areas not researched before, such as
expertise and collaborations would not be uncovered and be researched further.

The approach taken in this study, convergent mixed method, provides more insight on
the IAF performance that cannot be confirmed by the quantitative method alone. The
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significant associations of certain factors in the overall assessment of the IAF through
the tests on hypotheses could be compared and substantiated with the information
derived from the interviews made with CAEs who come from a different industry
background, having experienced situations with outsourced and in-house IAFs. For
example, even though collaborations are not significantly related to internal audit
performance in the quantitative analysis, the interviewed CAEs asserted that
collaborations are used to fill the gaps in audit team expertise.

Additionally, the quality of the data is assessed by Rasch measurement analysis. The
analysis has provided information on the level of difficulties in performing each task;
internal audit activities, the reviews by ACs on the IAF, and gave insights on the issues
relating to the different dimensions of corporate governance. The knowledge about the
level of difficulties in the task investigated in this study could be used to substantiate the
information gathered through the in-depth interviews and further hypotheses testing.
Lastly, the Rasch measurement has provided a model to determine the probability of
success in the performance of IAF, which could be used as a performance index. The
first study using Rasch measurement in audit research was done only on one area, to
determine the success of performing internal audit activities (Abdullah, A Rashid, &
Masodi, 2008), without considering the components of ACs’ involvement or the impact
of internal audit on corporate governance. Rasch measurement is already entrenched in
the field of medical sciences and education (e.g., Green et al., 1984; Griffin, 2007;
Tennant, McKenna, & Hagell, 2004). Future research in audit using Rasch measurement
may benefit more in investigating the richness and making meaningful inferences of
collected data.

7.3.3. Implications for Policy Makers
The results of the interviews pointed to the importance of having an in-house IAF. The
policy for mandating an IAF without specifying the type of IAF may need to be
reviewed in view of the findings from both the quantitative and qualitative enquiries
which suggest greater reviews be made by ACs for each stage of the internal audit. Such
increase in reviews will not be possible if the IAF is fully outsourced.
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This study supports the views expressed by others regarding the interaction of IAFs and
ACs (Goodwin, 2004; Mat Zain & Subramaniam, 2007; Turley & Zaman, 2007). ACs’
authority, the required expertise specifically having financial background and ACs’
reviews on the internal audit work are essential in ensuring that IAF are effective. Since
the reviews by ACs directly affects internal audit performance, the findings regarding
difficulty in accessing information and the lesser intensity in the reviews of internal
audit resources, processes and programs may need to be addressed by the regulatory
bodies to further enhance the effectiveness of ACs.

The areas of findings investigated by using the World Bank (1991) corporate
governance framework would aid the ACs to better review the internal control of
organisations. Audit findings could be reported by using all or some dimensions of the
corporate governance framework: legal framework/corporate policies, information and
transparency, management improvements, and accountability (see Figure 2-2 in Chapter
2 section 2.4.). The internal audit report would provide an overall view of areas being
managed well and areas impacted by deficiencies in the internal control or business
processes corresponding to the dimensions listed above.

7.3.4. Implications for Practice
For a successful implementation of a performance system, where a process is sequential,
the initial stage needs to be executed properly before the next stage is undertaken (Waal,
2003). Internal audit activities are sequential, from audit planning to audit monitoring.
The most crucial stage is internal audit planning because this will determine the scope
of the audit, detailing areas of concern to be reviewed, audit objectives, audit procedures
and the composition of the team members. The communication with the AC at this stage
should also include feedback from management on significant risks, internal control and
any limitations on the scope of internal audit processes (Bailey, 2007). With the present
low reviews of resources, internal audit processes and programs highlighted by the
present study (see Chapter 5 section 5.5.6.1 and Chapter 6 section 6.6), greater
communication with the AC is required. A review may be necessary to evaluate the
possibility of establishing practice notes in detailing the reviews by ACs on the IAFs
necessary to comply with the listing requirements.
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Team structure for an in-house IAF is very important to the quality of the internal audit.
This means an IAF that comprises of only one, the lone CAE in some instances to
satisfy the listing requirements, is inadequate. The results and analyses suggest that the
minimum number should be three. Inadequate number of internal audit resource has the
potential to lead to inadequacy of monitoring activities, thus follow-up activities are
ineffective in assessing the effectiveness of corrective and preventative actions taken by
management in improving their business processes or managing their business risks.
The roll-over effect will be insufficient information necessary to plan for the
forthcoming audit; the significant effect of the previous audit findings on the business
processes which should be considered in the determination of areas to be audited and
the audit tests to be performed.

The skill or knowledge gained in only the same area would not suffice to handle
different risk situations as businesses expand through mergers and acquisitions and
business innovations. Currently, businesses are more focused on areas such as corporate
responsibility and sustainability, cyber threat management and social media. Hence,
expertise in other areas related to the business processes is required and internal auditors
need to equip themselves with the necessary knowledge to enable them to audit
effectively. The results and analyses suggest that the team members should have more
than three expertise areas. Strategies that could be used to bridge the gap in skills and
knowledge may be through the use of collaborations, which is now gaining acceptance
by the CAEs. The presence of combined audits as an audit strategy is also an avenue
that the CAEs could use in improving the effectiveness of their internal audit such as
combining performance audit with risk management or health and safety audits. More
collaborations and combined audits should be encouraged as this could help to ensure
that there is adequate and effective use of resource to perform internal audits that would
provide a thorough coverage of business processes.

Effective internal audit function positively impacted corporate governance. The
suggestions by Gramling and Hermanson (2009) and Sarens (2009) on the usefulness of
the internal audit reports and the frequency of actions based on the audit
recommendations on corporate governance are pertinent. Effective internal audit
function positively influences the findings in corporate governance. With a competent
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internal audit team who have the necessary expertise, together with quality interactions
with the ACs through their reviews of various stages of the internal audit process, better
evaluation of corporate governance can be achieved. With this scenario, the ACs will be
kept informed about significant audit findings which may include conflict resolution,
inefficiency, irregularities or corrupt practices and ineffectiveness of systems such as
information dissemination and retrieval. The increase in responsibility and perceived
high success (77%) in fraud detection (IIAM, 2009) did not emerge in this study; rather,
corruption prevention and conflict resolution are found to be very infrequently reported.
The internal auditing standards have underscored that audit reports should bear
significant findings and highlight what actions had been made by senior management
(Vanasco, 1994). With constant and quality feedback to the ACs which include whether
the areas highlighted are showing deficiencies or otherwise, improvements in corporate
governance identified by using the dimensions such as those using the World Bank’s
framework (1991) could be made.

7.4. Limitations of the Current Study
The following limitations are to be considered when interpreting the results in terms of
generalising the IAF practices to those outside Malaysia and data sources.

7.4.1. Small sample size
The sample size of 68 responses could be improved. All the data were obtained through
the cooperation of the Institute of Internal Auditors Malaysia (IIAM), the professional
body for internal auditors in Malaysia. The institutional policy in not participating in
surveys, mentioned in Chapter 4, has also led to the small number of responses.
Although this sample size is comparatively acceptable relative to other studies in
internal audit, another approach is to get the cooperation of the Bursa Malaysia who is
the regulator for all listed companies in Malaysia.

7.4.2. Generalisability
This study is located in Malaysia and limited to public listed companies. Non-listed
companies and state owned companies have not been included even though combined
assurance activities may exist, especially when these companies are already practising
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internal audit for a variety of reasons. The results from this study may therefore not be
generalisable to state-owned companies and to other countries.

7.4.3. Sensitiveness of the Study
Internal auditors are enjoined to confidentiality of information. Not just internal auditors
but also external auditors, advocated change to uphold this confidentiality required in
their independent reviews of the organisations. It is possible that the respondents may
be reluctant to provide information on the areas of corporate governance where they
have made findings, even though confidentiality as to their identity has been assured
through non-identification of survey instruments and the mail-out was done only by
IIAM. Therefore, the study only focuses on the number of findings in each area; without
any specifications as to the exact findings which needed corrective or preventive actions
by management. Although other studies have supported the use of outcomes to gauge
the effectiveness of internal audit (Dittenhofer, 2001) the results may not be indicative
of the extent of the impact on corporate governance due to the sensitiveness of
information.

7.5.

Suggestions for Future Research

Several avenues could be explored:

7.5.1. Extending Rasch measurement
This study has extended the application of the Rasch measurement, often used to
measure performance in the field of medical sciences and education, to assess the
overall performance of the IAF, the respective internal audit activities and the IAF’s
impact on corporate governance. For the component of the involvement of AC in the
IAF, the present study assesses only eight areas in the review of the IAF. Future studies
could explore other determinants of the internal audit performance, such as the reviews
as listed in the internal control statement of the listing requirements and specific
activities in risk management.

7.5.2. Respondents for qualitative enquiry
Previous research has alluded to the lack of interactions between the ACs with CAEs
(Haron et al, 2005). The views of CAEs in this study lend further insight to the
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quantitative analyses results especially the level of interactions between these two
parties. This study looks at the perception of the providers themselves about the internal
audit activities. How accurate this perception will depend on the level of self-insight of
the CAEs on their IAFs’ performances. Other views could be those of the AC members,
senior managers and external auditors.
7.5.3. Data collection
The sample has been taken from the list of IIAM’s corporate members. In light of the
limitation on small sample, to further increase the sample size, the sample could be
extended to include both the main board and the second board companies. This could
allow for a more flexible approach in researching the IAF and its related components.
7.5.4. Research paradigm
The present study uses a functionalistic paradigm to examine issues pertaining to the
IAF and corporate governance. It also uses an interpretive approach to better understand
the agency relationship of internal auditors in their organisations. Other paradigms like
critical realism and pure interpretive approach may provide a different dimension to
explain the relationship of the IAF and corporate governance. Such paradigms may
necessitate the use of case studies to gauge the performance of the internal audit
function by conducting in-depth interviews and gathering data through other means with
respondents which could include CAEs, ACs and senior managers.

7.6.

Conclusion

Literature on internal audit has recognised the need to have quality in internal auditing.
There has been a growing focus among the professionals and the regulatory bodies for
internal audits to be of value to the organisation and in helping their organisation to
manage risk and in reducing the occurrence for fraudulent activities which may result in
financial failures.

The findings in this study have enriched our understanding of the performance of
internal audit functions and its impact on corporate governance with further suggestions
on future research.
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Appendix 1

Questionnaire

INTERNAL AUDIT SURVEY
Thank you for participating in this survey. This is an anonymous questionnaire. You
should read the Information Letter carefully as it explains fully the intention of the
study. Please ensure that you do not write your name (or any other comments that could
identify you) on the questionnaire. By completing the questionnaire, you are consenting
to take part in this study. This questionnaire presents a list of items which represents
activities during an audit process from inception to the closing of an audit finding.
Should you have any query on this study, kindly contact me at the following email
address: razimaha@our.edu.ecu.au. Please return the completed survey by 30th April
2012.
_____________________________________________________________________________
Individual information
1.

2.

3.

4.

Gender
Male

M

F

Female

Age
20 – 29 1

30 - 392

Management level
Supporting1
Staff
Educational background
Diploma 1
Area of specialization:

40 - 493
Executive2

Bachelor

50 – 59 4

Above 60 5

Middle 3
Management

2

Postgraduate

Accounting 1

Finance

Senior 4
Management
3

2

Economics 3

Others (please specify): 4…… ………………………………………..
5.

Years of experience
< 3 years 1

3 – 7 years

2

> 7 years

3

Company Information
1.

Industry sector: …………………………………………………………

2.

Size of Organisation (Revenue in RM billion in last financial year):
Below 0.5 b 1

3.

4.

0.5 – 9.9 b 2

Number of employees:
Below 1000 1
1001 – 5000 2

10 – 19.9 b3

Above 20 b4

5001 – 100003

10000+ 4

Type of Internal Audit Department
Financial

1

Quality 2

Others (please specify)

3

………………………….
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5.

Questionnaire

Your department’s reporting level in the organisation
Audit
Committee

Others (please specify) 4 …

6.

Board of Directors3

Head of Department/
Management Meeting 2

1

….………………………………….

Size of internal audit department and background (total number of persons): ………………
(please specify number of persons in the boxes below)
Finance 1

Accounting 2

Information Technology 3

Engineering 4

Others (please specify area of expertise and
number of persons)

5

…………………………………………………………………
…………………………………………………………………
7.

Internal auditors years of experience (please specify number of persons in the boxes below)
< 3 years 1
3 – 7 years2
> 7 years 3

8.

Does your organisation have any certification or accreditation, for e.g., ISO9001, ISO14001,
ISO17025, which requires internal audit to be conducted? Yes1
No2
If Yes, please specify all certification or accreditation held:
…………………………………………………………………………………………….
…………………………………………………………………………………………….

9.

The number of internal auditors that make up an audit team for an audit assignment:
…..………… persons

10.

If there is another department that conducts audits for example, quality management or
environmental audits , please specify:
Department name: …………………………………………..

Educational background of Head of Department:
Diploma 1
Bachelor 2

Postgraduate

Size of department and background (total number of persons):
(please specify number of persons in the boxes below)
Finance 1
Engineering 4

Accounting2

3

……………
…

Information Technology3

Others 5
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If others (please specify)
………………………………………………………………………

Reporting level in the organisation (please specify):

11.

………………………………………..

Composition of Audit Committee
a.

b.

Number of Audit Committee members: ………………… persons

Executive directors: ……… persons

Non-executive directors: ………

persons

Independent directors: ……… persons

Non-independent directors: ……… persons

Professional background of Audit Committee members
Membership of professional bodies:
Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA):

……… persons

If the Audit Committee members hold other professional memberships other than with
MIA, please specify:

…………………………………………..:
(Name of professional body)

……… persons

…………………………………………..:
(Name of professional body)

……… persons

…………………………………………..:
(Name of professional body)

……… persons

…………………………………………..:
(Name of professional body)

……… persons
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12.

Questionnaire

For any given audit assignment, has there been any collaboration with staff outside of
your internal audit department? Please specify the frequency of such occurrences in
the past two years. If the type of audit activity has not been conducted at all, input N/A
in the column for Types of audit activities. If there has been no collaboration in
relation to the audit activity, input N/A in the columns for Staff / department
collaborated and the relevant years.

Types of audit activities

Staff / department
collaborated

Year
2009

Year
2010

E.g. Legal compliance
N/A
E.g. Risk assessment

Research & Development;

N/A

2

Procurement & IT

3

N/A

Risk assessment

Legal compliance

Health and safety

Information system security

Process audit

Performance audit

Human resource audit

Environmental and
sustainable development

Others (please specify)
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13.

Questionnaire

For any given audit assignment, have there been any instances that each of the audits in Q12
were conducted together with one or more types of audit? Please specify the frequency of
such occurrences in the past two years. Input N/A if none of the audits were combined.

Types of combined audit Staff / department collaborated
activities (Please specify the
combinations)

Year 2009

Year 2010

14. What is the level of involvement of the reporting authority (audit committee or
other committee) in the following activities?
For each item, circle one of the numbers:
1 – Never, 2 – Sometimes, 3 – Usually, and 4 – Always.
a.

Review the scope of the internal audit activity.

1

2

3

4

b.

Review the functions of the internal audit department.

1

2

3

4

c.

Review the competency of the internal audit function

1

2

3

4

d.

Review the resources of the internal audit function

1

2

3

4

e.

Review the internal audit program

1

2

3

4

f.

Review the internal audit processes

1

2

3

4

g.

Review the results of the internal audit

1

2

3

4

h.

Review the actions taken by management on the
recommendations of the internal auditors

1

2

3

4
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15. Please identity the areas and frequency of occurrence where issues or weaknesses
has been reported by internal auditors in the following areas. Input N/A if no issues
were raised or reported in the internal audits conducted.

Areas in which issues or audit findings raised

Issues Raised
(Number)
2009

2010

Recommendations
Implemented
(Number)
2009
2010

Revenue management (delivery of goods and
services, collection procedures, demand forecasting,
pricing)

Expenditure management (budgets, capital
expenditures, inventory management, outsourcing)

Personnel management (recruitment, orientation,
staff development, performance appraisal, planning
personnel needs)

Financial performance (financial systems,
investments, compliance with debt covenants, audit
reviews, fraud detection, financial leverage)

Economic performance (identification of waste and
inefficiencies, profitability of ventures)

Complaints procedure (feedbacks, hotlines,
complaints, actions on complaints)

Rules and policies change procedure (availability
of rules and policies, standard operating procedures,
frequency of updates, audit mandates, reporting
structures, risk management)

Compliance to rules (workable rules, traceability of
transactions, reduced arbitrariness, management policies
and rules do not conflict with existing laws and
regulations)
Rule enforcement (authorization process, competent
administrators)

Conflict resolution (binding decisions on disputes,
arbitration)

Information transparency (availability of financial
results and decisions by management, results of risk and
environmental assessments)

Corruption prevention (tender process for
procurement, ‘whistle blowing’, joint appraisals of
projects, off-budget expenditures)
Analysis of data (statistical techniques, use of
relevant data, productivity analysis)

Dissemination of information (management
information system, clarity and accuracy of information)
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Each category represents your degree of perception as auditor towards each item
when you conduct an audit. For each item, circle one of the numbers:
1 – Never, 2 – Sometimes, 3 – Usually, and 4 – Always.
16. How would you rate the occurrence of the following activities in relation to the
internal audits in your organisation?
1.

Set performance objectives that management had identified for 1
business process as a reference point in audit program.

2

3

4

2.

Set key performance metrics such as budgeted vs actual audit time 1
for audit assignments.

2

3

4

3.

Appoint auditors with the necessary skills relative to the complexity 1
of the area to be audited.

2

3

4

4.

Monitor auditors’ competency for training purposes.

1

2

3

4

5.

Verify management
communicated.

been 1

2

3

4

6.

Confirm with auditee key control areas of business processes that are 1
automated vs manual.

2

3

4

7.

Evaluate effectiveness of policy implementation in the organisation.

1

2

3

4

8.

Identify processes that management highlighted as areas of concern.

1

2

3

4

9.

Communicate audit plan to the organisation, both at the Board of 1
Directors and operations, before execution of audit activities.

2

3

4

10.

Management gives access to information without any restrictions.

1

2

3

4

11.

Verify that auditee understands the use of information or transaction 1
that is being handled.

2

3

4

12.

Determine situations where override is made to the process or 1
controls.

2

3

4

13.

Check with auditee on how to detect errors in the transaction or 1
process.

2

3

4

14.

Use statistical methods to review systems performance or 1
productivity of area audited.

2

3

4

15.

Determine from auditee changes made in processes or controls.

1

2

3

4

16.

Identify issues involving potential waste in resources.

1

2

3

4

17.

Determine availability of information on consistency of transactions 1
processed.

2

3

4

18.

Clarify root causes of audit findings to management.

2

3

4

policies

for

all

processes

have

1
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19.

List audit findings according to significance of findings and impact 1
on the organisation.

2

3

4

20.

Inform management that follow- up audits will be conducted.

1

2

3

4

21.

Auditees are available as scheduled in the audit plan.

1

2

3

4

22.

Management seriously views corrective actions as avenue for 1
improvements.

2

3

4

23.

Audit reports specify clearly implications/potential of problems 1
arising from audit findings.

2

3

4

24.

Audit report contains status of previous audit recommendations, e.g. 1
whether remedied or in progress.

2

3

4

25.

Audit reports accepted by management without further queries.

1

2

3

4

26.

Audit reports give information on inefficiencies in resource 1
management.

2

3

4

27.

Audit team leaders discuss with management any issues in the area 1
audited arising from the conduct of the present audit.

2

3

4

28.

Discuss reasonableness of audit findings/recommendations in audit 1
reports with management.

2

3

4

29.

Review samples of data from recent records showing new actions 1
made in follow-up audit visit.

2

3

4

30.

Review feedback
management.

with 1

2

3

4

31.

Management monitors improvement activities generated within the 1
organisation.

2

3

4

32.

Analyse data using statistical methods in promoting preventive 1
measures.

2

3

4

33.

Receive reviews on audit reports from reporting authority within the 1
organisation, e.g. audit committee or Board of Directors.

2

3

4

34.

Receive reviews outside of internal audit, for e.g. from senior 1
managers, on audit checklists for incorporation in audits.

2

3

4

35.

Amend documented audit procedures to update for current regulatory 1
requirements on a continuous basis.

2

3

4

on performance

-

of

audit activities
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Interview Consent Form

Razimah Abdullah
School of Accounting, Finance and Economics
Faculty of Business and Law
Edith Cowan University
270 Joondalup Drive
JOONDALUP WA 6027
Email: razimaha@our.ecu.edu.au
Informed Consent Document
Internal Audit: Conduct of internal audit and involvement of audit committee
This case study is conducted by Razimah Abdullah, a Doctor of Philosophy (Accounting)
candidate in the Faculty of Business and Law at Edith Cowan University. The research is
funded by the Edith Cowan University.
I, on behalf of my organisation, confirm the following:
• I have been provided with a copy of the information letter which explains the study
• I have read the letter and understood what the study is about
• I have had opportunities to ask questions about what the letter means and my
questions have been answered to my satisfaction
• I have been given the contact details if I have any other questions
• I understand that what I say is being used only for the purposes of this research
• I know my identity will not be revealed unless I agree otherwise
• I agree to the researcher recording what I say on a digital recorder
• I know that I will be asked for my views to find out about the internal audit
activities, what I think about the measurement of internal audit effectiveness and
the impacts of internal audit on corporate governance
• I know that the information gathered on internal audit reports and the involvement
of audit committee in internal audit activities will not divulged information of a
sensitive nature but only to the extent of broad areas in corporate governance
• I am free to withdraw at any time and do not need to give a reason
• I agree to publications such as journal articles that will be produced from this study
• I freely agree to take part in this research
Name (Please print)

:

Organisation

:

Phone number/Email

:

Signed

:

Date

:
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Interview Guide

Internal audit structure
1.1. Q

Could you describe the organisation structure of the internal audit
department?
Prompt - e.g. in-house or out-source
IF in-house, when was the department established?
Probe – why was the department established
IF out-source, why and what motivate this action
Probe – types of services or audits done, frequency of audits, team members,
liaison officer, etc.

1.2. Q

What are the composition and experience level of internal auditors?
Probe – number of staff, team members , years of experience, guidelines used
on recruitment etc.

1.3. Q

What are the skills and background of internal auditors?
Probe – their qualification, industry expertise
Why are these important in the recruitment process?

1.4. Q

Has there been any instance where internal audit is carried out with other
departments or other departmental staff members?
Prompt – e.g. collaboration for IT audit, risk assessment, health and safety
Probe – Description of the situation and why?
When was it done? Frequency, departments involved, types of audits,
etc.
Why was collaboration done?

Internal audit activities
2.1. Q

What are the types of audit conducted in the company?
Prompt – e.g. operational, financial, quality audits, etc.
Probe – Are there any other department doing internal audits?
IF there is another department doing audit or internal checks, such as quality
audits,
Do you consider this as internal audits?
Why is it considered as not internal audits?
What is the nature of the checks carried out by them?
Who do these ‘auditors’ report to? Is it to the Audit Committee?

2.2. Q

Have any of the audits you mentioned been conducted as a combined activity?
Probe – How was it done? Why it is not considered as an audit strategy?

2.3. Q

How do you carry out the audit activities? Are there any particular stages in
the conduct of the activities?
Probe – Description of the stages and who is involved.
Timing and frequency.
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2.4. Q

Please explain why these stages in the audit are important to your company?
Probe – Which stage have priority? Why ?

2.5. Q

Do you feel that internal audit has any impact in the corporate governance of
this company?
Probe – What are the situations that you feel that the company has benefitted
from internal audit?
Why do you think that the situation create an impact?
How do other department feel about or view your work?

2.6. Q

Are there specific areas that you feel that internal audit has contributed to
improvements in the company? Please specify the areas.
Prompt – e.g. compliance, transparency, information system, disputes,
management improvement, human resource, etc.

2.7. Q

How do you measure the performance of the internal audit function?
Prompt – e.g. key performance indicators, feedbacks from auditees or audit
committee, actions on audit findings, etc.

Involvement of audit committee
3.1. Q

What are the composition and professional background of the audit
committee?
Probe – Any documents that can show the information?
How do these affect the relationship with you?

3.2. Q

Is the audit committee involved in the activities of internal audit?
Prompt – e.g.
i. Review of the scope and functions of the internal audit
ii. Review of the competency of the internal audit function
iii. Review of the resources of the internal audit function
iv. Review of the audit program of the internal audit
v. Review of the processes of the internal audit
vi. Review of the results of the internal audit
vii. Review of the actions taken by management on the recommendations
of the internal audit function
Probe – How involved is the audit committee, for e.g, in appointment of
internal audit staff, performance review, audit scope and particular steps in
audit programs

3.3. Q

Are there any other areas that affect corporate governance where audit
committee is involved? Please describe them.

3.4. Q

Is there anything else you think I should know about your internal audit
activities?
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Distribution of data and the results of Shapiro-Wilk test on normality

Skewness
Statistic

Audit committee involvement
AC01 Review scope of internal audit
activity
AC02 Review functions of internal
audit department
AC03 Review competency of
internal audit function
AC04 Review resources of internal
audit function
AC05 Review internal audit program
AC06 Review internal audit
processes
AC07 Review internal audit results
AC08 Review management actions
on recommendations
Audit planning
P01 Set performance objectives as
reference in audit program.
P02 Set key performance metrics for
audit assignments.
P03 Appoint auditors with the
necessary skills.
P04 Monitor auditors’ competency
for training purposes.
P05 Verify communication of
management policies.
P06 Confirm key control areas of
business processes.
P07 Evaluate effectiveness of policy
implementation.
P08 Identify processes of concern to
management.
P09 Communicate audit plan to
BOD and operations.
P10 Unrestricted access to
information.
Audit execution
E01 Verify understanding of use of
information or transaction handled.
E02 Determine overrides to
processes or controls.
E03 Check with auditee on how to
detect errors.
E04 Use statistics to review systems
performance.

z

Kurtosis
Statistic

Shapiro-Wilk
z

Statistic

df

Sig.

-.350

-1.205

-1.255

-2.186

.789

68

.000

-.605

-2.081

-.618

-1.077

.834

68

.000

-.119

-.410

-1.041

-1.813

.836

68

.000

.091

.312

-1.024

-1.784

.834

68

.000

.164

.565

-1.228

-2.139

.864

68

.000

.522

1.796

-.370

-.644

.807

68

.000

-2.306

-7.929

4.812

8.384

.481

68

.000

-1.633

-5.616

1.809

3.152

.588

68

.000

-.280

-.964

-.736

-1.281

.786

68

.000

-.629

-2.165

-.770

-1.342

.762

68

.000

-.995

-3.421

-.688

2.053

.770

68

.000

-.643

-2.210

-.767

.759

.812

68

.000

-.768

-2.641

-1.017

-.653

.782

68

.000

-.726

-2.496

-1.030

.028

.812

68

.000

-1.026

-3.529

-.146

-.255

.700

68

.000

-.629

-2.165

-.770

-1.342

.762

68

.000

-.815

-2.804

-.532

-.927

.735

68

.000

-.498

-1.712

-1.110

-.521

.835

68

.000

-.755

-2.598

.352

.612

.816

68

.000

-.637

-2.189

-.056

-.097

.802

68

.000

-.760

-2.615

.872

1.519

.797

68

.000

-.373

-1.283

-.599

-1.044

.859

68

.000
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Distribution of data and the results of Shapiro-Wilk test on normality

Skewness
Statistic

E05 Determine from auditee changes
in processes or controls.
E06 Identify issues of potential
waste in resources.
E07 Determine availability of
information on consistency of
transactions.
E08 Clarify root causes of audit
findings.
E09 List audit findings based on
significance and impact.
E10 Inform management of followup audits.
E11 Auditees available as scheduled.
Audit reporting
R01 Corrective actions seen as
avenue for improvements.
R02 Reports specify clearly
implications/potential of problems.
R03 Report contains status of
previous audit recommendations.
R04 Reports accepted without
further queries.
R05 Reports give information on
inefficiencies in resource
management.
R06 Team leaders discuss issues
with management on conduct of
audit.
R07 Discuss reasonableness of audit
findings with management.
Audit monitoring
M01 Review samples from recent
records in follow-up audit.
M02 Review feedback on audit
activities with management
M03 Management monitors
improvement activities.
M04 Statistical data analysis in
promoting preventive measures.
M05 Receive reviews on audit
reports from reporting authority.
M06 Receive reviews outside of
internal audit on audit checklists.
M07 Continuous updates of audit
procedures.

z

Kurtosis

df

Sig.

-.791

-2.721

-.356

-.620

.726

68

.000

-.386

-1.327

-.454

-.791

.843

68

.000

-.214

-.737

-.555

-.966

.752

68

.000

-.875

-3.009

-.165

-.287

.767

68

.000

-1.329

-4.572

.784

1.367

.643

68

.000

-1.257

-4.325

.314

.546

.657

68

.000

-.022

-.076

-1.045

-1.820

.809

68

.000

-.330

-1.134

-.656

-1.144

.772

68

.000

-1.627

-5.595

1.409

2.454

.587

68

.000

-.620

-2.133

-.851

-1.483

.763

68

.000

.066

.228

-1.037

-1.806

.808

68

.000

-.429

-1.477

-.618

-1.077

.847

68

.000

-1.540

-5.297

1.496

2.607

.602

68

.000

-.808

-2.778

-.303

-.528

.700

68

.000

-.574

-1.973

-.598

-1.042

.719

68

.000

-.583

-2.006

-.654

-1.139

.760

68

.000

-.317

-1.090

-.841

-1.465

.790

68

.000

-.417

-1.433

-.506

-.882

.856

68

.000

-.913

-3.139

-.131

-.229

.759

68

.000

-.157

-.540

-.481

-.839

.868

68

.000

-.628

-2.161

-.628

-1.094

.756

68

.000
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Appendix 8

Locations, Standard Errors, infit, outfit and point-measure correlation
for items in Rasch analysis

------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|ENTRY
TOTAL TOTAL
MODEL|
INFIT | OUTFIT |PT-MEASURE |EXACT MATCH|
|
|NUMBER SCORE COUNT MEASURE S.E. |MNSQ ZSTD|MNSQ ZSTD|CORR. EXP.| OBS% EXP%| Item |
|------------------------------------+----------+----------+-----------+-----------+------|
|
53
84
68
3.82
.28| .95
-.1| .86
-.4| .47
.34| 77.9 78.3| F10R |
|
56
90
68
3.41
.25|1.36
1.6|1.17
.8| .42
.37| 77.9 71.3| F13R |
|
55
94
68
3.18
.23|1.33
1.6|1.25
1.1| .40
.39| 70.6 68.3| F12R |
|
48
96
68
3.07
.23|1.12
.7| .91
-.4| .56
.40| 69.1 65.4| F05R |
|
54
96
68
3.07
.23|1.05
.3| .99
.0| .44
.40| 64.7 65.4| F11R |
|
57
96
68
3.07
.23| .96
-.1|1.11
.6| .23
.40| 58.8 65.4| F14R |
|
52
97
68
3.02
.22|1.01
.1| .97
-.1| .46
.40| 63.2 64.9| F09R |
|
49
101
68
2.83
.21|1.12
.7|1.22
1.1| .14
.42| 51.5 61.7| F06R |
|
47
107
68
2.57
.20| .76 -1.5| .81 -1.0| .48
.44| 64.7 58.2| F04R |
|
51
109
68
2.49
.20|1.10
.6|1.09
.5| .52
.44| 58.8 57.5| F08R |
|
46
115
68
2.26
.19| .69 -2.0| .71 -1.8| .47
.45| 58.8 54.0| F03R |
|
50
130
68
1.75
.18|1.19
1.2|1.16
1.0| .49
.48| 51.5 52.4| F07R |
|
44
143
68
1.35
.17|1.33
1.9|1.28
1.7| .42
.49| 52.9 50.5| F01R |
|
45
148
68
1.21
.17|1.37
2.1|1.38
2.2| .21
.50| 51.5 50.4| F02R |
|
5
163
68
.79
.17|2.09
5.4|2.12
5.5| .23
.50| 33.8 48.7| AC05 |
|
6
173
68
.52
.16| .91
-.5| .93
-.4| .36
.50| 55.9 48.6| AC06 |
|
42
183
68
.25
.16|1.11
.8|1.12
.8| .38
.50| 42.6 48.1| M06 |
|
4
194
68
-.05
.17| .96
-.2|1.02
.2| .43
.49| 47.1 48.2| AC04 |
|
22
198
68
-.16
.17|1.13
.9|1.18
1.2| .45
.49| 39.7 48.5| E04 |
|
40
199
68
-.19
.17|1.32
1.9|1.34
2.0| .32
.49| 41.2 48.5| M04 |
|
21
201
68
-.25
.17| .91
-.5| .94
-.3| .43
.49| 57.4 48.7| E03 |
|
33
201
68
-.25
.17|1.08
.6|1.11
.8| .21
.49| 47.1 48.7| R04 |
|
3
202
68
-.27
.17|1.05
.4|1.03
.3| .43
.48| 52.9 49.0| AC03 |
|
34
204
68
-.33
.17| .93
-.4| .91
-.6| .61
.48| 51.5 49.0| R05 |
|
24
205
68
-.36
.17| .87
-.8| .87
-.8| .55
.48| 50.0 49.2| E06 |
|
29
205
68
-.36
.17|1.03
.2|1.04
.3| .27
.48| 44.1 49.2| E11 |
|
2
206
68
-.39
.17|1.40
2.4|1.49
2.7| .43
.48| 35.3 49.1| AC02 |
|
18
209
68
-.48
.17| .92
-.5| .90
-.6| .52
.47| 51.5 49.9| P10 |
|
12
212
68
-.57
.17| .82 -1.2| .81 -1.2| .51
.47| 51.5 50.4| P04 |
|
19
212
68
-.57
.17| .74 -1.8| .73 -1.7| .66
.47| 67.6 50.4| E01 |
|
1
217
68
-.72
.18|1.00
.1|1.03
.3| .46
.46| 45.6 50.7| AC01 |
|
14
217
68
-.72
.18| .84 -1.0| .79 -1.3| .63
.46| 57.4 50.7| P06 |
|
9
219
68
-.78
.18| .85
-.9|1.11
.7| .33
.46| 52.9 50.7| P01 |
|
39
219
68
-.78
.18| .93
-.4| .94
-.3| .36
.46| 52.9 50.7| M03 |
|
20
220
68
-.82
.18| .83 -1.1| .86
-.8| .51
.45| 50.0 51.0| E02 |
|
30
223
68
-.91
.18| .72 -1.8| .76 -1.5| .48
.45| 67.6 52.7| R01 |
|
11
224
68
-.95
.18| .96
-.2| .97
-.1| .46
.45| 58.8 52.8| P03 |
|
13
224
68
-.95
.18| .94
-.3| .92
-.4| .58
.45| 50.0 52.8| P05 |
|
25
224
68
-.95
.18| .63 -2.6| .70 -1.9| .46
.45| 64.7 52.8| E07 |
|
32
226
68
-1.02
.19|1.06
.4|1.02
.2| .46
.44| 57.4 52.8| R03 |
|
26
227
68
-1.05
.19|1.18
1.1|1.04
.3| .44
.44| 54.4 53.5| E08 |
|
10
228
68
-1.09
.19|1.09
.6|1.13
.7| .32
.43| 48.5 53.9| P02 |
|
16
228
68
-1.09
.19| .66 -2.2| .62 -2.4| .69
.43| 61.8 53.9| P08 |
|
41
228
68
-1.09
.19|1.26
1.5|1.29
1.5| .38
.43| 50.0 53.9| M05 |
|
38
229
68
-1.12
.19| .77 -1.4| .87
-.7| .48
.43| 57.4 54.8| M02 |
|
43
230
68
-1.16
.19| .85
-.9| .90
-.5| .43
.43| 51.5 55.0| M07 |
|
17
233
68
-1.27
.20| .73 -1.6| .70 -1.7| .64
.42| 63.2 57.0| P09 |
|
23
236
68
-1.39
.20| .77 -1.3| .77 -1.2| .53
.41| 64.7 58.5| E05 |
|
37
236
68
-1.39
.20| .61 -2.6| .58 -2.4| .60
.41| 75.0 58.5| M01 |
|
15
238
68
-1.47
.20| .95
-.2| .81
-.9| .54
.40| 67.6 59.3| P07 |
|
36
240
68
-1.55
.21| .72 -1.7| .77 -1.1| .52
.39| 72.1 60.7| R07 |
|
28
242
68
-1.64
.21|1.23
1.2|1.36
1.5| .33
.39| 57.4 63.1| E10 |
|
27
246
68
-1.83
.22| .92
-.4| .76 -1.0| .49
.37| 66.2 67.5| E09 |
|
31
248
68
-1.94
.23|1.16
.8| .91
-.3| .48
.36| 70.6 69.1| R02 |
|
35
250
68
-2.05
.24| .86
-.6| .71 -1.1| .54
.35| 80.9 71.4| R06 |
|
8
251
68
-2.11
.24| .94
-.2| .77
-.9| .48
.34| 73.5 72.1| AC08 |
|
7
258
68
-2.60
.29|1.02
.2| .77
-.6| .41
.29| 82.4 80.4| AC07 |
|------------------------------------+----------+----------+-----------+-----------+------|
| MEAN
191.8
68.0
.00
.19|1.00
.0| .99
.0|
| 57.8 56.3|
|
| S.D.
52.1
.0
1.67
.03| .24
1.4| .25
1.3|
| 11.1
8.2|
|
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Most unexpected CAE’s responses based on the observed data

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------| DATA |OBSERVED|EXPECTED|RESIDUAL|ST. RES.|MEASDIFF| Item | Person | Item | Person
|
|------+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+-------+--------+-------+-----------|
|
1 |
1 |
3.66 | -2.66 | -4.98 |
2.44 |
41 |
31 | M05
| R31223232 |
|
2 |
2 |
3.84 | -1.84 | -4.79 |
3.29 |
9 |
6 | P01
| R06134223 |
|
2 |
1 |
3.77 | -2.77 | -6.15 |
2.90 |
2 |
6 | AC02 | R06134223 |
|
2 |
1 |
3.69 | -2.69 | -5.26 |
2.56 |
4 |
6 | AC04 | R06134223 |
|
3 |
1 |
3.88 | -2.88 | -8.69 |
3.63 |
38 |
6 | M02
| R06134223 |
|
|

2 |
4 |

1 |
1 |

3.83 |
1.71 |

-2.83 |
-.71 |

-7.23 |
-1.08 |

3.25 |
-1.47 |

28 |
48 |

2 | E10
2 | F05R

| R02134223 |
| R02134223 |

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|

2
4
4
3
1
3
4
2
4
2

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|

3.82
1.67
1.46
1.21
3.52
1.22
1.55
3.63
1.80
3.67

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|

-2.82
-.67
-.46
-.21
-2.52
-.22
-.55
-2.63
-.80
-2.67

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|

-6.89
-1.03
-.80
-.50
-4.15
-.51
-.91
-4.76
-1.18
-5.05

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|

3.14
-1.57
-2.13
-3.10
2.02
-3.05
-1.85
2.34
-1.28
2.47

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|

28
48
51
57
11
56
56
39
49
30

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|

25
25
4
30
9
16
15
15
15
15

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|

E10
F05R
F08R
F14R
P03
F13R
F13R
M03
F06R
R01

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|

R25124223
R25124223
R04132242
R30224523
R09224113
R16124223
R15134233
R15134233
R15134233
R15134233

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|

4
2
1
3
1
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
3
4
2
1
2
2
3
3
1
2
2

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|

1.82
1.07
3.28
3.92
3.40
1.31
1.34
3.69
3.68
3.66
3.65
3.65
3.57
3.18
1.37
1.93
3.63
3.05
3.62
1.10
1.47
1.41
3.10
3.60
3.57

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|

-.82
-.07
-2.28
-2.92
-2.40
-.31
-.34
-2.69
-2.68
-2.66
-2.65
-2.65
-1.57
-2.18
-.37
-.93
-2.63
-2.05
-2.62
-.10
-.47
-.41
-2.10
-2.60
-2.57

| -1.20 |
|
-.28 |
| -3.30 |
| -10.71 |
| -3.66 |
|
-.62 |
|
-.65 |
| -5.20 |
| -5.14 |
| -5.03 |
| -4.94 |
| -4.92 |
| -2.69 |
| -3.05 |
|
-.69 |
| -1.32 |
| -4.75 |
| -2.76 |
| -4.69 |
|
-.33 |
|
-.80 |
|
-.74 |
| -2.87 |
| -4.57 |
| -4.40 |

-1.23
-4.26
1.46
4.06
1.72
-2.66
-2.53
2.53
2.51
2.46
2.42
2.41
2.16
1.26
-2.41
-1.00
2.33
1.00
2.30
-3.92
-2.11
-2.29
1.10
2.24
2.16

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|

5
53
2
36
5
55
55
7
8
23
31
35
10
40
55
6
35
14
31
52
45
47
42
21
22

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|

48
48
68
33
33
20
19
56
3
52
60
41
64
64
23
34
50
50
4
49
49
57
31
28
28

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|

AC05
F10R
AC02
R07
AC05
F12R
F12R
AC07
AC08
E05
R02
R06
P02
M04
F12R
AC06
R06
P06
R02
F09R
F02R
F04R
M06
E03
E04

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|

R48224213
R48224213
R68133523
R33124213
R33124213
R20233423
R19232423
R56144253
R03133113
R52133213
R60112253
R41123522
R64124113
R64124113
R23232413
R34223213
R50123223
R50123223
R04132242
R49143243
R49143243
R57212212
R31223232
R28234123
R28234123

|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|

|
1 |
1 |
3.00 | -2.00 | -2.68 |
.92 |
3 |
19 | AC03 | R19232423 |
|
4 |
1 |
2.07 | -1.07 | -1.49 |
-.71 |
44 |
19 | F01R | R19232423 |
|
1 |
1 |
3.06 | -2.06 | -2.79 |
1.03 |
2 |
19 | AC02 | R19232423 |
|
4 |
1 |
2.01 | -1.01 | -1.42 |
-.83 |
44 |
20 | F01R | R20233423 |
|
2 |
1 |
3.58 | -2.58 | -4.47 |
2.19 |
38 |
8 | M02
| R08144313 |
|
1 |
1 |
3.02 | -2.02 | -2.72 |
.96 |
11 |
11 | P03
| R11132223 |
|
4 |
1 |
2.04 | -1.04 | -1.45 |
-.77 |
45 |
39 | F02R | R39224343 |
|
2 |
1 |
3.58 | -2.58 | -4.43 |
2.17 |
1 |
54 | AC01 | R54122212 |
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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